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Quando Io ebbi concluso quel corso di studi, al cui termine 
si era accolti nel numero dei dotti, io cominciai a pensare in modo 
del tutto opposto. Compresi infatti di trovarmi avviluppato in tanti 
dubbi e tanti errori da arrivare a credere che tutto il mio impegno 
per istruirmi non mi avesse dato altro vantaggio che quello di 
farmi scoprire sempre piu ’ profondamente la mia ignoranza.
Cartesio (Dissertano de Methodo, pp 2-3)

Summary
This dissertation investigates issues concerning export quotas and tariffs within a 
general equilibrium (GE) framework, under assumptions of both perfect and imperfect 
competitive markets, when trade is all intraindustry. The dissertation addresses 
important, though relatively neglected, contemporary trade policy issues in the 
developing world, such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and optimal export 
taxes. Given the complexity of the GE analysis with increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition, I also employ computational techniques in order to better 
understand the economic implications o f trade policies, especially with regard to the 
impact on welfare, which is often analytically ambiguous. The empirical analysis has 
been applied to Turkey, being a middle-income developing country which still applies 
high tariffs and export quotas. However, the empirical findings have a wider 
application. Firstly, I provide a different rationale from the standard literature as to 
why VERs are accepted by exporting firms. The essence of the argument Is that a VER 
serves as an institution to prevent entry and, therefore, to protect the monopoly power 
o f incumbent firms in both domestic and export markets. The impact on social welfare 
is indeterminate. However, numerical results for Turkey support the conjecture that 
with the elimination of a VER an exporting country is worse off, and that this welfare 
loss is larger, the smaller the country in question. Secondly, I argue that an export tax, 
considered to be optimal in a partial equilibrium (PE) framework, might be sub-optimal 
in a GE setting. In fact, all numerical simulations support the view that the PE export 
tax leads to a social welfare loss. I also demonstrate analytically that the PE formula is 
upwardly biased. Finally, a further issue has been analysed, which refers to the impact 
o f regional agreements on income distribution and employment, which are two of the 
most contentious issues among economists and policy-makers, in the areas o f tariffs 
and quotas. Given the complexity of the analysis in a multi-household and multi-factor 
framework, I apply a GE model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition 
to study the impact on welfare, income distribution and employment o f the recent 
customs union (CU) agreement between Turkey and the European Union (EU) on the 
Turkish economy. The numerical results indicate that the CU is not trade diverting. 
Most importantly, this agreement might substantially raise income inequality between 
urban and rural household members, suggesting that analysis based only on 
assumptions, which characterise the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, might be misleading. 
In addition, the CU favour the creation of 148 thousands new jobs, mainly with basic 
skills. So, in conclusion, I argue that (i) VERs arc agreed to protect the monopoly 
power o f incumbent firms and to enhance possibly the welfare o f the exporting 
country; (ii) export taxes are upwardly biased and non-optimal; (iii) the regional 
agreement with the EU raises Turkish employment and might raise income inequality 
among household members.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Outline
The aim of this thesis is to analysis a set o f trade policy issues within a GE framework. 
Although tariffs and quotas are often used as a source o f  government revenues, 
especially by developing countries, issues such as the economic impact o f  optimal 
export taxes and export quota have been relatively neglected by the contemporary 
economic literature. In fact, the “new trade theory” and, to a certain extent, the 
“strategic trade theory” concentrated their analysis on import tariffs and subsidies.1 For 
example, in a seminal paper by Krugman (1979), he argues that there are mutual gains 
from trade as, by enlarging markets, international trade would allow both a greater 
variety of goods and a greater scale of production.2 Whereas, in a strategic duopoly 
Cournot game, Brander and Spencer (1985) show that governments could enhance the 
welfare of their nations by subsidising the exporting firm. In contrast, Eaton and 
Grossman (1986) find that the Brander-Spencer policy conclusion would be the
1 The “new trade theory” began with models facing imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale. Alongside the gains from trade due to the conventional comparative advantage, several authors 
argue that, by enlarging markets, international trade raises competition and allows greater 
exploitation of economies of scale (Krugman, 1979, 1981; Lancaster, 1980; Dixit and Norman, 1980; 
Helpman, 1981; Ethier, 1982). The “strategic trade theory” began with work by Brander and Spencer 
(1983, 1985), where they argue that governments could raise national incomes at other countries' 
expense by suppoiting national firms in international competition.
1 However, Krugman, in a subsequent study, shows that under increasing returns to scale, protection 
of a domestic firm by an import tariff can shift the equilibrium to the firm's advantage in the export 
market by lowering its marginal cost of production (Krugman, 1984).
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opposite, if  the domestic firm and the foreign firm behave in a Bertrand fashion. In this 
case, they argue that an export tax is required for the profit-shifting motive to exist. 
However, if  domestic consumption is introduced in this modelling framework, the 
impact o f an export tax on welfare is no longer unambiguous, depending upon the 
precise forms o f the demand and cost functions (Eaton and Grossman, 1986). It must 
be stressed that the analyses o f  Brander-Spencer and Eaton-Grossman focused only on 
the profit-shifting motive, and neglected the effects o f  trade policies on terms o f  trade 
(Rodrik, 1989). In addition, their analyses are based upon a strategic game among two 
firms, the domestic firm and the foreign firm. By so doing, they exclude a priori the 
effects o f  trade policies on the degree o f competition among domestic firms and on 
firms’ domestic production.
Similarly, Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) use a duopoly model with Bertrand 
competition and differentiated products to show that a VER induces the domestic firm 
o f the importing country to become an industry price leader, and therefore obtain the 
profits o f  a Stackelberg leader, as the foreign firm makes the credible commitment that 
it will not increase the level o f  exports when the domestic firm increases its price. 
Hence, the imposition o f  a VER at or close to the free trade level increases prices and 
profits to both the domestic and the foreign firms. However, their models examine the 
VER effects on an importing economy and limit the analysis o f the exporting country 
simply to the firm’s profits.
I examine the impact o f export quota (Chapter 2) and optimal export taxes 
(Chapter 3) in a GE setting when firms produce for the export market as well as for the 
domestic market. Three key assumptions are postulated: (i) imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale; (ii) trade policies have a direct influence on firms’ domestic 
production decisions; (iii) foreign trade is all intraindustry. If the first assumption has 
been adopted in order to derive the number o f firms in equilibrium, the second 
assumption has been introduced in order to analyse VERs in a context o f  a strategic 
trade policy (Chapter 2) and to examine optimal export taxes when markets are
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segmented (Chapter 3). The third assumption has been required in order to distinguish 
the price vector of domestic goods from the price vectors o f exports and imports. 
Within this modelling framework, I examine the economic impact o f export taxes, 
which are believed to be optimal in a PE framework, and export quotas in the form of 
VER agreements, the former under the assumption of constant conjectures, the latter 
under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. It is important to stress that Eaton and 
Grossman (1986) show that the form of optimal trade policies depends critically on the 
nature of the competition between firms; whereas Venables (1994), by using a 
numerical multi-regional PE model, shows that the impact o f trade policies is not 
significantly important to the different equilibrium concepts employed.
Given the complexity of the GE analysis, under the assumptions that markets 
are segmented, technology exhibits internal economies o f  scale, and trade is 
intraindustry, I also employ numerical GE models to verify if the qualitative effects 
lead to quantitative aspects o f significant magnitude; and if the analytical ambiguity of 
the policy effects on some o f the variables, such as welfare and firm size, can be 
numerically resolved. The empirical analysis has been applied to Turkey firstly, because 
it is a middle income developing country, which periodically renews VER agreements 
on textiles and apparel with the EU (GATT, 1994) and within the Multifibrc 
Arrangement (MFA) scheme; secondly, because of a long tradition o f  planning, the 
State Institute of Statistics o f Turkey periodically estimates reliable Input-Output 
tables for the nation as a whole, which are a fundamental data set for the compilation 
o f a benchmark needed for the calibration of Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) 
models.1
A third issue, which is a hot topic among economists and policy-makers, has 
been examined: that is, the impact of regional agreements on income distribution and 3
3 The calibration procedure consists of estimating unknown parameters, such that the observed values 
of endogenous variables constitute an equilibrium of die numerical model. It is important to stress that 
the numerical calibration does not involve any econometric testing procedure (Mansur and Whalley, 
1984).
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employment. Given the complexity of the GE analysis in a multi-household, multi­
labour, multi-sectoral framework, I follow the traditional computational GE 
methodology to numerically quantify the economic impact of the recent CU agreement 
between Turkey and the European Union (EU) on income distribution and employment 
in Turkey. The technique employed follows the Arrow-Debreu GE framework, 
elaborated in Arrow and Hahn (1971), where each consumer has an initial endowment 
and a set o f preferences; producers maximise profits with constant returns to scale 
technology; and where the standard features of excess demand functions (i.e. 
continuity, non-negativity and homogeneity of degree zero) and the Walras law (i.e. 
total value of all expenditures of households and firms is equal to total sales) apply.
It is vital to stress that both the analytical models in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
and the three AGE models in the three chapters, are static single country open 
economy models, where dynamic features and retaliation issues are neglected.
The motivation behind each of these studies is simple. The first model is 
motivated by the fact that a clear answer is still not given as to why small exporting 
countries agree to voluntary restrain their exports. It is generally accepted that 
exporting countries receive quota rents, and they are fearful about other forms of 
protection by the competing importing country (Rosendorff, 1996). However, this 
argument cannot explain the MFA scheme, where a large number o f small exporting 
countries periodically renew the level o f export quotas for each individual country. In 
addition, numerical results based on multircgional AGE models indicate that several 
developing countries suffer welfare losses from the MFA scheme (Trela and Whalley, 
1990; Francois, el al., 1995; Yang, et al., 1997). I show that incumbent firms keep 
renewing VERs agreements because these arc an instrument to protect these firms 
from domestic competition, and therefore to protect their monopoly power in both 
domestic and export markets. In addition, the numerical findings indicate that, as a 
consequence o f  the elimination o f  VERs in Turkish textiles and apparel, there is a
4
modest welfare loss under both quantity setting and price setting oligopolies, and this 
loss is larger, the smaller the country.
The second model concerns export taxes. The standard PE literature with 
imperfect competition (Rodrik, 1989; Helpman and Krugman, 1989; RHK, 
henceforth) argues that a positive optimal export tax policy can be pursued. However, 
the estimated optimum tax rates are generally very high, normally around 30-40%. 
Policy suggestions o f  this kind are obviously not welcome among policy-makers and 
industry associations. In addition, export taxes are not typically adopted to raise the 
welfare o f  a nation. I show that the RHK export tax in a GE framework has an 
ambiguous impact on welfare and that the Rodrik’s formula is upwardly biased. 
Numerical estimates for Turkey indicate that the introduction o f the RHK export tax 
leads to a social welfare loss, which is much larger if part o f  firms’ costs is sunk.
The third model has been constmcted to analyse the impact o f  the recent CU 
agreement between Turkey and the EU on income distribution and employment in 
Turkey.4 Trade and income distribution, and trade and employment are now two hot 
topics among trade theorists (Krugman, 1995, 1997; Wood, 1994)). Thus, 1 build a 
multi-household model to quantify the impact o f  this regional policy on income 
distribution and employment in Turkey, by employing two alternative assumptions on 
real wages, one fixed and one flexible, as also suggested by Krugman (1995). The 
numerical results indicate that despite the validity o f  the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
overall income inequality rises in the scenario with fixed wages, suggesting that an 
analysis based only on the functional distribution o f  income and under the assumption 
o f flexible wages might be misleading. In addition, the computed estimates indicate 
that 148000 new jobs would be created, as a result o f  the CU.
4 Harrison, et al. (1997) and Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) analyse the CU between Turkey and the EU, 
by using AGE models with a representative consumer, thus neglecting issues on income distribution.
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The thesis consists of five chapters in all. Chapter 1 introduces the general aim 
of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the economic implications of the elimination o f a VER 
for an exporting country. Chapter 3 examines the economic implications of what is 
believed to be a PE optimal export tax in a GE framework. Chapter 4 analysis the 
economic implications, the income distribution effects, and the impact on employment 
of the 1996 CU agreement between Turkey and the EU, applying a multi-household, 
multi-labour GE model to the Turkish economy, and Chapter 5 provides a summary, 
some conclusions and the perspectives for future research. The appendices related to 
each chapter are reported in the last section of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Why Exporting Countries Agree to Voluntary Export Restraints: 
The Oligopolistic Power of the Foreign Supplier
[2.1] Introduction
The economic literature on VERs was developed in the eighties, when such 
agreements started to be used internationally as an instrument to protect the domestic 
economy from international competition, without breaking the GATT rules. The 
standard analysis o f a VER, in the context o f perfectly competitive markets, identifies 
three effects: the higher price paid by consumers o f the importing country, the transfer 
of rents associated with artificially high prices from the importing to the exporting 
country, and the lower supply price for exports, as the marginal revenue product 
decreases.5 It can be shown that the global welfare loss for a two-country economy as 
a whole is represented by the loss in the consumer surplus faced by the importing 
country, plus the loss in the producer surplus faced by the exporting country. In an 
imperfectly competitive market Harris (1985), Krishna (1989) and Rosendorff (1996)
' de Melo and Winters (1*190) estimate a 9% fall of the marginal revenue product of factors employed 
in the Korean footwear industry leading the industry to contract, as a consequence of a VER 
agreement with die US in die period 1977-81. This econometric finding supports die view that a VER 
decreases die supply price of exports. The economic effects of VERs are surveyed by Hamilton (1985) 
and Pomlret (1989).
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show that a further effect arises since quantitative restrictions may increase the market 
power of some firms. However, their models examine the VER effects on an importing 
economy and limit the analysis of the exporting country simply to the firm’s profits. 
Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) use a duopoly model with Bertrand competition and 
differentiated products in a partial equilibrium setting to show that a VER induces the 
domestic firm o f the importing country to become an industry price leader (assumed in 
Harris, but derived endogenously by Krishna), and therefore obtain the profits o f a 
Stackelberg leader, as the foreign firm makes the credible commitment that it will not 
increase the level o f  exports when the domestic firm increases its price. Hence, the 
imposition o f a VER at or close to the free trade level increases prices and profits to 
both the domestic and the foreign firms.6 Roscndorff claims that an exporting country 
agrees a VER for fear o f antidumping actions or other forms o f administered 
protection by the importing country.7 Su/.umura and Ishikawa (1997) extend the 
Harris’s result to the welfare implications o f a VER. They show that, whether the 
duopolists compete in prices or quantities, a VER set equal to the free-trade level o f 
exports enhances the welfare o f the importing country if, and only if, it reduces the 
profits of the exporting firm. Kemp, et al. (1997) show that the Su/.umura-Ishikawa 
proposition survives in a general equilibrium setting if, and only if, the two goods arc 
substitutes, the own price elasticities are larger than the cross price elasticities, and the 
price effects outweigh the income effects o f the trade policy.
Most o f the literature on VERs focuses upon the effect o f a VER on an 
importing economy. The implication for an exporting country have been mainly 
analysed with empirical models, de Melo and Winters (1993), for example, argue that 
with a VER the contraction in the restrained industry is associated with spillovers of
6 Harris (1985) argues that the introduction of a VER serves as a collusive local point lor domestic 
pricing. Hence, a VER may be an instrument to hold and reinforce the oligopolistic power of 
established domestic firms of the importing country, rather than an instrument for import substitution.
7 Rosendorff shows that the government of the importing country prefers a VER to an optimal tariff if 
the domestic firm’s profits, multiplied by a factor indicating the lobbying pressure on the government, 
are greater than the losses in tariff revenues.
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exports to unrestricted markets.8 Applying a partial equilibrium econometric model to 
the Taiwan footwear industry, they also found that this country suffered a welfare loss 
as a consequence o f a VER. Trela and Whalley (1990) report estimates of national and 
global welfare costs o f  both developed country tariffs and bilateral quotas on textiles 
and apparel using an AGE model with constant returns to scale. When bilateral quotas 
alone are removed, results clearly show that the developed countries and the vast 
majority of developing countries gain. Based on 1986 data, the total gain has been 
estimated to be of around $ 22 billion. On aggregate, developing countries gain around 
$ 3 billion.9 Similar results for developing countries are found by Yang (1994) and 
Yang, etal. (1997).
Francois, et al. (1995), by using various types o f multiregional AGE models 
characterised by perfect competition, or imperfect competition, or endogenous capital 
stock, found that the elimination of the MFA would result in welfare gains for most of 
developing countries, and for developing countries as a whole."’ In contrast, Harrison, 
et al. (1997), by using a similar modelling approach, found that the elimination o f the 
MFA would result in welfare gains for few countries, and in losses for developing 
countries as a whole. They argue that this aggregate welfare loss is due to the transfer 
o f MFA quota rents from developing to industrialised countries. Only in the long run, 
after capital stock has optimally adjusted, do they estimate an aggregate welfare gain 
for developing countries as a whole. Similar results have been also obtained by Hertcl, *
* However, in a previous study, by investigating the effects of VERs on resource allocation in the 
Korean leather footwear industry, de Melo and Winters (1990) estimate that die reduction of the 
industry size is mainly due to the difficulty of switching sales towards markets which are not 
constrained by VERs.
9 In a subsequent study, Trela and Whalley (1995) focus their attention upon the extra costs on 
exporting countries of their own internal quota-allocation procedures. Since quotas are typically 
alhxaitcd to established rather than new and more efficient firms, the cost of quota restriction in their 
model is estimated to be $ 23 billion per year compared to the $ 3 billion without internal quota- 
allocation schemes.
10 The main feature of the MFA is the use of bilateral agreements on export quotas to regulate textiles 
and apparel trade. VERs are typically agreed so as to limit textiles and apparel exports from 
developing countries. Under the MFA, in addition to bilateral quotas, importing countries also levy 
non-discriminalory tariffs (Yang, et al. 1997).
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et al. (1995). These empirical findings support the dominant view that several 
exporting countries, especially small countries, are forced, rather than agree 
voluntarily, to export restraints.
This paper explores the economic effects o f  a VER on a foreign supplier when 
the VER also modifies the degree o f  competition in the exporting country’s domestic 
market, under both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. 1 show that the elimination o f a 
VER certainly leads to a more efficient allocation o f  resources, favouring the 
expansion o f  the previously restrained industry. However, the elimination o f  an export 
quota causes an increase in the producer price o f  exports, which brings about a rise in 
the composite producer price. The export expansion and the higher average cost allow 
less efficient firms to break even. As the number o f the competing symmetric firms 
within the industry increases, the firms’ perceived elasticity o f  export demand rises. 
As a result, the power o f  incumbent firms declines regardless o f  the firms’ 
conjectures. However, the smaller the country, the larger the possibility that the 
monopoly power in the domestic market declines more than in the export market. 
With regard to the impact on firm size, it positively depends upon the size o f  export 
growth for the industry as a whole, and on the impact on firm s’ domestic production, 
and negatively on the extent o f  new entry.
From the social point o f view, I show that the elimination o f a VER has two 
positive, two negative and two indeterminate effects on the welfare o f  the exporting 
country. The positive effects are due to the increase in the producer price o f  exports, 
as foreign consumers are more sensitive to price changes, rather than to quota 
premium variation (export producer price effect);11 and to increased product diversity, 
as domestic brands enter in pursuit o f positive profits (variety effect). The negative 
effects on welfare are due to the loss o f  the economic rent (rent loss effect), and the 
greater cost o f  purchasing intermediate inputs (increased intermediate inputs cost
11 In models with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, with the elimination of a VER, the 
rise in the supply price of exports is due to the fact that the marginal revenue product rises (de Melo and 
Winters, 1990).
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effect). In fact, I show that the impact on the costs o f intermediate inputs might be 
substantial and might be larger than the rise in the producer price o f  exports. The 
impact on the consumer price index (consumer price effect) and on total production 
(global efficiency effect) cannot be classified. Thus, the welfare implications o f VERs 
on an exporting economy are analytically indeterminate.
In order to comprehend the significance o f  the analytical results, to understand 
better the uncertain outcome on welfare and firm size, and to examine how sensitive 
the results are to alternative equilibrium concepts, an AGE model with the restrained 
sectors facing increasing returns to scale, identical firms, and free entry/exit has been 
built. This model studies the main effects o f  the elimination o f VERs on welfare, 
output, resource allocation, average cost, firm size, concentration o f  the industry and 
price cost margin, under both Bertrand and Cournot conjectures. The model has been 
applied to the Turkish textiles and apparel industries, which have been subject to 
VERs in relation to the European market since 1982 for textiles and 1986 for apparel, 
and since then periodically renewed and now broken as a consequence o f  the recent 
customs union agreement (GATT, 1994). The numerical results clearly indicate that 
regardless o f  market conjectures, as a consequence o f the elimination o f  VERs, the 
contraction o f  industry concentration is substantial, whilst it is modest regarding the 
negative impact on price cost margins. In addition, it supports the hypothesis that the 
negative welfare effects dominate the positive effects with trade, thus decreasing the 
aggregate welfare o f  a nation, although by a small amount. It also confirms the 
analytical result that the smaller the country the larger the negative economic 
implications o f  the abrogation o f  VERs for incumbent firms. Similarly, there is a 
larger welfare loss for the nation as a whole. The quantitative results are less sensitive 
to equilibrium concepts. However, incumbent firms would be worse o ff  in terms o f  
new entry, size and average cost under Bertrand conjectures, as they are inherently 
more competitive. Hence, it seem s that industry associations, with the consent o f
11
policy-makers o f  exporting countries, reach agreements about VERs for rational 
economic reasons.
[2.2) A model with imperfect competition and symmetric firms
A VER is an entry barrier in the market for exports. It favours the concentration o f  the 
industry, and allows established firms, especially those which receive the export 
licence, to better exploit economies o f  scale by producing at lower average cost. Since 
the break-even price for potential entrants is the average cost, a VER can also be 
regarded as an effective entry barrier in the domestic market. Thus, the voluntary 
acceptance o f  export restraints not only generates forms o f  oligopoly in the market for 
exports, but also modifies the degree o f  competition in the foreign supplier’s domestic 
market. I model the oligopolistic behaviour o f  firms as a noncooperative game, where 
the stable solution is represented by a Nash equilibrium in prices or quantities. To 
justify that, it can be argued that a VER may facilitate the learning process o f  each 
established firm with regard to the reaction functions o f  other competing firms, such 
that each incumbent firm chooses the amount o f  output (exported and sold in the 
domestic market) in order to maximise its own profit, given the output or the price 
choice o f  other competing firms. So a VER may serve as an institution to protect an 
established domestic oligopoly o f  an exporting country, which behaves in a Cournot 
or Bertrand fashion.
The model presented in this section is an intraindustry GE model with 
increasing returns to scale, segmented markets and symmetric firms used to study the 
impact o f  the elimination o f a VER on the average cost, the number o f firms, firm 
size, industrial output, price cost margin and welfare, under both Bertrand and 
Cournot conjectures. I also assume the existence o f  sectors not subject to VERs, 
which face perfect competition and constant returns to scale. The latter sectors are
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indexed with crs, whilst the sectors subject to VERs are indexed with i. To represent 
all sectors o f  the economy, I use j  = i u  c rs .
To model domestic and foreign trade, I assume that each firm in sector i and 
each industry crs employ factors and intermediate inputs to produce two imperfect 
substitute goods, one sold in the domestic market and the other exported. The 
representative consumer gains utility from the consumption o f  domestic goods 
produced by the industry crs and their imperfect substitute imports, and from the 
consumption o f  a variety o f domestic goods produced by the sectors o f differentiated 
products and a variety o f  imperfect substitute imports. Also the sectoral intermediate 
demand, which is defined as a Leontief specification o f  sectoral output, is satisfied 
with the supply o f  domestic goods and imports.
(2.2.1) Technology and cost function
The production function o f  a single representative firm, © , is additively separable in 
<!>, and <t>2, and such that 3 20/(5<I>ld<I)2) > 0 :
(2.1) y, =©[«!», (*„ ),0 2 (/„ *,)]
= 0 i f  /, < l[ or k, < k[
where y, represents composite production o f  domestic goods and exports; x Jt denote 
intermediate inputs, assumed to be net complements; /, and k, represent labour and 
capital inputs; and i f  and k f  the fixed factor inputs needed to start the production 
process. Due to the presence o f  fixed setup costs, the production sets are not-convex.
I II
<1>2 is locally assumed to be twice differentiable, so that <1> 2 > 0 and <t2 < 0 .
The production possibility frontier o f  each firm is represented by
(2.2) y i=Q.(d„e,), > 0 , £2, > 0 , d2£l/(dd,de,)< 0 ,
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which locally is a separable, differentiable transformation curve of domestic goods ( d: ) 
and exports (e ,). The transformation curve is locally assumed to be twice differentiable
•t «•
with respect to dt and e ,, such that i2 (di) < 0 and Q (e,) < 0 .
The fixed factor inputs, i f  and k f  , multiplied by their respective returns, 
determine the firm’s fixed cost. It is important to emphasise the benefits for each firm 
of raising production, as each firm would bear a reduced fixed cost element per unit o f  
output. The total cost faced by each firm is the sum o f variable and fixed costs, hence 
the average cost ( aci ) to produce one unit of output is
where pj denotes the price vector of final and intermediate goods. The factor demands
o f each firm and the marginal cost equation can be derived by solving a standard dual 
problem. The marginal cost is independent of output, and is a function of factor prices 
and sector specific parameters.
The production function and the transformation curve for sectors facing perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale take respectively the following form:
where Ycrs denotes composite output, Dcr, domestic output, Ec„ exports, Lcrs labour, 
and Kc„ capital for the industry as a whole. 0 " ' is globally linear homogenous, 
additively separable in and <t>2r', and such that 3 20 rr'/(d<t>"'d<t>',” ) > 0 .  <t>™ is
twice differentiable. Q e" is globally linear homogenous, separable, differentiable and 
concave.
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5) Ycn = Q  c"{Dcrs,Em ),
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12.2.2] Number o f  firm s
The model is characterised by free entry/exit. One key feature o f the model is the 
definition of the profit function:
(2.6) K, = pd,d, + pe,e, - c,(d, +e i) - f ,
where it, denotes pure profits net o f rents from VERs, pd, the domestic price, pet 
the producer price o f exports, c, the marginal cost and f  the fixed cost. It does not 
include rents from VERs, because entry in the export market is restricted to those 
owning the licence to export. So economic rents can be still made by firms with the 
licence to export. In summary, the number of firms is endogenously determined by the 
zero profit condition: = 0 .
[2.2.3] Domestic and foreign demand functions
Armington (1969) argues that goods produced by industries located in different 
countries, but which compete in the same market, are imperfect substitute. The 
Armington specification is typically a CES function o f  domestically produced goods 
and imports. Thus approach is very useful to derive the demand for domestic goods 
( Di ) and the demand for imports ( Af,) by solving the Armington-dual problem:
(2.7) D,=<p,E'M 'V 'G ,
(2.8) Af, = (1 -< P ,)“' pw m ?1 p-‘ Qt ,
(2.9) Q , = f { H R , Pi) + X,
where Q, is the sum in quantities o f final demand ( / )  and intermediate demand ( X , ), 
HR denotes the representative consumer income, pw m t the fixed world price of 
imports, cp, a share parameter o f the Armington function, e, the elasticity of
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substitution between imports and domestic goods, p, = [cppd) '■ '*,
X, -  2 ^ apY, ■ (2.9) is the equilibrium condition in the goods market. The Marshallian
j
demand functions, / ,  are derived by solving a three stages utility maximisation 
problem, with the representative consumer lacing a convex indifference curve a la 
Dixit-Stiglitz (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In the first stage, consumers allocate income 
between goods which are produced by the differentiated industries; in the second 
stage, they allocate income between imports and domestic competing goods; and, in 
the third stage, they allocate income between the differentiated domestic products and 
the differentiated imports.
An oligopolistic profit maximising firm is characterised by a decreasing 
marginal revenue curve in the domestic market as well as in the market for exports. 
This implies that domestic demand and export demand ought to he downward sloping. 
The solution o f the Armington-dual problem leads to the desired downward sloping 
domestic demand curve |see  (2.7)], whilst the industry export demand function ( £ , )  is
assumed negative and iso-elastic;
(2.10) E, = AiPwe~% ,
where pwe, is the price paid by foreign consumers for goods under VER, T), the 
absolute value of the foreign price elasticity and A, a positive constant.
The Armington specification and an infinitely elastic export demand function 
are postulated for sectors facing perfect competition and constant returns to scale. 12
12 Note that the criticism by Whalley and Young (1984), about the external sector closure rules in 
AGE models, does not hold in this modelling framework for two reasons: firstly, the exchange rate 
does not appear in the model; secondly, the foreign import-supply function is assumed to be infinitely 
elastic.
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/ 2.2.41 Price mark-ups and firm s' perceived elasticities
The fact that the domestic market and the export market are segmented implies that 
firms maximise (2.6) with respect to both dt and e ,. The profit maximising conditions 
result in the Lemer mark-ups formula:
where X, and 8, represent the firm’s perceived price elasticities of domestic demand 
and export demand, respectively.
x , can be derived by considering the consumer three-stage budgeting 
procedure. To derive 8 ,,  I also assume that a hypothetical foreign consumer purchases 
different brands of the industry under VER.
In the third stage of the budgeting procedure, the representative domestic 
consumer maximises the following subutility function subject to the budget devoted to 
the purchase o f domestic goods:
where , which is greater than one, is the elasticity o f substitution among n domestic 
varieties; are demand parameters describing the consumer preferences for a brand s
represents the price index (or unit expenditure function).
Similarly, the foreign consumer in the purchase o f brands subject to a VER 
faces the following problem
(2. 11) 1pdt 1 -  —r -  C,,
k
( 2. 12)
n
-i>'C i,)
produced by a sector i, d u , which are priced at p d is; and pd, = pd„
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"*«\Ei = Z^y„ *<•
«is 4=1
•lMlH)
where , which is greater than one, is the elasticity of substitution among n exported 
brands; Y„ are demand parameters describing the preferences o f  the foreign consumer 
for a brand s exported by sector i, e „ ; pwe^ denote their price, and
Utihty maximisation implies that the demand for product varieties is a negative 
function of the price of the varieties and a positive function o f the aggregate price 
index. In fact, the first order conditions yield:
As a result, (2.10) and (2.14) imply that > T),.
As already described in section [2.2.3], domestic demand and export demand 
have different characteristics. Domestic demand is derived by solving a dual problem, 
whilst export demand is assumed to be iso-elastic. So two different approaches have 
been employed to derive x, and 8, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, x, 
has been obtained following Harrison, et al. (1994), who in their model employ the 
Armington specification;13 whereas 8, has been obtained following Smith and 
Venables (1988), where a iso-elastic demand function is postulated. Under both 
Bertrand and Cournot conjectures, the profit maximising conditions take the form of 
(2.11) and (2.12). However, if firms maximise profits given rivals’ prices (i.e. Bertrand 
competition), then X( and 8, take the form,
13 Harrison, et al. (1994) derive the price elasticity of demand under Cournot conjectures and under 
the assumption that the price elasticity of aggregate demand (%,) is unity, whilst I assume that x, is 
endogenously specified. The Bertrand formula is my derivation.
n ~  ~ (!-£,) '
pwe, = pweh is the price of the aggregate, £ ,.
4=1
(2.13) dis = P >  A M 1 pd«  4' >
(2.14) eis = y j ‘ Efpwe,■*' pw elt
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change. Whereas the direction o f  the change of the variables would remain 
substantially similar.15
[2.2.51 Rents and the supply price o f  exports
The policy experiment performed in this study is the evaluation of the impact of the 
elimination o f a VER, when rents accrue to firms. So I assume that the industry 
associations of an exporting country already agreed with an importing country to 
restrain their level o f exports. This implies that the government does not intervene in 
allocating export licenses and is not the recipient o f  the rents. The rents accrue to the 
private sector, and each firm receives a rent (ver;) which is equal to the ad valorem 
quota premium parameter ( qr, ) times exports, evaluated at pe, \
(2.19) verj = q^pe^j
The producer price of exports ( pe , ) is equal to the agreed price adjusted by
qr,:
(2.20) pe, = pwe>
1 + '
As I am interested in examining the economic implications of the elimination of 
VERs, qr{ is assumed to be exogenous. When qr, is zero, the rent disappears and
pe, = pw e,.
15 It is important to stress that a similar conclusion has been drawn by Venables (1994). By using a 
multiregional computable partial equilibrium model of trade under imperfect competition, Venables 
finds that the gains from an import tariff and an export subsidy are not significantly sensitive to the 
change of the equilibrium concept. The equilibrium types used in his study are the cases of price and 
quantity competition, segmented markets, and oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
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¡2.2.6] Representative household income
The sources of household income are value added, pure profits, plus the economic 
rents which originate from sales on foreign markets:
where the first term represents the value added, that is the value o f  production minus 
the cost o f intermediate inputs. In order to study the impact of VERs alone, it is 
assumed free entry/exit, so that the number of firms adjusts until pure profits are zero.
[2.3] Analytical results
¡2.3.1 ] The impact on the export producer price and the average cost
If the VER agreement is broken and the country can have an impact on its terms of 
trade, the immediate effect is a lower level o f pwe, and an increase o f  the demand for 
exports (2.10). However, the producer price of exports rises if foreign consumers are 
more sensitive to price changes, rather than to ad valorem quota premium variation. In 
fact, by using (2.10) and (2.20), pe{ can be written as
Since consumers are more sensitive to changes of prices gross o f  equivalent taxes, 
rather than to the variation of the equivalent tax rate itself, I argue that the elimination
(2 .21)
(2.22) p e ^ A ^ E ^ i l  + qn)'1.
By differentiating the latter expression with respect to qrt , then
(2.23)
where V , = -[(l + qrt)/Ei]dEi/dq^ . Then, dpe,/dqp < 0 if, and only if, r|, > y , .
21
o f a VER raises the producer price o f  exports. Obviously, the smaller the country (that 
is the larger rj, ), the greater the negative impact on p e ,. In summary, pe, under free 
trade is greater than its value under VER, but smaller than pwe, under VER.
The composite producer price ( py , ) is equal to
(2.24) py, = ^ - p d ,+ ^ -  p e ,.
Since qr; has a secondary impact on pd, and D, ,  then also py, rises as a consequence 
o f  the VER abrogation. Given the zero profit condition, then, dac, / dqr, < 0 . In 
summary:
PROPOSITION 2.1: The elimination o f  a VER increases the producer price o f  
exports. The liberalisation process is thus associated with a rise in the average cost, 
which is larger, the smaller the country.
[2.3.2] The impact on the number o f  firms
The profit maximisation conditions can be also written as:
(2.25) +
(2.26) p e , [ l - ( l  + X,X",Tl , ) ’ l ] = c ,,
where to, is the absolute value o f  the price elasticity o f  domestic demand and X, the 
firms’ conjectural variation parameter, which for simplicity is assumed to be equal in 
both markets.16 By multiplying (2.25) by D, and (2.26) by E, , and rearranging, the
16 Appendix 2.A shows that under Bertrand conjectures to, = e, -  (e, -  x, )*?,, whilst under Coumot 
conjectures a), = [l/e, -  (l/e, -  1/x, )T, ] '.
22
zero profit condition and the assumption that the marginal cost is independent of 
output yield
(2.27)
[ l  +  A., pd,D , ! pe t£ , j |
i ft . *1, J]
1/2
The reduced form for n, is very simple to interpret. Firstly, an expansion of
domestic sales or export sales invites entry; secondly, markets, which are characterised 
by a greater price elasticity, fear more competition, than those characterised by a 
smaller price elasticity; thirdly, the larger the fixed cost to produce one unit of output, 
the smaller the number of firms in equilibrium; finally, markets, which are characterised 
by a lower degree of competition (i.e. a larger ~k, ), allow a larger number of firms in 
equilibrium, which cooperate to a certain extent.
The total differential o f (2.27) with respect to qr: yields
(2.28) i f  f pd,D,  ^ pe,E, f
1 d(pd,D¡) pd,D, dm, 1 d(pe,E, )
2 [l+k, ta, t|, J CO, dqr, CO ,2 dqr; T | , dqr\
Given the secondary impact o f qr, on the variables related to domestic production and 
domestic consumption, the elimination o f  a VER, by raising export sales, determines 
the entry of new firms: dnjdqr, < 0 . So,
PROPOSITION 2.2: The elimination o f  a VER raises the number o f firm s in 
equilibrium.
It Is important to stress that markets characterised by an infinite demand elasticity do 
not determine the number of firms in equilibrium. This feature is important to explain 
the empirical finding in section [2.4.2.1], where a third unrestricted export market is 
introduced.
23
/ 2 .3 .3 ]  The im p a c t on the p r ic e -c o s t m argin
(2.16) and (2.18) clearly show that, with the elimination of a VER, as the number of 
firms rises, each producer faces a more elastic export demand curve, under both 
Cournot and Bertrand competition. This implies that with the elimination o f  a VER, 
the price cost margin in the export market declines. In contrast, the impact on z, also 
depends upon the impact on T, and Xt- However, by differentiating (2.15 )-(2 .18) by 
qr, , the incumbent firms’ power in the domestic market would also fall, and at a larger
rate than the drop in the export market, if
(2.29) / \ d*¥, , dy,X, -e ,  +dqr, dqrt J > (Ç, -  h
under Bertrand conjectures, and if
J__lW , T, dXi ] -tli) dn,
Xt ejctyr, x i dqr, J dqr,
under Cournot conjectures. It is clear that, given the curvature of the foreign
consumer’s preferences ), the smaller the country (that is, the larger rj, ) the greater
the possibility that the price cost margin would fall more in the domestic market as a
result o f a VER abrogation.
(2.30)
Ç i e i
r j ___l ì dnl
Ixi E J
nidqr,
PROPOSITION 2.3: The elimination o f a VER leads to a fall o f incumbent firm s’ 
monopoly power in the export market. The impact on the monopoly power in the 
domestic market is ambiguous. However, the smaller the country, the greater the 
possibility that the price cost margin would decline more in the domestic market than 
in the export market.
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[2 .3 .4 ]  The im p a c t o n  f i r m  s ize
The impact on firm size is ambiguous. Since dYJdqr; = y,(dn,/dqr,) + n,(dy,/dqr,), 
where Y, = nly l ; and since, by aggregating firm s’ domestic output and exports, the 
total derivative o f  production for the industry as a whole with respect to qr: is
dYJdqr, = Q l)(dD fidqrl ) + £ lk (dEJdqrl) ,  where Q.,, and S2( respectively denote
the partial derivative o f  composite production with respect to domestic output and
exports for the industry as a whole, the latter two expressions can be rearranged as
. . .  dy, Q f dE, 1 / _ , \ d n ,  _  dd,
(2.31) - 7 ^  = — ~ - T ^ ------ ( y ,-£ 2 D4 ) - ^  + £2D—
dqr, n, dqr; n, dqr; dqr;
With the elimination o f  the quota premium, the first term represents the positive 
impact o f  an export expansion for the industry as a whole. The second term denotes 
the negative impact o f  returns to scale, as a larger number o f  firms results in the less 
efficient exploitation o f  fixed inputs (note that £2„d, < y , , i f  0 ^  < 1, where 0 W
denotes the elasticity o f  composite production with respect to domestic output.).17 
Finally, the third term denotes the capability o f  firms to sell in the domestic market 
after new entry has occurred. I expect it to be negative, since given the domestic 
demand, a larger number o f  firms implies a fall in per firm domestic production. 
Hence, despite the benefits from export expansion, the size o f  incumbent firms might 
not expand.
PROPOSITION 2.4: The elimination o f  a VER raises the size o f  incumbent firms i f  
and only if, export expansion outweighs the negative effects o f  both inefficiently 
exploiting economies o f  scale and o f  trading in the domestic market.
17 Note that i l Dd, <y, implies i l u/ ( y jd :) < 1.
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On the basis o f  the results on average cost, number o f  firms, price cost margin 
and firm size, which are summarised by the first four propositions, incumbent firms 
will lobby the government or industry associations to keep signing VERs 
agreements.18
[2.3.5] The impact on the cost o f  primary and intermediate inputs
The lower price cost margin in the export market is obtainable only if  the marginal 
cost increase is larger than the rise in the producer price o f  exports (2.12). Since the 
model assumes the factor inputs to be homogenous among sectors, the impact on 
factor returns should not be large. This implies that the rise in the marginal cost is 
mainly due to the substantial rise in the intermediate inputs costs. This finding is very 
important when I w ill analyse the VER implication on welfare in section [2.3.7].
PROPOSITION 2.5: The elimination o f  a VER raises slightly the cost o f  primary 
factor inputs, and substantially the cost o f  intermediate inputs. The intermediate 
inputs cost rise might be larger than the rise in the export producer price.
To prove Proposition 2.5, it is necessary to subgroup the marginal cost into 
two components: the marginal cost related to the primary factor inputs ( v ,) and the 
marginal cost related to intermediate inputs ( in t,). Rearranging (2.10),
(2.32) v( + int, = pei {l - 1/|6( |} .
From Proposition 2.6, d Y J d q r ,< 0 , which implies that dLJdqr: < 0 and 
dK Jdqr; < 0 ,  where L, = « ,/,, and K , =n,k,. Consequently, dvjdqr, < 0 .  By using 
the chain rule, d b jd q r, < (db jdn , \d n , /dqr, ) .  Since d n jd q r ; < 0  (from Proposition
18 One might ask why incumbent firms would accept VERs in the first place, if some of them would exit 
the market. It could be argued that if export quotas in the first place are at, or close to, the tfee market 
equilibrium, incumbent firms would rationally welcome them.
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2.2) and d&Jdn, < 0 ,  then db,/dqr,>  0 . The latter finding, plus the fact that 
dpe, /  dqr, < 0 ,  imply that dcjdqr, < 0 .  Consequently, if  primary factor inputs are 
homogenous among sectors and the reduction o f  qr, just slightly varies v ,, then 
d  int ,/dqr, < 0 . In addition, the total differential o f  (2.32) with respect to qr, is
(2.33)
dv, d  int 
- +
dqr, dqr, 1 1 dqr,
The latter expression can be rearranged as
(2.34)
dv, , d int, (pe, - c , ) qn qr, dpe, dpe,
dqr, dqr, qr, [I8 * I d<lr. Pe, d4rt J d<l ri
Since dpe,/ dqr, < 0  and d\8,\/dqr, < 0 ,  then the first term on the right is positive, if 
the export producer price elasticity with respect to qr, is in absolute value larger that 
the elasticity o f  the inverse o f  the price cost margin in the export market with respect
, then dint,/dqr, >dpe,/ dqr, . In otherdv, (pe, -  c, to qr . If — -  < -— ----^
dqr. qr,
qr, 4|6,| qr dpe,
|8,| dqr, pe, dqr,
words, if  the cost o f primary factor inputs is just slightly affected, and the fall in the 
price cost margin in the export market is smaller than the rise in the producer price o f  
exports, the rise in the intermediate inputs cost would be larger than the rise in the 
producer price o f exports.
[2.3.6] The impact on output and trade volume
Given the characteristics o f  the transformation function (2.2), at industry level
dY, n  dD, n  dE,
( 2 . 35)  +
dqr, dqr, dqr,
The first term represents the effect on domestic demand, and the second term the
effect on exports. Given the secondary effect on D ,, and since dE, /dqr, < 0 ,  then
dYJdqr, < 0 .
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The trade balance can be written as
(2.36) Y ,P weiEt + Y jP e'r>Ecr, = Y ,P wmjM i •
i ers j
The derivative of (2.36) with respect to qr{ yields
(2.37) X pwe< dE,Mqr, + ^ JE,dpwei/dqri + ' £ p e cr,dE m /dqrl dMJdqr, ,
i i ers j
where, with the elimination o f  VERs, the first term denotes the positive quantity effect 
due to export expansion, the second term denotes the negative terms o f trade effect, 
the third term represents the negative effect o f other sectoral exports, as resources are 
reallocated, and the last term denotes the impact on imports.
PROPOSITION 2.6: The elimination o f a VER leads to the growth o f a previously 
restrained industry. The impact on trade volume is positive i f  and only i f  the quantity 
effect dominates the negative terms o f trade effect and the negative effects on other 
industrial exports.
These latter two results, easily obtainable with models facing constant returns 
to scale, are consistent with the general thinking about the effects of the elimination of 
a VER on an exporting country.
¡2.3.71 The impact on welfare
The sign of the welfare change can be measured by the ratio between the change in 
indirect utility function and the marginal utility o f income, which is equal to the
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difference between the change in income ( dH R ) and the change in the consumer price
If the numeraire of the model is the Laspeyre’s price index o f  domestic goods, 
the total differential o f household income, under the zero profit condition, yields:
The sum o f the first three terms yields the global efficiency effect. The first term 
denotes the negative production effect in the unrestricted sectors, as resources are 
reallocated to their detriment; the second term denotes the firm’s value added effect. 
This is indeterminate, since, from Proposition 2.4, the impact on firm output is 
ambiguous. The third term denotes the market structure effect, which has a twofold 
effect on welfare: (i) a negative effect arises if  economies o f  scale are exploited less 
efficiently; (ii) a positive effect arises if  a firm, by perceiving a more elastic domestic 
demand curve, decreases the price o f the ith domestic commodities, resulting in an 
expansion o f domestic consumer surplus. Hence, the global efficiency effect is 
indeterminate. The fourth term represents the gain from an increase in the producer 
price o f  exports, as described by Proposition 2.1, which generates a positive income 
effect (export producer price effect). The fifth term represents the loss from an 
increase in the cost o f  intermediate inputs, as described by Proposition 2.5 (increased 
intermediate inputs cost effect). The sixth term represents the loss from the annulment 
of the economic rent (rent loss effect). The last term represents the gains from variety,
19 v[p<'HR} is the household’s indirect utility function, where pt is the price vector of consumption 
goods. The total differential of v \p , , Hit] is d v \p ,, HR] -  (dV/dHR)dHR + (dV/dp, )dp, . Using
index ( ^ Q jd p j  ).19
i
(2.38)
the Roy’s identity, the latter expression can be written as dv[pr  ///?] = (3V/dHR) dHR- £  Qj dp1 ,
j
where QJ is the quantity demanded.
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as domestic firms enter in pursuit o f  positive profits, in accordance with Proposition 
2.2 (variety effect). Hence, the net gain on aggregate welfare is analytically 
indeterminate. It is important to stress that the literature on VERs focuses only on the 
rent loss effect and, to a certain extent, on the export producer price effect. The 
variety effect, the increased intermediate inputs cost effect and the indeterminate 
global efficiency effect have been neglected. The consumer price effect is negligible, 
as the Laspeyre’s price index o f  domestic goods is assumed constant and the world 
price o f  imports is not affected by the trade policy. In summary, the impact o f  the 
elimination o f  VERs on welfare is indeterminate, regardless o f  the size o f the country.
[2.4] An AGE model for Turkey
This section seeks to answer three main questions: Do the qualitative effects identified 
in the previous section [2.3] lead to quantitative aspects o f  significant magnitude? Can 
the analytical ambiguity o f  the policy effect on some o f the variables, in particular 
welfare and firm size, be numerically resolved? Is the impact o f  the elimination o f  a 
VER sensitive to the type o f competition employed? To answer these fundamental 
questions, I use an AGE model with the same features o f the analytical model applied 
to Turkey. This country is a good test case for two main reasons. Firstly, as a 
consequence o f  the recent customs union agreement with the EU, VERs on Turkish 
textiles and apparel have been abolished. Secondly, since the Turkish government 
does not officially recognise any quota restriction, VER agreements could only be 
made with Turkish industry associations (GATT, 1994). Thus, the rents from VERs 
accrued to the exporting firms which were able to obtain the export quota documents 
for deliveries to the EU.
The model contains two categories o f  industries: those where perfect 
competition and constant return to scale are assumed to prevail (18 sectors), and those
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which are characterised by increasing returns to scale (textiles and apparel).20 The 
production function has a two stage nested CES structure. At the first stage, I assume 
a Leontief function among primary factors o f  production and intermediate inputs, 
which are in turn assumed to be complements. At the second stage, the value added is 
characterised by constant returns variable costs with nonsunk setup costs. The 
elasticity o f substitution among the mobile labour and the mobile capital is assumed to 
be positive and to vary across industries. The production possibility frontier has a two 
stage constant elasticity o f  transformation (CET) specification. At the first stage, 
producers allocate their production in the domestic market and abroad.21 At the 
second stage, exports are allocated in the restricted EU market and in the unrestricted 
rest o f the world (RoW) market. On the demand side, at the first stage, the 
representative household’s demand and the intermediate demand are satisfied by 
composite commodities.22 At the second stage, buyers choose among imports and 
domestic goods. At the third and fourth stages, buyers first choose among a variety of 
domestically produced goods and a variety o f  composite imports, and then among 
imports from the EU and imports from the RoW, according to the Armington 
specification, which states that goods competing in the same market are imperfect 
substitutes. The small country assumption is postulated for all traded commodities, 
with the exception o f  textiles and apparel exports to the EU for which an iso-elastic 
demand curve is supposed.
[2.4.1] Benchmark and calibration
The theoretical model outlined above and applied to Turkey requires a benchmark 
data set to calibrate unknown parameters, such that the observed value o f endogenous
20 The structure of the AGE model is reported in Appendix 2.B.
21 One property of the CET specification is that the condition Q „d, < y, [see footnote (17)] is valid for 
any value of the elasticity of transformation.
22 At the first stage, the utility function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas. This assumption, plus (2.9) imply 
that x, is equal to the ratio between final demand and aggregate demand.
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variables constitutes an equilibrium o f the numerical model. The main bulk o f  the data 
comes from a 1990 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Turkey (De Santis and 
Ozhan, 1995 and 1997), which has been compiled by using the official 1990 Input- 
Output Table for Turkey (SIS, 1994).23 The SAM has been adjusted in order to extract 
the rents on exports subject to VERs accruing to the companies and, then, to 
households. The activities and commodities are disaggregated into 20 different types 
and classified according to the 1-0 table classification. Table 2.1 shows the statistics 
related to Turkish production, cost structure and composition o f the demand. 
According to these official data, the value o f production o f  Turkish textiles and 
apparel is 5.5% o f total output value, whilst textiles and apparel export sales comprise 
18.5% o f total exports. These two sectors are relatively efficient in Turkey, as the 
average productivity o f  labour and capital is almost double than that recorded by the 
economy as a whole.
As far as the demand side is concerned, textiles and apparel intermediate 
demand comprises 4.6% o f  total intermediate demand, whilst the budget share o f  the 
representative consumer is equal to 5.6% o f his disposable income.
The accounts for imports and exports are disaggregated to model the relations 
with the EU and the RoW. The share o f  imports and exports have been derived from a 
recent unpublished statistical source o f the Turkish State Institute o f Statistics (Table
2.2).24 The export volume o f  textiles and apparel to the European market is estimated 
to be 16.4% o f total exports. These summary statistics indicate that the elimination o f  
VERs in textiles and apparel might have an important impact on the reallocation o f  
resources within the economy.
23 Appendix 2.C reports the 1990 SAM for Turkey.
24 The EU is composed of 15 countries: 12 members existing in 1990, plus the new members Finland, 
Austria and Sweden.
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Most of the elasticity values have been selected from the existing literature: the 
factor substitution elasticities, the Armington trade elasticities, the elasticities of 
substitution between imports coming from different regions and the production 
possibility frontier’s elasticities have been selected from Harrison, et al. (1992), and 
some o f them in relation to the sectors facing constant returns to scale have been 
adjusted for differences in the aggregation of sectoral output; whereas the smaller 
export demand elasticities for the sectors facing increasing returns to scale (see Table 
2.3) have been chosen from Dervis, et al. (1982). The elasticity of substitution between 
domestic brands and brands to be exported have been chosen exogenously, such that 
they are respectively larger than the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods 
and imports, and the export demand elasticity. The fact that the calibrated price 
elasticity of aggregate demand are less than one in both sectors implies that 
Ç, >£; > Xi- As a result, the individual producer will face a more elastic demand curve 
with entry. The ad valorem quota premium have been selected from Trela and Whalley 
(1990). The economic rents from VERs are equal to 0.5% o f total household’s 
revenues.
In order to calibrate the variables o f sectors facing increasing returns to scale, 
the algebraic structure of the model required further information on price-cost margins, 
fixed costs and the number o f symmetric firms at sectoral level. These data are not 
easily collectable. However, the 1990 SAM for Turkey classifies labour in 8 different 
labour categories. I assume that three categories, represented by “professional 
workers”, “administrative and managerial workers”, and “clerical workers” comprise 
the fixed amount o f  labour required to have the plant open. According to the SAM’s 
estimates, the fixed labour cost in textiles and apparel is almost 20% o f  total labour 
force. With regard to the capital stock, the Istanbul Chamber o f Industry (1991) 
published some statistical information on the largest 5(H) industries in Turkey.
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Table 2.3 Data for the imperfectly competitive sectors
SECTORS Textiles Apparel
Elasticity o f substitutions among domestic brands 8 8
Elasticity o f substitutions among export brands 8 8
Export demand elasticity (small) 2 2
Export demand elasticity (high) 5 5
Price elasticity o f aggregate demand 0.401 0.809
Number of firms 20 20
Ad valorem quota premium 0.150 0.300
Fixed labour cost (l) 0.197 0.196
Fixed capital cost (2) 0.150 0.150
Price cost margin for domestic goods (Bertrand) 0.131 0.131
Price cost margin for exports (Bertrand - q , = 2 ) 0.130 0.130
Price cost margin for exports (Bertrand - T | ( = 5 ) 0.127 0.127
Price cost margin for domestic goods (Cournot) 0.230 0.175
Price cost margin for exports (Cournot -  T|| = 2 ) 0.144 0.144
Price cost margin for exports (Cournot - r|, = 5 ) 0.129 0.129
(1) The fixed labour cost is a share of the total labour cost.
(2) The fixed capital cost is a share of total sales.
Using this statistical source, the fixed capital stock, represented by capital depreciation, 
interest payments and rents, has been estimated to be equal to 15% o f  total sales in 
both textiles and apparel. The number of firms has been chosen exogenously; whereas 
the price cost margins in both domestic and foreign markets have been calibrated 
within the model, with their value depending upon the adopted conjectures. The price 
cost margin in the Bertrand case is smaller, because Bertrand conjectures are inherently 
more competitive (see Table 2.3).
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Tabic 2.3 shows that the additional data needed to calibrate equations with 
imperfect competitive features are assumed to be similar in both sectors. This 
assumption is not a fallacy of the numerical model. On the contrary, since the ad 
valorem  quota premium in apparel is double that in textiles, the empirical findings will 
help us in understanding the relation between the impact on sectoral variables and the 
size of the binding quota.
As the analytical model, the AGE model assumes free entry/exit. Hence, the 
benchmark generates a long run reference equilibrium by setting pure profits to zero. 
This reference equilibrium is then the basis for comparison in counterfactual trade 
policy analysis.25
[2.4.21 The elimination ofVERs scenarios
[2.4.2.11 The impact on Turkish industry and incumbent firms ’ variables
The equilibrium concepts employed in this chapter are Nash equilibria in prices (i.e. 
Bertrand competition) or quantities (i.e. Cournot competition). Tables 2.4-2.5 report 
the numerical results o f the elimination of VERs on Turkish textiles and apparel 
respectively under Cournot and Bertrand conjectures in two different cases, assuming 
the price elasticity of the export demand in these two sectors to be equal to 2 and 5. In 
this way, the sectoral results of the policy scenarios can be compared under alternative 
Nash equilibria, and under different hypothesis regarding the size o f the country and 
the size of the quota premium.
25 The calibration procedure and the GAMS code of the entire model are reported in Appendix 2.D.
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T a b le  2.4: E lim ination o f  VE R s in textiles and apparel (Cournot)
(Base year = 100)
1  =  2)
VIIIET
Turkey’s social welfare 99.4 98.9
Aggregate output in real terms 100.7 101.4
Trade volume 100.4 100.7
Consumer price index 100.0 100.0
Intermediate inputs cost index 100.8 103.3
Textiles Apparel Textiles Apparel
- At sectoral level
Exports to the EU 124.3 148.4 135.0 193.6
Output 107.1 112.2 119.5 124.6
Number o f firms 107.3 106.0 113.1 104.1
Domestic sales 106.2 99.6 111.9 99.0
Export sales to the EU 128.2 158.4 146.2 220.5
Export sales to the RoW 91.8 96.2 63.4 91.9
Price elasticity o f domestic demand 94.3 100.0 89.6 100.2
- At firm level
Output 99.9 105.8 96.8 119.7
Domestic output 95.9 88.2 91.4 83.7
Exports to the EU 115.9 140.0 119.4 186.0
Exports to the RoW 85.6 90.8 56.0 88.3
-  Prices and costs
Producer price o f exports to the EU 103.2 106.7 108.3 113.9
Average cost 102.7 104.9 107.4 109.1
Marginal cost 103.3 106.9 108.3 113.9
Primary factor inputs cost 100.5 100.6 100.5 100.7
Intermediate inputs cost 103.8 107.3 109.7 114.9
Price cost margin in the domestic market (1) 99.6 98.4 99.7 98.8
Price cost margin in the EU market (2) 99.1 99.3 99.7 99.9
Price cost margin ratio: ( I ) /  (2) 100.5 99.1 100.0 98.9
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Table 2.5: Elim ination o f  V E R s in textiles and apparel (B ertrand)
(Base year = 100)
77, = 2 T|, = 5
Turkey’s social welfare 99.4 99.0
Aggregate output in real terms 100.6 101.4
Trade volume 100.9 101.0
Consumer price index 100.0 100.0
Intermediate inputs cost index 101.0 102.0
Textiles Apparel Textiles Apparel
- At sectoral level
Exports to the EU 123.5 144.8 136.6 195.0
Output 106.7 111.8 110.5 125.9
Number o f firms 108.3 107.1 115.2 106.0
Domestic sales 106.1 99.8 112.2 99.1
Export sales to the EU 127.8 158.0 147.6 221.8
Export sales to the RoW 94.3 96.3 87.9 90.0
Price elasticity o f domestic demand 97.1 102.5 94.7 105.0
- At firm level
Output 98.5 104.4 95.9 117.9
Domestic output 94.7 87.0 90.2 82.2
Exports to the EU 114.0 138.0 118.6 184.0
Exports to the RoW 87.6 89.9 76.3 85.0
- Prices and costs
Producer price o f exports to the EU 103.5 106.9 108.0 113.7
Average cost 103.3 105.6 107.7 110.1
Marginal cost 103.5 107.0 108.1 113.8
Primary factor inputs cost 100.4 100.3 100.4 100.2
Intermediate inputs cost 104.1 107.5 109.4 114.7
Price cost margin in the domestic market (1) 99.6 99.6 99.3 99.6
Price cost margin in the EU market (2) 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.9
Price cost margin ratio: ( l ) / (2) 99.9 99.8 99.6 99.7
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It is clear that the numerical results are fully consistent with those analytical 
findings which are unambiguous. The elimination o f  VERs brings about a large 
increase o f  sectoral exports to the EU, both in terms o f  total exports and exports per 
firm. The large impact on textiles and apparel exports to the EU raises output in both 
industries quite remarkably in accordance with Proposition 2.6, and expands trade 
volume under both forms o f  competition. The producer price o f  exports to the EU is 
also positively affected in accordance with Proposition 2.1. The possibility o f  making 
profits allows less efficient firms to break even in accordance with Proposition 2.2. 
The number o f  firms increases by 7.3% (13.1%) in textiles and 6% (4.1%) in apparel 
in the Coumot case, and by 8.3% (15.2%) in textiles and 7.1% (6%) in apparel in the 
Bertrand case. The zero profit condition is once again restored if  the average cost rises 
in accordance with Proposition 2.1. In the Coumot case, the average cost rises by 
2.7% (7.4%) in textiles and 4.9% (9.1%) in apparel. Whereas in the Bertrand case, it 
rises by 3.3% (7.7%) in textiles and 5.6% (10.1%) in apparel.
It is interesting to note that although, in accordance with Proposition 2.1, there 
is a unique positive relation between size o f  quota premium, or size o f  the country, 
and average cost, a similar relation between size o f  quota premium, or size o f  the 
country, and number o f  firms does not occur. This is because the impact on the 
number o f  firms is also a function o f  domestic sales and o f  the price elasticity of  
domestic demand [(see (2.28)]. In fact, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that although the 
quota premium in textiles is half that in apparel, new entry is larger in textiles, 
because the VERs abrogation reduces the price elasticity o f  domestic demand and has 
a positive impact on domestic sales. I should stress that the impact on the export sales 
to the RoW does not affect the number o f  firms, because the RoW faces an infinitely 
elastic demand function. A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the size of 
the country.
As far as the form o f competition is concerned, the impact on both average 
cost and new entry is larger under Bertrand conjectures, as they are inherently more
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competitive. Similarly, the ex-post size o f  firms is smaller under Bertrand 
competition. This implies that incumbent firms will prefer the status quo especially 
under a price setting oligopoly. However, it must be stressed that the difference 
between the numerical results obtained under Bertrand and Cournot conjectures is 
small. So despite the significance o f  the quantitative results, they are less sensitive to 
equilibrium concepts, as already described by Venables (1994) for the case o f an 
import tariff and an export tax. This is because as the number o f firms rises, the price 
cost margins in the domestic and export markets converge towards the same value 
(that is, the inverse o f  the elasticity o f  substitution among brands) under both 
conjectures.
Entry leads to a modest decline o f  the price cost margin in both markets. 
Another important empirical result is in relation to the ratio between the price cost 
margins in the domestic and export markets. Given the elasticity o f substitution 
among exported brands, the smaller the country, the greater the loss o f  monopoly 
power in the domestic market with respect to the export market [see (2.29) and (2.30)] 
in accordance with Proposition 2.3.
The full employment assumption o f  factor inputs implies a reallocation o f  
resources among sectors. Thus, despite the increase o f  factor inputs demand in textiles 
and apparel, wage and rental rates characterising the whole o f the economy are only 
slightly affected in accordance with Proposition 2.5. Hence, if  the cost o f  primary 
factor inputs rises slightly, and the fall in the price cost margin in the export market is 
smaller that the rise in the producer price o f  exports, then the cost o f intermediate 
inputs has to increase substantially, and at a higher rate than the rise in the producer 
price o f  exports to the EU, for the price cost margin in the export market to decline 
[see (2.34)] in accordance with Proposition 2.5.
Despite output growth, output per firm might expand or decline in accordance 
with Proposition 2.4, depending positively on the size o f  export expansion, which is
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obviously larger in apparel, and negatively on both the number o f new entrants, which 
is larger in textiles, and the domestic output fall, which is larger in apparel.
A further important empirical result is in relation to the impact on firms’ 
domestic output. All scenarios show that despite the large spillovers o f exports from 
the RoW, firms record a domestic output contraction, which is larger, the smaller the 
country.
These numerical results support the hypothesis that a VER is a good 
instrument to prevent entry and to protect the monopoly power o f  incumbent firms in 
both the domestic and the export markets, either in a quantity-setting or in a price­
setting oligopoly.
[2.4.2.2] The impact on Turkey’s social welfare
The measure o f  the welfare change in AGE literature is the Hicksian equivalent 
variation. To be consistent with the analytical model, the representative household 
faces a convex indifference curve a la Dixit-Stiglitz, which is taken to be Cobb- 
Douglas at the first stage, and CES form at the second, third and fourth stages. Income 
distribution issues are neglected, hence the representative consumer’s utility function 
can be regarded as representing the Samuelsonian social indifference curves, which 
takes the following form:
(2.39) w  = n [ c c„®- ] n [/,°' ] , 5 X . ,  + 1 > ,  = i .
crs i
where fr / represents the household’s consumption shares, Ccrj denotes the
individual’s consumption o f  commodities produced by industries facing constant 
returns to scale, and I, can be regarded as the Dixit-Stiglitz quantity index o f  
aggregate consumption o f  the industry output o f  differentiated products. Cc„ is 
derived by maximising the subutility function subject to the money income spent on 
commodities produced by the industries facing constant returns to scale.
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Given the assumption that domestic production and imports satisfies both 
household consumption and the intermediate demand of the industry [see (2.9)], /, 
takes the form,
where %it the price elasticity of aggregate demand, is equal to the share o f  household 
consumption in the total demand of goods produced by industries facing increasing 
returns to scale.
Given the symmetry assumption among firms, the utility gained from the 
consumption of domestic goods and imported products can be written as:
denote respectively the EU and the RoW representative firms’ sale to the market of the 
exporting country, q, is the elasticity o f substitution among imported varieties, ft; is 
the elasticity o f substitution among imports from different regions, and t, is a share
parameter of the import aggregation function, nT should properly be treated as an 
endogenous variable. However, the model presented in this study is a single country 
open economy model. It is therefore difficult to model the product selection process in 
foreign industries.26
26 In examining the economic implications for Canada of the North-America free trade agreement, 
Harris (1984) assumes that the number of imported variety of a product is in a constant ratio to the 
number of domestically produced varieties. However, this assumption implies that as the number of 
domestic firms decreases with the elimination of tariffs, the number of competing foreign varieties is 
also reduced. In contrast, it is generally accepted that product variety rises with trade. Thus, the 
welfare gains of tariff liberalisation in the presence of product differentiation would be 
underestimated. As far as the effect of a VER on n7 is concerned, it can be argued that the ad 
valorem quota premium is equivalent to an ad valorem tariff rale for the importing country. Its 
elimination might produce the same results discussed in Harris (1984), where the elimination of 
tariffs imposes a downward pressure on price mark-ups in manufacturing industries and forces the
(2.40)
(2.41) D, = n ^ - " d t ,
(2.42)
where n 7 represents the fixed number o f competing foreign brands, m f1' and m?',v'
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that, as a consequence of the elimination of VERs, the 
impact on welfare, though small, is negative. Social welfare decreases by a factor of 
0.6 (1-1.1) as a percentage of consumer income in 1990. Given the fact that the 
consumer price index is not affected, the social welfare loss indicates that the rent loss 
effect and the increased intermediates input cost effect dominate the positive effects 
from trade. It also seems that the smaller the country, the larger the welfare loss o f the 
elimination of VERs, although the efficiency gains (represented by the rise of 
aggregate output in real terms), the gains from variety, and from the rise in the export 
producer price, are much larger. Thus, since the loss of the economic rent and the 
consumer price index are equal in all scenarios, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
increased intermediate inputs cost effect is an important negative effect, which might 
determine the size of the welfare loss in the exporting country. In fact, the computed 
estimates show that the intermediate inputs cost index rises quite remarkably, when the 
country faces a more elastic foreign demand curve.
In summary, if policy-makers o f exporting countries might accept VERs 
agreements in order to improve the welfare of their nations, industry associations 
voluntarily agree to restrain their level o f exports in order to limit entry of other 
potential firms. This allows incumbent firms to better exploit economies of scale, 
capture rents and protect their monopoly power in both domestic and export market.
less efficient firms to exit in response to losses. Thus, fixing n7 exogenously might overestimate the 
welfare effect of the elimination of a VER. It is likely that only a multiregional model might attempt 
to explicitly model both domestic and foreign brands, and in this way examine the welfare effect of 
trade policies in the presence of product differentiation. In this study, n " is assumed to be equal to the 
benchmark value of n,, and is assumed to be equal to <;,.
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[2.5] Conclusions
This paper analyses the possible consequences o f VERs on an exporting country when 
firms facing increasing returns to scale behave either in a Cournot fashion or with 
Bertrand conjectures. I show that the elimination o f  a VER raises the average cost to 
produce one unit o f  output, and this effect is larger, the smaller the country. It 
decreases the concentration o f  the industry and the price cost margins in the export 
market. The impact on firm size is ambiguous. In addition, I show that the smaller the 
country, the greater the possibility o f  a relative lower price cost margin in the 
domestic market, as a result o f  a VER abrogation. This implies that incumbent firms 
have an interest in renewing VERs in order also to protect their monopoly power in 
the domestic market. The analytical effect on social welfare is indeterminate: the 
positive effect comes from the increased product diversity, as the number of 
symmetric firms rises (variety effect), and from the increase o f  the producer price of 
exports, as foreign consumers are more sensitive to price changes rather than to ad 
valorem quota premium variation (export producer price  effect); the negative effect 
comes from the loss o f  the economic rent (rent loss effect), and from the rise in the 
intermediate inputs cost (increased intermediate inputs cost effect); whilst the 
indeterminate effect comes from the impact on production (global efficiency effect) 
and on the cost o f  living (consumer price  effect). The increased intermediate inputs 
cost effect is very important, as a fall in the price cost margin in the export market can 
be achieved only if  the cost o f purchasing intermediate inputs rises substantially.
An AGE model with increasing returns to scale, segmented markets and free 
entry/exit, applied to the Turkish textiles and apparel industries, indicates that the 
analytical results are quantitatively interesting, under both Bertrand and Cournot 
competition, and seems to support the hypothesis that an exporting country is better 
off under a VER, as the rent loss effect and the increased intermediate inputs cost 
effect dominate the positive effects from trade and the global efficiency effect, which
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the numerical analysis has shown to be positive. The numerical model indicates that 
the smaller the exporting country, the larger the welfare loss. Given the facts that the 
consumer price index is not affected, and the loss o f economic rents is equal in both 
scenarios, and since the export producer price effect, the variety effect and the global 
efficiency effect are negatively related to the size o f  the exporting country, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the increased intermediate inputs cost effect explains much 
of the welfare loss in an exporting country.
The numerical results also indicate that the contraction o f  firms’ domestic 
output is large, whilst the impact on price cost margins is modest. In addition, they 
show that the rise in both the average cost and the number o f  new entrants is larger 
under Bertrand conjectures, as they are inherently more competitive. Similarly, the 
size o f  the firms is smaller. This implies that industries, especially characterised by 
more competitive conjectures, will lobby the government or industry associations to 
keep renewing VERs agreements. However, the quantitative difference o f the impact 
o f the elimination o f  VERs under Bertrand and Cournot conjectures is small, which 
implies that the impact o f  this policy is less sensitive to equilibrium concepts.
A  possible loss in social welfare and the fall o f monopoly power o f incumbent 
firms, in both domestic and export markets, are the key elements to understanding 
why exporting countries voluntarily agree to restrain their level o f exports.
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CHAPTER 3
Optimal Export Taxes, Welfare, Industry Concentration 
and Firm Size: A General Equilibrium Analysis
[3.1] Introduction
After the seminal papers by Bickerdike (1906, 1907) on the optimal degree o f  trade 
restriction, the literature on optimal tariff, which developed in the nineteen thirties and 
forties, (Lemer, 1934; Kaldor, 1940; Scitovsky, 1941; Kahn, 1948-49; Graaff, 1949- 
50) argues that an optimal export tax is equal to the absolute value o f  the inverse 
elasticity o f foreign export demand, i f  perfect competition prevails among domestic 
firms and foreign countries do not retaliate. More recently, this basic insight has been 
further elaborated in a PE framework in a context o f  an imperfect competitive 
domestic market, where an optimal export tax is positive and adjusted by firm size 
(Rodrik, 1989; Helpman and Krugman, 1989). The larger the firm’s share, or the 
greater the conjectural variation parameter, the smaller the firm’s specific optimal 
export tax. In the case o f  monopoly or collusion, the optimal export tax is nil. So RHK 
argue that an export tax is welfare improving in a context o f  a non-collusive 
oligopoly, which has international market power.
I use a GE model, with fixed (or sunk) costs and segmented markets, to show 
that an export tax does not necessarily have a positive impact on social welfare, as the
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efficiency effect from trade restriction is negative, and might outweigh the terms o f  
trade benefits. Moreover, the efficiency loss from trade restriction would be larger if  
costs are sunk (i.e. developing marketing channels overseas, obtaining export licenses, 
foreign promotion and advertising). Thus, it is inappropriate to assume that the RHK 
formula could yield the optimal size o f an export tax.
In addition, I show analytically that the simple method suggested by Rodrik 
(1989) to compute the uniform export tax is upwardly biased. This is because the size 
o f  Rodrik’s export tax is also a negative function o f  its impact on the absolute value o f  
the foreign demand elasticity and industry concentration. I show analytically that an 
export tax implies a more elastic foreign demand curve and a fall in export sales, i f  a 
hypothetical foreign industry produces an imperfect substitute good for the own 
market. Both these results lead to the exit o f  some domestic firms. So, under constant 
conjectures, the Rodrik formula is upwardly biased.
This paper also attempts to understand the impact o f  an export tax on firm 
size. I find that it is ambiguous, as it is negatively related to the effect o f the trade 
policy on foreign demand, and positively to both the ability o f  firms to trade export 
excess supply in the domestic market, and to the capability o f  exploiting economies o f  
scale.
I use an AGE model, which has the same features o f the analytical model 
applied to Turkish textiles and apparel industries, to investigate how large and 
significant the above described findings are; and, in particular, to examine the impact 
o f  RHK export tax on welfare, as this is analytically ambiguous. I find that the 
computed RHK export tax is smaller than the rate calculated using the PE formula 
suggested by Rodrik (1989), where all variables are set exogenously. Under constant 
conjectures, the ratio between the PE estimate and the computed optimal export tax 
ranges between 1.034 and 1.089. So, as far as the Rodrik formula is concerned, 
despite the importance o f the analytical result, the bias seems to be numerically small.
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The numerical model also shows that the impact on firm size varies according 
to different scenarios.
The most important numerical result is related to social welfare. Despite the 
analytical indeterminacy, all numerical scenarios show that moving from free trade to 
the RHK export tax has a negative impact on the exporting country’s welfare, which 
implies that the RHK export tax is not an optimal policy in a GE framework. The 
estimated welfare loss varies among the alternative scenarios. It ranges between - 
0.3% and - 1.6% as a percentage o f consumer income in the scenarios with fixed 
costs, and between - 1% and - 2.9% in the scenarios w ith sunk costs. The size o f  the 
welfare loss is also an interesting empirical finding, when it is compared to the static 
welfare gains from multisectoral trade liberalisation, which, in the AGE literature, are 
usually estimated to be equal to 1-2% o f  a country’s GDP. Whereas, in this study, 
trade restriction is only imposed on two sectors, whose output comprised 5.8% o f  total 
Turkish production in the benchmark year.
The remaining sections o f  this Chapter have been organised as follows: 
Section 2 analyses the relation between optimal export tax, industry concentration, 
foreign demand elasticity and conjectural variation; Section 3 describes a GE model 
with increasing returns to scale, segmented markets, intraindustry trade and identical 
firms; Section 4 analyses the impact o f  the RHK export tax on firm size, industry 
concentration, foreign demand elasticity and welfare; Section 5 reports the numerical 
results obtained applying a GE model to the Turkish textiles and apparel industries; 
and the final section presents a summary and some conclusion.
[3.2] Optimal export tax and industry concentration
Assume that within an oligopolistic industry (i) there are firms (k) o f  different sizes. 
They export homogenous goods at price level, pwe, . The industry has international
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market power. So, according to the PE literature, the government o f  an exporting 
country could enhance social welfare by restricting exports with differentiated export 
taxes ( te'k). More precisely, the government has to choose a vector te'k, such that 
when a firm k  maximises its profit function, the total amount o f  exports for the 
industry as a whole has to be equal to the export level Ef1, which would have been 
chosen by a monopolist: ^ e lk = where elk denotes the amount o f  the firm k's
k
exports.
Fig. 3.1 The optimal export tax in a PE framework
Figure 3.1 shows a PE graphical representation, used by Helpman and 
Krugman (1989, pg. 87), to determine the optimal size o f  an export tax. E d denotes
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the export demand schedule, MR the marginal revenue curve faced by a monopolist, 
MR the firm k ’s perceived marginal revenue curve, and clk the constant marginal cost 
curve. The equilibrium in autarchy is represented by the equilibrium price pwe" and 
quantity E . The introduction o f  an export tax o f  a given size, te 'k, would shift the 
marginal cost curve upwardly, such that the intersection between the new cost curve 
(gross of the export tax) and MR would allow firms to set prices and quantities at 
their optimal level, pwe“ and E“ , respectively.
The diagrammatic analysis suggests that the optimal export tax vector can be 
calculated as a difference between the firm’s perceived marginal revenue and the 
profit-maximising cartel marginal revenue, evaluated at the export level chosen by the 
domestic firms acting as a profit-maximising cartel ( E Using this definition, it can 
be shown that
where slk denotes the &th firm’s share in total exports, Xlk the conjectural variation of 
firm k about the other firms in the export market, and T)' the absolute value o f the 
export demand elasticity.27 This is the same expression proposed by Rodrik (1989), to 
whom I refer for a complete analytical argument. te'lk ought necessarily be no 
negative. It is evident that a uniform optimal export tax is applicable only if  firms are 
symmetric or if  perfect competition prevails ( X lk = - 1 ) .  Typically, the optimal export 
tax is firm specific and is negatively related to firm size (Rodrik, 1989). In the limiting 
case of monopoly (or collusion), the optimal export tax is nil, since a profit- 
maximising monopolist (or cartel) already sets pwe, at its optimal level, pwe,(^E“ Y
27 te‘k can also be defined as the difference between the klh firm’s perceived marginal revenue and its 
marginal cost ( c,k ) evaluated at : le':i | f £« = pwel{ l-s ,4[l + X.,4]/T i'} -c ,4 (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1989).
(3.1)
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Conversely, as the Xth firm’s export share becomes smaller, the optimal export tax 
converges towards the upper bound limit pw e,/r\‘ ,28
However, as the policy-maker chooses the vector te’k , all variables in equation
(3.1) would be affected. Thus, the method suggested by Rodrik (1989) for calculating 
an optimal export tax by adjusting r|' for the Herfindahl index o f  concentration ( H ), 
when traders are symmetric and behave in a Cournot fashion, is only a simple 
approximation, because both r\‘ and H, are treated exogenously.29
To better emphasise the point, let us make the simplifying assumption that 
firms are symmetric. In this case, the uniform ad valorem optimal export tax ( t *) in 
equilibrium is
(3.2) «.eT|,
1 -
1 + X,
where «, denotes the number o f  identical firms. It is important to emphasise that all 
variables in (3.2) are endogenously determined. Thus, moving from free trade to an 
optimal export tax would hardly likely result in r\‘ , X, and n, equating their initial 
values. This implies that the argument that an optimal export tax is negatively related 
to the ex-ante industry concentration ratio does not automatically hold in a GE 
framework. In fact, the total derivative o f  t* yields
28 In fact, lim ie't = 0  (i.e. monopoly case); lim te’t =0 (i.e. collusive case); lim/ej = p w e jl\‘
*»-*' *»-((<. )“-i] '•‘-*0
(i.e. large number of firms’ case); and lim te \ = pwe, / r f  (i.e. competitive case). Similarly,
X,^  —►—1
lim te\ = °° , which implies that foreigners would accept exports at any price; whereas lim le‘t = 0 ,
>lf -*0 n '
and this result corresponds to the small country assumption.
29 Under the symmetry assumption and Cournot conjecture, (3.1) takes the following form: 
,e’\Emf;u =(pw e,/rirX | - / / , ) ,  where H‘ = V". ; as proposed by Rodrik (1989).
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<3-3> d t' \ t , - r  = i [ ( 1 +  x -)</n''1/ ni
(  . , tn, — 1 -  A.
",n,
dr\‘ .
This expression shows that the ad valorem optimal export tax depends not only on the 
ex-ante T|f, A., and n ,, but also on its impact upon these variables, as it is also 
recognised by Rodrik (1989, note 4). In section 3.4, I will show that under constant 
conjectures, the Rodrik formula, which I have reported in footnote 30, is upwardly 
biased because the impact o f  an export tax raises rtf and decreases n, ,30
(3.3] A GE model with fixed (or sunk) costs and segmented markets
The model presented in this section is a GE model with fixed (or sunk) costs, 
segmented markets and identical firms used to study the impact o f moving from free 
trade to the RHK export tax on the number o f  firms, firm size, foreign demand 
elasticity and welfare. Given the difficulty o f  modelling firms conjectures 
endogenously, I assume them constant. In order to study the impact o f the RHK export 
tax on firm size, I assume that each firm produces two imperfect substitute goods, one 
traded within the domestic market and the other exported. An export tax leads to 
export contraction, but not necessarily to the decline o f  the firm size, as the remaining 
firms can increase their supply in the domestic market. So to model domestic and 
foreign trade, I assume that each firm employs factors and intermediate inputs to 
produce two imperfect substitute goods, one sold in the domestic market and the other 
exported; whereas the representative consumer gains utility from the consumption of 
domestically produced goods and their imperfect substitute imports. Also the sectoral 
intermediate demand is satisfied with the supply o f domestic goods and imports. 10
10 In addition, in section 3.4.3., I prove that the impact of an export tax on welfare in ambiguous in a 
GE setting.
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[3.3.1 ] Mark-up pricing
Assume that within an industry (i) firms face fixed (or sunk) costs, produce two 
differentiated commodities, one supplied in the domestic market and the other 
exported, and have constant conjectures, in the sense that the firms’ choice on how to 
react to its rivals’ choices is given a priori and is independent of the impact of trade 
policies.
The profit function of a representative firm ( 7t,) takes the following form:
(3.4) n, = pd,d , + (pwe, -  te, ]e, -  c, (d, + « , ) - / ,
where d, and et denote domestic output and export, respectively; pd: the price of 
domestic goods; f  the fixed (or sunk) cost and c, the marginal cost, which is 
indipendent of output. The first order conditions yield
(3.5)
dpd dD,
pd, +d, f f  ' 1 = c , , 
dD, ddt
dpd‘ <o
dDi
(3.6)
dpwe, dE:pwe, + e, — - — — = c, + te, , 
d£, de,
dpwe‘ < 0 
d E,
where D, denotes domestic demand and E, export demand.
[3.3.2] Technology and number o f firms
The production function of a single representative firm, © , is additively separable in 
<t>, and <t>2 , and such that dJ0/(d<I>ld<I>2)>  0  :
(3.7)
= 0 if l, < i f  or k, < k f
where y, represents composite production of domestic goods and exports; x J: denote 
intermediate inputs, assumed for simplicity to be net complements ( j  = i u  c rs , where
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crs indicates the sectors facing perfect competition and constant returns to scale); l: 
and k , represent labour and capital inputs; and i f  and k f  the factor inputs employed 
in fixed proportion. This implies that the production sets are not convex. <t>, is locally
The production possibility frontier o f the representative firm is represented by
which locally is a linear homogenous, separable, differentiable transformation curve 
of domestic goods and exports. The transformation curve is locally assumed to be 
twice differentiable with respect to d( and en  such that d 2Q./dd:2 < 0 and 
d2£ l/d e2 < 0 .
The fixed factor inputs, multiplied by their respective returns, determine the 
firm’s fixed (or sunk) cost. It is important to emphasise the benefits for each firm of 
raising production, as each firm would bear a reduced fixed cost element per unit of 
output. The total cost faced by each firm is the sum o f variable and fixed (or sunk) 
costs. So the average cost to produce one unit o f output net o f export taxes ( ac,)  takes 
the following form:
where p ; represents the price vector of final and intermediate goods. The factor
demands of each firm and the marginal cost equation can be derived by solving a 
standard dual problem.
The number o f  firms is endogenously determined by the long run zero profit 
condition:
assumed to be twice differentiable, so that O ; > 0 and <t>2 < 0 .
(3.8) y( =£2(d,,e,), £2rf > 0 ,  Q.e > 0 , d2£i/(dd,de, ) < 0 ,
(3.9)
(3.10)
where pyt is the composite producer price.
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The tax-free sectors are assumed to face perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale. This allows me to restrict the analysis of the impact o f the RHK tax 
on these industries only on their production level, as it is relevant for welfare analysis. 
So the production function and the transformation curve of the tax-free sectors take 
respectively the following form:
(3.11) r „
(3.12) Yen = a " ’(Dcr,,E m ),
where Ycrs denotes composite output, Dcrs domestic output, Em exports, Lm labour,
and Kcn capital for the industry as a whole. 0 " ' is globally linear homogenous,
additively separable in and O"1, and such that d2©"Y(3<l>"’dO‘2ri) > 0  . <t>‘2r’ is
twice differentiable. Q."' is globally linear homogenous, separable, differentiable and 
concave.
[3.3.3] Domestic and foreign demand functions
The demand for domestic goods ( Dt ) and imports ( A /,) is a function of a consumer’s 
final demand and industries’ intermediate demand ( X ,):
(3.13) Di = f{H R ,p d t, ~pwmi, X,) ,  Dm  > 0 , Dx > 0 ,  Dptl/—  < 0 ,
(3.14) M t = f{H R ,pd t, pwmt ,X ,) , Dm  > 0 , Dx > 0 ,  D  /—  > 0 ,
where HR denotes the representative consumer income, pwmt the exogenous world 
price of imports treated as substitutes for domestic goods, and X, = ^  ap YJ .
j
The export demand function of the taxed industry ( E( ) is derived by assuming 
that a hypothetical foreign consumer gains utility by purchasing their own domestic 
goods ( D ‘) priced at p d ' , and their imperfect substitute imports, which are exported
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by the country under analysis. The two-stage utility maximisation problem faced by 
the foreign consumer takes the following form
S t. X (Pd ’D ’ +pwe,E,) = HR‘ ,
i
where HR’ represents the income o f the representative foreign consumer, Q ’ the 
vector o f  composite commodities, n  and T the upper level and the lower level utility 
functions, respectively. The solution o f  the problem yields
(3.15) E ,= r { p d ; ,p We„H R :), 1 ^ . > 0 ,  < 0 ,  1 ^ . > 0 .
For simplicity, the sectors which are not subject to an export tax (free-tax 
sectors) are assumed to face an infinitely elastic export demand function and an 
infinitely elastic import supply function. Domestic goods and imports are treated as 
imperfect substitutes.
The trade balance is always in equilibrium. Thus,
(3.16) ^ p w e tE , + ^ p w e crsEcrs - ' ^ p w m JM] = 0 ,
i crs j
where pwecrs denotes the world price o f exports produced by the ffee-tax sectors.
[3.3.4] Representative household income
The sources o f  household domestic income are value added and export tax revenues 
received in the form o f a lump-sum transfer:
(3.17) HR = wL + rK + ^ t e , E , ,
i
where L and K  denote labour and capital endowments, respectively; while w and r 
their respective returns. L and K  are fully employed, although if  costs are sunk, their 
endowment would decline with firms’ exit.
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[3.4] Analytical results
[3.4.1] The impact o f  RHK export tax on foreign demand elasticity and industry 
concentration
t|' can be obtained from (3.15). Assume that the upper level utility function o f  the 
hypothetical foreign consumer is a Cobb-Douglas and that T is a function with 
constant elasticity o f  substitution, %, > 1. Then, (3.15) can be rewritten as
(3.18) E. = fr. HR x f'p w e , *'
xf'pwej1'*^  + (l -  x, )*■ p d ’} ' 
where t, is the CES share parameter and fr,’ the foreign household’s constant budget
share. Then, 31
P~x.)«. dE, pwe,(3.19) rif = -  ' y  1 = X, + -— ~  , x (x
dpwe, E, (x -' _  i)x' p(j  (l x']pw e{f  0 + 1
By using the chain rule, thenW /die, =(dr\'/dpwe,)(dpwe,/die,). The sign o f this
expression depends only on the sign o f  dr)' /dpwe, , as moving from free trade to an
export tax the world price o f  exports rises. The derivative o f  (3.19) with respect to the
price o f  exports is
0  201 frli -  P - X .^ V 1 - l ) X,M ,(‘~x'W e,(x'-2>
dpwe, |(T|-' -  l)x' p</;(l‘x'>pwe1(lt,‘l) + i]2
Then, dr\’ /die, > 0 .
An export tax does have an impact on industry concentration, as it affects 
sectoral aggregate output and demand price elasticities. Given (3.5), (3.6), (3.10) and 31
31 This approach has been already adopted by Devarajan and Rodrik (1989, 1991) on the domestic side 
in examining the procompetitive gains from trade. They calibrate the price elasticity of domestic 
demand endogenously as a positive function of the ratio between the price of imports and the price of 
domestic goods.
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the symmetry assumption, the equality between the combined-market marginal revenue 
curve and marginal cost is
where 0 f  = DJYj and 0 f = £ ,/! '  . The latter expression can be rearranged as
variation is assumed to be equal in both markets.32 The total derivative o f ni with 
respect to an export tax is
Since an export tax has a secondary effect on sectoral domestic production and 
domestic consumption decisions, the analysis o f the impact on n, can be confined to
the analysis o f the impact on T|*, which is shown to be positive, and on export sales. 
The impact o f an export tax on export sales can be examined by using (3.18) and the 
chain rule as follows,
Since dpwejdte, > 0  and X: > 1 » then d[pweiEi)/dtei < 0 .  The findings that 
d[pweiEi)/dtei < 0  and dr\'/die, > 0 ,  plus the consideration that the trade policy has 
an indirect effect on domestic sales and domestic demand price elasticity, imply that an 
export tax leads to the exit of firms: dn, /dte, < 0 In summary: *3
12 For an interpretation of (3.22), see section 12.3.2] in the previous chapter.
331 have indirectly shown that entry always occurs if total output ( K,) expands. It is interesting to note 
that the conventional wisdom suggests dYJdn, > 0 (see Seade, 1980).
(3.23)
(3.24) d(pweiE,) _ E (1 - XiX1 ~ T.)X'M*0'*-* dpwef
dtei x f ‘pwef~x^  + ( l  — Xj)Xlpd'^' x‘^  dtet
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PROPOSITION 3.1. Under constant conjectures, Rodrik’s PE formula to compute an 
optimal export tax is upwardly biased; when moving from free trade, both the foreign 
demand elasticity (in absolute value) and industry concentration raise.
In fact, (3.3) unequivocally shows that, under constant conjectures, the lower 
the ex-post number o f firms and the larger the ex-post absolute value o f the foreign 
demand elasticity, the lower the optimal size of the export tax. This result might be 
easily extended, if we assume that A, is a function of « ,. The existence o f few firms 
may facilitate collusion among firms, which implies that dXJdni < 0 (Seade, 1980). 
Since an export tax raises the industry concentration ratio, the effect o f increased 
collusion implies dX,/dte, > 0  and, as a consequence, a further lower export tax rate in 
equilibrium.
¡3.4.21 The impact ofR H K  export tax on firm  size
The impact on firm size is ambiguous. Since dY,/dte, = y,(dn,/dte,) + n,(dy,/dte,) ,  and 
since, by aggregating firms’ domestic output and exports, the total differential o f Y, 
with respect to tei can be also written as dY,/die, = £iIt{dl),/die,) + i lE(dE,/dte,), where 
0 ;) and i i E denote the partial derivatives o f the transformation curve with respect to 
D, and E ,, respectively; the latter two expressions can be rearranged as
(3.25) ^  = ^ ^ + L {n Ddi- y , ) ^ + i i D^ .
dte, n, dte, n, '  dte, dte,
The first term represents the negative impact o f a fall in real exports for the industry as 
a whole. The second term denotes the positive impact o f returns to scale, as a lower 
number of firms allows a better exploitation o f fixed inputs (note that Q„d, < y , , if 
<t>w < 1, where ()>vrf denotes the elasticity o f composite production with respect to
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Idomestic output.).34 Finally, the third term denotes the capability o f  firms to sell 
excess supply in the domestic market. I expect it to be positive, since given the 
domestic demand, a lower number o f  firms implies a rise in per firm domestic 
production. Hence, despite the benefits from better exploiting economies o f  scale, and 
despite the rise in domestic production, the impact o f  an export tax on y l is 
indeterminate.
PROPOSITION 3.2. Moving from free trade to RHK export tax has an ambiguous 
impact on firm  size. It depends positively upon the firm ’s capability o f  exploiting 
economies o f  scale and o f  trading excess export supply in the domestic market, and 
negatively to the magnitude o f  export contraction.
[3.4.3] The impact on welfare
Assume the indirect utility function o f the representative consumer to be the measure 
o f  social welfare. As already shown in the previous chapter, the incremental welfare 
can be measured by the ratio between the change in the indirect utility function and 
the marginal utility o f  income. This ratio (v )  is equal to the difference between the 
total derivative o f  the consumer income and the consumer price change. Equation
(3.17) can be also written as HR =- I pd,D, + (pwe, - le ,)E, ~ ' ^ a J/pJYt S ' e'£' >
where the first term in the bracket represents the value o f production minus the cost of 
intermediate inputs, with a u representing the Leontief intermediate inputs 
coefficients, and the second term denotes export tax revenues. If the Laspeyre’s price
34 Note that £lnd, <y, implies i l j / ( y jd , )  < 1.
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■index o f  domestic goods is the numeraire o f  the model, by total differentiating H R , v 
can be written as
(3.26)
p d cr,d D „ ,  + p w e m d E c„ -'Z °j~P jdrcr, p d , d d ,  + p w e , d e ,  — a ^ P j d y ,  n
crs j i j
pd,d, + pwe,et -  ^ J “J,P ,y, dn, + ^^E ,dpw e, ~ 2  X  a» Y, dpt ~ X  Q’dpi
where QJ denotes total sectoral demand o f  final and intermediate goods, which is a 
composite o f  domestically produced goods and imports.
Equation (3.26) is a general expression for the analysis o f  the impact on 
welfare, when export taxes are collected and devoted to households in the form o f  a 
lump-sum transfer. Here, I focus the analysis when an export tax is levied on sectors 
facing IRS. The sum o f  the first three terms yields the global efficiency effect. The 
first term denotes the production effect in the tax-free sectors, which is indeterminate 
as it depends upon: (i) the positive reallocation o f primary factor inputs in their 
favour; (ii) the interdependency among sectors via the intermediate inputs flows (the 
greater the interdependency among the taxed sectors and the non-taxed sectors, the 
larger the negative impact on the non-taxed sectors). The second term denotes the 
firm’s value added effect. It is indeterminate, since, from Proposition 3.2, the impact 
on firm output is ambiguous. The third term denotes the market structure effect, which 
has a twofold effect on welfare: (i) a positive effect originates if  economies o f  scale 
are better exploited; (ii) a negative effect results if  a firm, by perceiving a less elastic 
domestic demand curve [see (3.5)], raises the price o f  the ith domestic commodities 
and, as a result, a contraction of the domestic consumer surplus occurs. Since the first 
three terms are ambiguous, the global efficiency effect is indeterminate. Obviously, a 
possible efficiency loss would be larger in the presence o f  sunk costs, as a lower factor 
endowment would be available in the economy with firms’ exit. The fourth term 
represents the positive terms o f  trade effect. The fifth and the last term indicate the 
intermediate inputs cost effect and the consumer price effect, respectively. Since the 
Laspeyre’s price index o f  domestic goods is the numeraire o f  the model, and since the
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world prices o f  imports are exogenous, the welfare impact o f the latter two effects, in 
particular o f  the consumer price effect, should be negligible. Then,
PROPOSITION 3.3. The RHK export tax is not optimal in a GE framework i f  a 
possible efficiency loss outweighs the terms o f trade benefits.
[3.5] Numerical results
In order to understand quantitatively the relation among optimal export tax, firm size, 
industry concentration and welfare, an AGE model has been constructed having the 
same features o f  the analytical model presented in the previous two sections. It has 
been applied to Turkey because, as a consequence o f  the customs union agreement 
with the EU, the export restriction in the form o f  VERs on Turkish textiles and 
apparel have been abrogated. In addition, Turkey is one o f the countries signing the 
MFA arrangement, which also might be abolished in the near future. If Turkish 
textiles and apparel industries have market power within the international markets, the 
regional agreement with the EU and the abrogation o f  the MFA scheme would imply a 
deterioration o f  the Turkey’s terms o f trade. Hence, the Turkish government might 
still wish to rely on the positive terms o f  trade effect by introducing an optimal export 
tax.
[3.5.!] The AGE model fo r  Turkey
As in the analytical model, the AGE model contains two categories o f  industries: 
those where perfect competition and constant return to scale are assumed to prevail 
(18 sectors), and those which are characterised by increasing returns to scale (textiles
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and apparel).35 The production function has a two stage nested CES structure. At the 
first stage, I assume a Leontief function among primary factors o f production and 
intermediate inputs, which are in turn assumed to be net complements. At the second 
stage, the elasticity o f  substitution among the mobile labour and the mobile capital is 
assumed to be positive and to vary across industries. The production possibility 
frontier o f  firms and o f  industries facing perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale is a CET specification o f domestic products and exports, treated as imperfect 
substitutes.36 On the demand side, the representative household demand and the 
intermediate demand are satisfied by a composite o f domestic and imported goods, 
according to the Armington specification, which states that goods competing in the 
same market are imperfect substitutes. For simplicity, the price elasticity o f  domestic 
demand is assumed constant. The country is assumed to be a price taker for the 
commodities traded internationally, with the exception o f textiles and apparel exports, 
for which a downward sloping export demand curve has been derived by assuming 
that a hypothetical foreign consumer purchases both Turkish exports and their 
imperfect substitute domestically produced goods. The world price o f  imports in 
textiles and apparel is also assumed exogenous. The trade balance is always in 
equilibrium.
[3.5.2] The benchmark data set
The benchmark data set employed to calibrate the relevant variables and parameters of 
the model is based on the benchmark used in the previous chapter.37
In order to calibrate the export demand function in textiles and apparel, I 
employed OECD data (OECD, 1995) for the year 1990. In particular, I use the value 
o f production, exports and imports relative to 18 OECD countries to which Turkey
35 The structure of the AGE model is reported in Appendix 3. A.
36 See footnote (21) in the previous chapter and footnote (34).
37 The calibration and the GAMS model is reported in Appendix 3.B.
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ships almost all textiles and apparel exports (see Appendix 3.C). The elasticities o f  
substitution between Turkish exports and foreign production faced by the hypothetical 
foreign consumer have been chosen from Huff, et al. (1997): in their global GE trade 
model, the Armington elasticities are equal to 2.2 in textiles and 4.4 in apparel. Given 
that the share of Turkish textiles and apparel exports is small with respect to OECD 
production, r|' is computed to be very close to H u ffs  trade elasticities.
[3.5.3] Scenarios
Tables 3.1-3.3 report the results o f  several policy scenarios, which differ in: (i) the 
initial value o f  the conjectural parameter; (ii) the initial value o f  the number o f  firms; 
(iii) the treatment o f  primary factor inputs as fixed or sunk costs. The conjectural 
parameter is assumed to be zero or two, in order to examine the impact o f RHK export 
tax when firms compete a la Cournot, as in the Rodrik’s study, or act in a more 
collusive behaviour. The benchmark value o f  the number o f  firms is hypothesised to 
equal 15, 20 or 25, in order to compare the results when alternative ex-ante industry 
concentration ratios are postulated. In all scenarios, labour is always assumed to be 
fully employed. So the proportion o f  labour employed by firms in fixed amount 
always constitutes a component o f  fixed costs. Consequently, the scenarios with sunk 
costs assume that only a proportion o f capital is sunk. The simple reason behind this 
assumption is that labour can be reallocated, while capital easily depreciates.
The experiments consist o f  computing endogenously the RHK export tax 
vector for textiles and apparel in a GE setting, where all variables are directly or 
indirectly affected. It must be stressed that, with the exemption o f  aggregate output 
and welfare, the results produced under the alternative hypotheses o f  fixed and sunk 
costs are similar. In particular, the computed RHK export tax vector is equal in both 
categories o f  scenarios.
65
Table 3.1 Computation of the RHK export tax
SCENARIO 1: Cournot case (Benchmark value: X, = 0 ). 
SCENARIO 2: More collusive case (Benchmark value: X, = 2 ).
Sectors
Number 
of firms
(Base year)
A d  va lo rem  
export tax
(1)
Rodrik's
formula
(2)
(2) / (1)
1
1 Textiles n=  15 0.411 0.426 1.036
1 Textiles n - 2 0 0.419 0.434 1.034
1 Textiles n = 25 0.424 0.438 1.034
SCENARIO 1 !
I Apparel n =  15 0.198 0.214 1.078
I Apparel n = 20 0.202 0.217 1.077
1 Apparel n = 25 0.205 0.220 1.072
1
I Textiles n=  15 0.348 0.365 1.050
I Textiles n = 20 0.375 0.388 1.050
1 Textiles n = 25 0.395 0.411 1.039
SCENARIO 2Î
I Apparel n=  15 0.168 0.183 1.089
I Apparel n = 20 0.178 0.195 1.089
1 Apparel n = 25 0.190 0.206 1.082
Table 3.1 shows the computed RHK export tax and the PE Rodrik’s formula. 
This results suggest that the PE formula is upwardly biased, although by a small 
amount.
This bias is larger, the greater the benchmark value o f  X ,. The Rodrik’s 
formula is above the computed export tax by a factor ranging between 1.034 and 
1.089. This is because the number o f firms declines and the price elasticity o f foreign 
demand rises (see Table 3.2). However, if  the foreign demand elasticity is slightly 
affected, the number o f firms contracts enormously. Hence, Proposition 3.1 is 
corroborated.
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The numerical results support the conventional wisdom that the smaller the ex-ante 
concentration ratio, the larger the RHK export tax rate; and in addition, the smaller the 
bias. It is also interesting to note that when firms cooperate to a certain extent 
(X, = 2  ), exit is remarkably smaller.
The second finding is in relation to Proposition 3.2: the impact of an export tax 
on firm size is not predictable. In general, despite the possibility o f  better exploiting 
economies of scale and despite the greater amount of domestic production both due to 
firms’ exit, output per firm might decline because of the large export fall for the 
industry as a whole [see (3.25)].
The last finding is in connection with social welfare (Table 3.3). Despite the 
impact on welfare being analytically ambiguous, the Hicksian equivalent variation 
index, which is w idely used in AGE analysis as an aggregate measure of welfare, is 
found to be negative in all scenarios. This implies that the RHK formula is not 
optimal in a GE framework. The welfare loss is due to the negative impact of the tax 
on global efficiency. In fact, the global resource allocation effect, measured by real 
aggregate output, ranges between - 0.3% and - 1.6% in the scenarios with fixed costs, 
and between - 1% and - 2.9% in the scenarios with sunk costs. With regard to the 
other partial effects on welfare [(see (3.26)], the most important is the impact on terms 
of trade, which ranges between 8.2% and 9% in both categories of scenarios; whereas 
the impact on intermediate inputs cost index and on the consumer price index is 
generally small.
Table 3.3 shows that, although the impact on terms of trade is similar in both 
categories of scenarios, the negative impact of the RHK export tax on aggregate 
output in the scenarios with sunk costs is around 50% larger, than the negative impact 
in the scenarios with fixed costs. This is because, in the scenarios with sunk costs, as a 
consequence of trade restriction, firms’ exit leads to a contraction of the capital 
endowment. Consequently, since the negative global efficiency effect is greater in 
absolute value, the welfare loss is much larger when a proportion o f factor inputs is
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sunk. In particular, when the benchmark is characterised by 25 homogenous firms, the 
welfare loss is estimated to be very large (- 2.9% as a percentage o f  consumer 
income). It is also interesting to note that when firms cooperate to a certain extent 
(X, = 2 ), the welfare loss is smaller and this due to the fact that, as a consequence o f  
the smaller exit, the negative impact on aggregate output is attenuated. So in 
conclusion, these results clearly indicate that the RHK. formula to determine an 
optimal export tax in a PE framework is not optimal in a GE setting.
[3.6] Conclusions
This chapter employs a GE model with increasing returns to scale and 
segmented markets to show that the positive optimal export tax, suggested by Rodrik 
(1989), Helpman and Krugman (1989) in a PE framework, might be sub-optimal in a 
GE setting. Under the symmetry assumption, I show that Rodrik’s formula is 
upwardly biased, because the impact on industry concentration, foreign demand 
elasticity and conjectural variation is not taken into account. I show that the foreign 
demand elasticity (in absolute value) is positively related to the export price. Thus, an 
export tax, raising the export price, brings about a rise in the foreign demand 
elasticity. I also show that the number o f  competing firms is positively related to 
output and negatively to the foreign demand elasticity. Thus, as a result o f  export 
contraction and higher foreign demand elasticity, an export tax leads to firms’ exit. 
Both these effects drive down the Rodrik’s export tax. Obviously, this result would be 
larger if  firms’ conjectures about the reaction o f  other firms were a positive function 
o f the industry concentration ratio. In addition, I show that the impact on firm size is 
indeterminate. It depends upon three factors: the size o f  the export contraction, the 
degree o f  exploiting fixed inputs and the capability o f  trading in the domestic market.
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A GE model applied to Turkish textiles and apparel shows that Rodrik’s export 
tax formula is upwardly biased by a small factor ranging between 1.034 and 1.089 
under constant conjectures. It supports the view that the smaller the ex-ante industry 
concentration ratio, the larger the RHK export tax, and the smaller the bias. The 
numerical results also indicate that the impact on firm output is highly indeterminate. 
As far as social welfare is concerned, despite its analytical indeterminacy, all scenarios 
show that welfare decreases with the introduction of the RHK export tax. The welfare 
loss would be larger in the presence of sunk costs. This numerical finding is very 
important from the policy-makers point o f view, as this can explain why developed 
countries do not impose positive export taxes. RHK suggests that an export tax should 
be positive in the presence o f a large industry (within the international market), a 
domestic oligopoly and no retaliation. However, the numerical finding indicates that it 
is not optimal, because the negative impact on output causes a global efficiency loss, 
which offsets the welfare gains, mainly coming from incremental terms of trade.
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CHAPTER 4
The Impact of a Customs Union with the EU on Turkey’s Welfare, 
Employment and Income Distribution: An AGE Analysis
[4.1] Introduction
In December 1995, the European Parliament ratified the customs union (CU) 
agreement with Turkey for mining and industrial products, with the exception of the 
commodities subject to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This preferential trade 
arrangement came into force in January 1996. Despite this, very few attempts have 
been made to analyse the economic implications of this agreement on Turkey 
(Harrison, et al. 1993, 1997;'* Mercenicr and Yeldan, 1997*9), and none of them has 
examined the impact on employment, and the distribution of income.
’* By using a representative consumer AGE model, Harrison, el at. (1997) estimate that Turkey’s 
welfare gain of the CU agreement will) lite EU is equal to 1.1% of 1990 Turkish GDP (2,861 Billions 
of 1990 Turkish lira). However, Uiis result has been obtained under die assumption dial die Turkish 
terms of trade lor noil-agricultural products with third countries rises by 4.2%. Harrison, el ill. claim 
that, hy the year 2001, Turkey will negotiate preferential trade agreements with diird countries, widi 
whom the EU has negotiated Association and Free Trade agreements. This assumption plays a key 
role in the estimate of die aggregate welfare gain. As Harrison, el ill. (1997, pp. 866-867) put it: 
“Improved access to these markets results in a gain in Turkish welfare of 0.5%, which is die largest 
gain of all the components.” However, die improved access has been extended to all non-member 
countries, whilst Turkish exports with die countries, which negotiated preferential access agreements 
widi die EU, are less than one diird of Turkish exports to all non-member slates (United Nations, 
1997).
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Trade and income distribution, and trade and employment have become two 
important issues among economists, as some o f the recent studies argue that trade 
with poor countries is the main source o f  both the decline in employment (Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; Sachs and Shatz, 1994; Wood, 1994) and the increase in wage 
inequality (MacPherson and Stewart, 1990; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1991; Murphy 
and Welch, 1991; Borjas and Ramey, 1994; Wood, 1994; Sachs and Shatz, 1996) in 
industrialised regions.39 40 The latter studies employ PE techniques to show that trade 
liberalisation widens the gap between the wage o f the skilled worker (the abundant 
factor) and the wage o f  the unskilled worker (the scarce factor).41 Similar results are 
obtained by McDougall and Tyers (1997), who use a multiregional AGE model to 
explore the impact o f  world trade “opening up" on factor price inequality within the 
developed countries. They also found that the wage-rental ratio declines in the 
developed countries, in accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states 
that with trade, aggregate welfare gains are accompanied by an income redistribution 
effect in favour o f  the factor which is intensively used in the production o f the 
exportable good. However, it is generally accepted that a trade policy satisfies the 
Pareto criterion o f  optimality, if  those who gain from the policy can fully compensate 
those who lose.
39 Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) use a representative agent multiregional intertemporal AGE model, 
with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, to show that the CU agreement with the EU 
is detrimental to Turkish welfare. They argue that this regional agreement would generate welfare gains 
to Turkish consumers if, and only if, full integration of the commodity market with nontariff barriers is 
achieved.
40 It must be stressed that other economists, such as Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Krugman and 
Lawrence (1993) and Bound and Johnson (1992), argue that trade is not an important contributor of the 
increasingly unequal distribution of wages, and plays a minor role in the contraction of U.S. 
manufacturing output and employment registered in the eighties. They believe that technological change 
is the cause of these trends in U.S. economy. In contrast, Wood (1994) argues that technology is only a 
further plausible force to explain the rise in relative demand of skilled labour in developed countries, in 
particular in U.S.. In this study, technological change is not modelled.
41 As MacPherson and Stewart ( 1990) pointed out, the immediate policy impact of this finding would be 
a request for trade protection by trade unions. The same concern is shared by Bhagwati and Dehejia 
(1994).
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Turkey is a middle income developing country abundant of both basic educated 
workers (basic skilled workers) and workers with virtually no schooling, who are 
unemployable in the manufacturing sector (no-skilled workers).42 Since Turkey levies 
very high sectoral tariffs on goods imported from both the EU and the non member 
states, and since the European CAP is not part o f the CU protocol, this preferential 
trading arrangement with the EU might favour a wage rise o f the basic skilled workers 
relative to both the skilled workers, who are richer, and the no-skilled workers, who 
are poorer. As a result, the impact on inequality is ambiguous. In addition, the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem enables one to determine the relationship which may exist between 
foreign trade and functional income distribution, but it cannot predict the effects on the 
size distribution of income, which depend upon the combined ownership structure of 
primary factors of production.43 In a recent study on the theory o f income distribution, 
Atkinson (1996, p. 20) says:
“Statements about the distribution of national income between wages and profits, or about the relative 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers, do not tell us directly how the share of the top 20 per cent or 
the bottom 20 per cent is likely to have changed. The factor distribution is certainly part of the story, 
but it is only part, and the other links in the chain need to receive more attention.”
Nowadays, households receive their income from different sources, including capital, 
in the form o f interest and dividends. In this study, each household income group 
engages its own members in eight different labour activities, owns two different shares 
of capital factor of production, and is a recipient of part of the quota rents which 
originate from the VER agreements with the EU.44 As a result, the finding that trade
42 In this study, 8 labour categories are distinguished in 3 skilled workers and 5 unskilled workers. In 
turn, the latter group is distinguished in 4 basic skilled workers and 1 no-skilled workers. The no- 
skilled workers are farmers, who are unemployable in modern manufacturing. Migration issues are 
not taken into account.
43 Adclman and Robinson (1989) provide a substantive discussion on these concepts.
44 The European Commission and the Istanbul Textiles and Clothing Exporters Association (ITK1B) 
have agreed quantitative restrictions and price mechanisms for Turkish textiles in 1982 and for 
clothing categories in 1986. Since then, the VERs arrangements have been regularly renewed (GATT,
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widens (reduces) the wage gap between skilled and basic skilled workers in developed 
(developing) countries cannot be used to predict the impact on overall inequality. It 
seems that the issue o f international trade and the size distribution of income has been 
neglected by trade theory mainly because it requires a general equilibrium framework 
where sectoral output, trade Ilows, prices, factor returns, factor inputs and households’ 
income are all simultaneously determined. So I have built a single country AGE model 
which is able to trace such effects in a multi-sector, multi-labour, multi-household 
framework, to quantify in a GE setting the effects o f the CU agreement with the EU 
upon the welfare of Turkish rural and urban households, and the functional and the size 
distribution of income in Turkey.4'
As I have mentioned above, with regard to the issue of trade and employment, 
several studies show that the trade liberalisation process is the cause o f the decline 
(increase) in manufacturing employment in industrialised (developing) countries 
(Wood, 1994). So it is important to examine what might be the impact o f the CU 
agreement on Turkish employment. The technique employed follows Krugman’s model 
of global trade, employment and wages (Krugman, 1995). Krugman uses a stylised 
numerical GE two-country model with two productive inputs, skilled labour and *45
1994). The elimination of the VER on Turkish textiles and apparel exports is an important issue of 
the preferential trade arrangement agreed with the EU. The Turkish production of textiles and apparel 
comprises 13% of Turkey’s industrial production, and their exports represent 38% of merchandise 
exports. Most of them are exported to the European market. Hence, the elimination of the VERs could 
have an important impact on the Turkish economy. Certainly, the quota rents on textiles and apparel 
accruing to the exporting firms, and transferred to households, would be annulled; although the output 
of these sectors would expand, affecting sectoral factor mobility, welfare and, as a consequence, the 
distribution of income. Also Harrison, el al. (1997) assume that Turkish exporters obtain improved 
access in textiles and apparel, which consists of an exogenous increase of the prices received by 
Turkish exporters to the EU on these goods. However, die quota rents are not annulled. Hence, they 
over-estimate the computed welfare gains.
45 The analysis of economic policies on income distribution with AGE models has a long tradition. 
Adclman and Robinson (1978) were pioneering in this regard, as they examined the impact of various 
policies affecting income distribution in Korea. Their mtxlcl identifies 15 different categories of 
income recipients, classified according to Uicir skills. However, the impact on the size distribution of 
income has been derived indirectly, by using the calculation on factor incomes and by assuming that 
the size distribution of income within each occupational group is represented by a lognormal 
distribution.
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unskilled labour, and two goods, one exportable and one importable, to study the 
impact o f  trade on employment o f  an industrialised country in the case o f rigid real 
wages. His model predicts a fairly large negative employment effect, in relation to the 
labour input used intensively in producing the importable good. Following Krugman 
(1995), the employment implications o f  the CU agreement on the Turkish economy 
have been examined under the assumption that real wages are constant. Since Turkish 
industries employ unskilled workers intensively in manufacturing exportable goods, 
the CU leads to a rise in Turkish employment, as one would expect from the Krugman 
model applied to a developing country. I estimate that the number of new jobs created 
is equal to almost 148000. As Turkish manufacturing industries expand, the demand 
o f basic skilled production workers rises substantially, comprising 75% o f the new 
jobs created.
The second important finding is that although, in terms o f changes in real 
income, the owners o f  basic skilled labour (the abundant factor) are better off than 
both the owners o f  skilled labour and the owners o f  capital (the scarce factors), the 
impact on inequality in Turkey is ambiguous: it increases in the scenario with fixed 
wages and declines in the scenario with flexible wages. This is due to the fall (rise) in 
both agricultural capital income and farmers’ earnings in the scenario with fixed 
(flexible) wages, which brings about a substantial rise (decline) o f inequality between 
urban and rural household groups. This suggests that the analysis o f trade impact on 
the distribution o f  income, only carried out with models which define household 
groups according to their functional role and under the full employment assumption, 
such as the Stolper-Samuelson model, might be misleading.
To measure the impact on welfare, I use the Hicksian equivalent variation, 
which is widely used in AGE literature. The results indicate that although Turkey’s 
welfare gain is in aggregate equal to 1226-2750 billions o f  1990 Turkish lira (470- 
1054 million US dollars), the welfare impact on most o f  individual households
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depends hugely on the assumption made for the labour market. In particular, several 
urban groups would suffer large welfare losses in the case o f  flexible wages.
The static single country AGE model for the Turkish economy presented in 
this study specifies 20 urban household groups and 19 rural household groups, 
disaggregated by income class. Factor inputs (8 different labour categories and 1 
capital) are fully mobile among sectors. In addition, unlike the Kxugman model where 
traded goods are homogenous, it is assumed that domestic products, imports and 
exports are imperfect substitutes, in order to capture the cross-hauling phenomenon. 
The model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and this is 
because the literature on trade liberalisation and income distribution, which I hope to 
contribute to, makes these assumptions. The intra-industry trade model used for this 
study adopts the consumption tax base definition o f  the VAT, as the effective VAT 
rates in Turkey are not uniform among commodities. The multiregional relations have 
been described in the form o f  two trade flows, one with the EU and one with the Rest 
o f the World (RoW). To measure inequality, the income received by household 
members, adjusted by the households’ “true” cost o f living index, has been employed 
as a unit o f measure.
The study also consists o f a further four sections. Section 2 defines the 
algebraic specification o f the model, and the measures o f  welfare and income 
inequality. Section 3 describes the benchmark. Section 4 explores the effects o f the 
policy simulations, and the final section provides some conclusions.
[4.2] Model Specification
The trade model presented in this study is a standard static multi-sector, multi-labour, 
multi-household AGE model for Turkey with perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. It is characterised by intra-industry trade as each tradeable commodity is
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exchanged in five different markets: the domestic market; the markets for imports from 
the EU, and the RoW; and the markets for export to the EU, and the RoW. This 
implies that although Turkey is assumed to be a price taker of international goods, 
domestic prices are endogenously determined. To simplify the presentation, the 
specification of the model is divided into five components: production technology and 
factor demand, treatment o f  traded goods and foreign sector closure, household 
revenues and consumption, government revenues and consumption, and treatment of 
savings and investment decisions. In addition, the welfare and the income distribution 
measures have been reported. The complete algebraic formulation of the model is 
shown in Appendix 4.A.
¡4.2.11 Technology and factor demand
The production technology is described by a three stage nested separable CES 
function. At the first stage, sectoral production is generated as a Leontief function 
between raw-material inputs, which are assumed to be strictly complementary, and the 
value added, which is, at the second stage, a CES combination of three factor inputs, 
such as composite skilled labour, composite unskilled labour and capital. At the final 
stage, composite skilled labour and composite unskilled labour are respectively a CES 
aggregation of different skilled occupational categories and of different unskilled 
occupational categories.
The demand for factor inputs is derived by solving a two stage dual problem. 
Firstly, the minimisation o f the skilled (unskilled) labour cost function subject to the 
skilled (unskilled) labour aggregation function yields the demand of labour for different 
skilled (unskilled) occupational categories. Secondly, the minimisation of the total cost 
function subject to the production technology yields the demand for composite skilled 
labour, for composite unskilled labour and for capital. In other words, producers 
behave competitively and the factor returns equal their marginal revenue product.
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It is assumed that factor inputs are mobile between sectors. Total labour 
demand of each category is equal to exogenous labour supply of each category only 
when wages are flexible, whereas total capital demand always equates exogenous 
aggregate capital. In addition, since Turkish farmers are virtually without schooling, 
they are unemployable in manufacturing. Or to put it in another way, since 95% of 
employed persons in Turkish agriculture are self-employed or unpaid family labour 
(Bulutay, 1995), it is assumed that any effect of the trade policy is perceived on 
farmers’ wages.
[4.2.2J Treatment o f traded goods and foreign sector closure 
[4.2.2.11 Imports
As far as the imports arc concerned, on the supply side, the small country assumption 
is postulated with respect to both regions. Hence, the import supply functions are 
represented by the import price equations for the EU ( p m fu ) and the RoW ( pm* 'w) 
commodities:
the EU and the RoW, respectively; and tm fu and tm^oW are the effective ad valorem
regional import tariff rates, gross of the effective ad valorem Mass Housing Fund 
levies on EU and RoW commodities evaluated in terms of tariff equivalent.4'’ 46
46 Turkey has levied this surcharge on imports since 1984, the year of the Housing Fund law approved 
by the Turkish Parliament to finance the government's low cost housing scheme for poor and middle- 
class income households. The Mass Housing Fund duty will be phased out in 1998 (GATT, 1994).
(4.1)
(4.2)
where pwm ** and p w m are the fixed world prices o f similar imports produced by
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On the import demand side, a two stage nested separable CES function is 
employed. Thus, it is assumed that buyers first decide between domestically produced 
goods and the composite imported commodities, and then choose between imports 
from the EU ( M fu ) and imports from the RoW ( M *oW) with elasticity o f substitution 
P j ,  according to the Armington specification (Armington, 1969), which states that 
products of different countries competing in the same market are imperfect substitutes:
where M ' denotes the composite imports, pm^ is the composite domestic price of 
imports, A ( and a  • are the shift and the share parameters o f the CES import 
aggregation function.
14.2.2.21 Exports and VERs
With regard to exports, on the demand side, the small country assumption implies the 
export demand functions to both regions to be infinitely elastic. Hence, the Turkish 
export production is totally absorbed by foreign trade partners at world prices. 
However, for goods subject to VERs, the domestic supply price o f  exports ( p e f" ) is 
endogenously determined by the amount of output which is agreed to be exported. 
Hence,
represents the ad valorem export quota premium parameter on Turkish textiles and
(4.3)
(4.4)
---------EV
(4.5)
where pw e*■" is the fixed price of exports prevailing in the EU market, and qrf'"
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apparel. When qrf"  is zero, the domestic supply price of exports to the EU is equal to 
the price prevailing in the EU market.
On the supply side, the export supply functions to the EU ( E fu ) and the RoW 
( E ‘tioW) are derived by maximising total export sale revenues subject to the export 
possibility frontier ( E[ ), which is defined by a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function. Hence,
elasticity o f transformation, B, and [), the shift and the share parameters o f  the CET 
export aggregation function. The composite export, E\ , is in turn derived by 
maximising total sales (domestic sales, plus export sales) subject to the production 
possibility frontier, which is a transformation function of the domestic good and the 
composite export with constant elasticity.
The rents from VERs ( VERfu ), which arc allocated to the Turkish exporting 
sectors,47 and then transferred to households, arc proportional to the agreed quota 
premium and the level o f exports:
When qrfM is zero, quota rents disappear.
47 Since the Turkish government does not officially recognise any quota restriction, VERs agreements 
could only be made with Turkish industry associations (GATT, 1904). Thus, the rents from VERs 
accrued to the exporting firms which were able to obtain the export quota documents for deliveries to 
the EU.
(4.6)
(4.7)
where pwe* " is the fixed price o f exports prevailing in the RoW market, T|,- the
(4.8)
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[4.2.2.31 Foreign sector closure
The current account deficit, CA , is exogenously specified. Thus, the equilibrium in the 
balance of payments is:
(4.9) X  + X  P ^ * OWE*°w +CA = X  ~pyvm^UM fu + X  ~P^ *° W ■
< > )
[4.2.3] Households’ revenues and consumption 
[4.2.3.11 Households ’ revenues
The household sector comprises 20 urban and 19 rural household groups classified 
according to their income size. This disaggregation allows one to identify the losers 
and the gainers of the CU agreement between Turkey and the EU. The source of 
private income ( HRh ) originates from wage payments, returns to capital, plus rents 
from VERs:
(4.10) HRh - X & 5 X I *  + Q ^ r A K aer+ ^ A j j rAK„agr+ J j VERfu \
c i agr \rtagr i /
where i = agr u  nagr , AKagr and AKnagr denote the net capital factor in agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities, respectively; Lic represents the different labour 
categories employed in sector i\ r and wc are the returns on capital and labours of 
different skills’ categories, respectively; C,!kr represents the distributive share 
parameters of labour income to households; and ^*r and represent the
distributive share parameters of agricultural and non-agricultural capital incomes to 
households, respectively. Since the Turkish government did not take part in the VERs 
arrangements with the EU, the rents accrued directly to the private companies, which
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then distributed them back to shareholders in the form of dividends, and therefore in 
proportion to £J“*r .
14.2.3.2] Households ’ consumption
Since the model is static, the households’ utility functions are defined only over 
composite commodities. The households’ consumption behaviour is obtained by 
maximising their utility functions, subject to their disposable income after deduction of 
savings, which are simply measured by the product between the average propensity to 
save and households’ disposable income. Because of lack of data on the values o f the 
elasticity o f  substitution among commodities for each household group, consumers’ 
preferences have been described simply by Cobb-Douglas utility functions.48
[4.2.41 Government revenues and expenditure
The government levies various taxes in order to finance its expenditures: a direct tax 
on household income; duties on imported goods; and indirect taxes on goods and 
services. Despite the VAT system only being introduced in Turkey in 1985, VAT has 
become the main component of indirect tax revenues. AGE modellers usually levy the 
VAT rates on wage payments, plus the return to capital net of depreciation, thus 
assuming a proportionate tax on the value added by the firm (income tax base 
definition o f  the VAT).49 However, by definition, VAT applies to commodities’ sales 
net of all intermediate goods purchases (consumption tax base definition of the VAT). 
The consumption tax base definition of VAT is an equivalent concept of the income 
tax base definition only if the tax rate is uniform among commodities. However, the
4* Harrison, el al. (1997) employs a CES utility function for their model with a representative 
consumer. The elasticity of substitution is also assumed ad hoc, and equal to 1.5.
“ Harrison, et al. (1997) for example employ the VAT, defined on the income side, as a replacement 
tax to examine the impact of the CU agreement on Turkey’s welfare.
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effective VAT rates in Turkey are commodity specific.50 Hence, the consumption tax 
base definition of the indirect taxes has been employed as replacement tax to perform a 
revenue neutral tariff reform. A fuel consumption tax is also considered.
With regard to the apportionment of customs’ revenues to Turkey, it is 
assumed that these revenues are distributed to the members of the EU in proportion to 
their imports from the RoW (Corden, 1984). Thus, the duties on RoW imports 
collected by Turkey continue to be considered revenues of the Turkish government 
after the CU agreement.
Public expenditure is simply treated as exogenous transfers to households and 
foreign institutions, and exogenous consumption of public goods and services in real 
terms. Thus, the government is a separate consuming agent; however its consumption 
decisions are not affected by price changes.
[4.2.5] Savings and investment decisions
Since the purpose o f the model is to measure the static effects o f the preferential trade 
arrangements with the EU, savings and investment decisions have been treated in a 
simple fashion. Households’ savings are a constant proportion of disposable income; 
foreign savings, given by the current account deficit, are set exogenously; the budget 
deficit is exogenously specified as a difference between public revenues and exogenous 
public expenditure; capital depreciation is also assumed to be exogenous. Aggregate 
savings always equates aggregate investment, set exogenously in the model. 
Investment spending in each sector is held constant in real terms.
50 The VAT system has been introduced in Turkey in 19X5. As has been reported by the OECD (1992, 
1995), the lax administration is still inadequate in die lace of a large underground economy. Hence, 
despite the general VAT rate being 12% in 1990, die effective VAT rate is not uniform among 
commodities.
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[4.2.6] Welfare and inequality measures
Two main indices are constructed to measure welfare changes in AGE literature: the 
equivalent variation and the compensating variation. Since they are very similar 
concepts, I use the Hicksian equivalent variation to study the impact o f the partial 
trade liberalisation policy on each household income group. The welfare o f urban and 
rural household income groups, and o f the Turkish nation as a whole, is an additive 
aggregation o f  the welfare o f each household income group. 51
As far as the measurement o f  inequality is concerned, the study focuses on the 
inequality between urban and rural household members. The number o f members 
within each household group varies substantially, and many o f  them are concentrated 
around the bottom and middle o f the income distribution. This implies that 
considerable information would be lost if  the income received by household income 
groups is used as a unit to measure inequality.52 Since the data source does not 
provide any additional information concerning the income redistribution among 
household members in each income class group, the arithmetic mean income across 
household members in each income class group ( hrh ) has been employed to examine 
the CU impact on the size distribution o f income. However, income does not capture 
directly the price effect as tariffs fall. Thus, the ratio between hrh and the ‘true’ cost
51 Although this procedure is widely used in cost-benefit analysis, it presents problems related to 
interpersonal utility comparisons, which are described in Boadway (1974). However, if one accepts the 
Pareto criterion of optimality, the aggregation is admissible. A more general discussion can be found in 
Hammond (1991).
52 Assume that there are two households groups (I urban household group and I rural household 
group), each earning the same income. Obviously, income is equally distributed among household 
groups. Assume now that the urban household group has one member and that the rural household 
group is composed of k members. In this case, income would be unequally distributed among household 
members. This implies that the use of the income received by household groups as a unit of measure of 
inequality would be imprecise.
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I0
o f living index, Ph = n (p ; /•Qjh) where 0 j(, denotes the household budget share for
good j ,  (that is, the indirect utility function) is used as a basis to measure inequality.51 *3
A set o f  general entropy indices for discrete distributions (GEg) has been 
employed to measure inequality. Given the assumption that, within each income class 
group, members receive the same income, GEe can be written as:
where kh represents the number o f household members in each household income
group h ; K  the total number of members; hr" the arithmetic mean income across 
household members for the entire population in real terms; H  the number of 
households income groups, which is 39 (i.e. 20 urban and 19 rural household income 
groups); and 0 an arbitrary parameter which in principle can assume any real value, 
although particular values generate known inequality measures as specific cases. The 
generalised entropy index measures the average distance between each person’s real 
actual income and the real income he would receive in a perfectly equal society. The 
advantage o f this is that one can derive the inequality measure directly, without 
postulating the existence o f  a social welfare function, and discussing its desired 
properties (Cowell, 1995). The generalised entropy index has also been chosen as an 
indicator o f income inequality because it has three main important properties: it 
satisfies the strong principle o f  transfer, according to which the change in inequality 
depends only on the “distance” between individual income shares, no matter which 
individuals one chooses; it is additively decomposable by population subgroups; and it 
encompasses all other measures that are ordinally equivalent: the entire subfamily of 
Atkinson indices (0  < 1), the Theil index (0  = 1) and half o f the square o f the
51 It must be stressed that household income does not adjust for differences in needs between
households (so called equivalisalion process), but only for the number of individuals (so called
reweighting process). A fuller discussion on these issues can be found in Cowell (1984), Danziger and 
Taussig ( 1979), and G lewwe (1991).
0 H
(4.11)
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coefficient oi variation (0  = 2 ).54 The additive decomposability property is very 
important for this study because one can compare the inter group income inequality 
among rural and urban areas and the inter group income inequalities among household 
members partitioned according to their geographical location.55
4.3. Features and properties of the benchmark
The benchmark for this study is mainly based upon the SAM for Turkey constructed 
for the year 1990 by the author in collaboration with Ozhan (De Santis and Ozhan, 
1995).56 This SAM does not provide information regarding regional trade data 
disaggregation. Thus, further sources have been used, such as a recent unpublished 
document of the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey (SIS), which shows the Turkish 
trade flows with the EU for the year 1990, and a recent unpublished dissertation by 
Kose (1995), who reports the import duties and the Mass Housing Fund duties, both 
disaggregated at regional level and consistent with the aggregate data published in the 
official Input-Output table for Turkey (SIS, 1994).
The SAM defines the cost o f labour in terms of wages and salaries in line with 
the official Input-Output table for Turkey. In other words, it includes only the cost of 
employees. This implies that sectors, such as agriculture, dominated by self-employed 
and unpaid family labour, would be characterised by an underestimated ratio between 
labour and capital. Since self-employed and unpaid family labour comprise almost 95% 
of the employed persons in Turkish agriculture (Bulutay, 1995), and since this might 
effect the computation o f  the impact o f the CU agreement on the size and the 
functional distribution o f income, I have calculated the total farmers’ earnings in
54 For proof and further discussion see Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980), Cowell and Kuga (1981a, 
1981b), Shorrocks (1980).
55 Appendix 4.B describes the measurement of inequality in more detail.
56 Some of the data have been already reported in Table 2.1 and Appendix 2.C.
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Turkish agriculture for the year 1990, by using as a basis the average nominal wage in 
agriculture estimated by Bulutay for the year 1989 (Bulutay, 1995).57 According to my 
estimates for agriculture, the ratio between farmers’ earnings and value added is 
45.01%, and the ratio between total labour cost and value added is 48.09%. In the 
SAM, these two ratios are respectively equal to 7.06% and 10.13%.
Table 4.1 shows a schematic representation o f a SAM used for this study. Its 
main features are that firstly, the trade flows of Turkey are distinguished in two 
geographical directions: one with the EU and one with the RoW; and secondly, the 
rents on exports subject to the VERs are an income source of the factors of production 
accruing to the exporting firms. These aggregate accounts are disaggregated as 
follows: factor labour is disaggregated into 8 different types o f labour categories;58 
households are disaggregated according to their income size and to their geographical 
regions (20 rural and 19 urban households); activities and commodities are 
disaggregated into 20 different types and classified according to the 1-0 table 
classification.59 The accounts for imports and exports are disaggregated to model the 
relations with the EU and the RoW.60
Table 4.2 shows the source of income of urban and rural households, 
disaggregated by their income size and split in twentieth percentiles. Each income class 
group contains a large number of household members.
57 I have also considered the fact that the index of prices received by farmers increased by 62.8% from 
1989 to 1990 (SPO, 1996), and that the full time equivalent work in agriculture is 41% of the entire 
time, as it has been estimated for similar European countries, such as Greece (EC, 1996).
58 Partly following Wood (1994), I classify professional workers, managerial workers and clerical 
workers as the skilled labour group, with post-basic education; sales workers, service workers, non- 
agricultural workers and other workers as the unskilled labour group, with basic education; and the 
agricultural workers as the no skilled labour group, with virtually no schooling.
59 The disaggregated 1990 SAM for Turkey comprises 54 sectors. Since the formation of CU between 
Turkey and the EU involves only mining and manufacturing commodities, the author has mainly 
aggregated the sectors subject to the CAP, mining and services. Mining has been aggregated mainly 
because it is a very small sector in terms of share in the GDP, labour force employed and volume of 
trade.
60 The EU is composed of 15 countries: 12 members existing in 1990, plus the new members Finland, 
Austria and Sweden. See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.
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In aggregate, the geographical subgroups are composed of about 25 million urban 
household members and almost 28 million rural household members. It is evident that 
much of the urban and rural population is concentrated in the bottom-middle of the 
income distribution. In fact, 87.7% of urban household members (almost 22 millions) 
and 91.2% or rural household members (almost 25 millions) earn an income level 
below the eleventh percentile. In addition, 69.8% of labour income and 55.2% of 
capital income is allocated among urban household members, which represent only 
47.4% of the population. This implies that intra group income inequality as well as 
inter group income inequality are important features of Turkey. It is also interesting to 
note, for the subsequent numerical analysis on income inequality, that the main income 
source of rural households is agricultural labour and capital incomes. A contraction 
(expansion) in agriculture would imply a fall (rise) in rural welfare and a rise (fall) in 
inter group income inequality.
Table 4.3 shows the ad valorem effective indirect tax rates on goods and 
services, the ad valorem effective duties levied on foreign imports, the quota premium 
and the European common external tariff. It is evident that the sectors which are much 
more protected by an effective tariff are beverages and tobacco, wearing apparel, 
footwear, wood and wood products, petroleum and coal products, non metallic 
mineral products and transport equipment. One might expect that these sectors are 
those which would be much more affected by the CU with the EU. The ad valorem 
effective net indirect tax rates { t j ) have been derived from De Santis and Ozhan
(1995). The duties levied by the EU on Turkish commodities and the European 
common external tariff are published by the Commission of the European Communities 
on an annual base (CEC, 1990). The duties levied by the EU on Turkish goods are 
zero. Since the EU imports a large number o f differentiated commodities from non­
member countries, which are subject to a large range of different duties, the mode has 
been employed in this study as the average European common external tariff ( cet*°w).
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Table 4.3 Indirect tax rate, tariff, quota premium, 
and common external tariff (%)
SECTORS •J t-*EUItYlj tnRoWtnij < , . RoWcetj
Agriculture 0.3 18.3 17.9 0.0 12.0
Mining 17.1 1.0 0.9 0.0 2.4
Food processed products 1.0 14.8 14.2 0.0 12.0
Beverages and tobacco 0.8 145.0 91.9 0.0 24.0
Textiles 8.4 14.5 16.5 5.0 9.0
Wearing apparel 4.0 61.2 0.7 15.0 13.0
Leather and fu r products 12.4 4.3 3.2 0.0 3.1
Footwear 4.0 166.6 32.3 0.0 11.7
Wood and wood products 6.7 19.1 67.9 0.0 5.7
Chemical products 1.1 21.9 35.0 0.0 7.3
Petroleum and coal products 32.8 112.1 94.6 0.0 3.1
Non-metallic mineral products 7.6 35.8 56.1 0.0 5.2
Metal products 18.9 9.6 2.9 0.0 5.1
Machinery 2.1 17.4 29.8 0.0 5.0
Transport equipment 2.6 34.2 40.6 0.0 7.0
Electricity, gas and waterworks 0.5 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0
Construction 2.7 - - - -
Trade, restaurants and hotels 0.6 - - - -
Transport and communication 3.5 - - - -
Other services 11.8 - - - -
With regard to the quota restriction on Turkish textiles and wearing apparel exports to 
the EU, the exogenous increase on the export price of these goods, used by Harrison, 
etal. (1997), is assumed to be the ad valorem quota premium on VERs ( q r fv ).
It is important to note for the subsequent analysis on welfare that the European 
common external tariff rates are lower than the tariff rates levied on Turkish imports 
from the RoW, with the only exemption o f mining, wearing apparel and metal 
products. This implies that the CU should not be trade diverting.
9 2
With regard to the elasticity values, the factor substitution elasticities, the 
Armington trade elasticities, and the elasticities o f transformation have been selected 
from Harrison, et al. (1992), and some of them have been adjusted for differences in 
sectoral aggregation (see Table 2.2). In addition, because o f the lack of data, the 
elasticities o f substitution among skilled and unskilled labour categories are assumed to 
be equal to 2 and 5, respectively.
With regard to the calibration o f all other parameter values, such as initial 
prices, direct tax rates on household income, marginal propensities to save, factor 
income distribution shares, shift and share parameters of different functional forms, the 
standard techniques widely used in AGE literature are employed (Mansur and Whalley, 
1984).61
4.4. The revenue-neutral tariff reform scenarios
The preferential trading arrangement between Turkey and the EU is a regional 
economic integration agreement, signed in respect o f the GATT’s rules, according to 
which the member countries remove tariffs and quotas on mining and manufacturing 
commodities which circulate within the CU, and apply a common external tariff on 
these commodities from outside the CU. As a result, nominal protection rates on 
goods subject to the European CAP (that is, agricultural and food processed 
commodities) remain unchanged.
The indirect tax rate has been used as a policy instrument manoeuvrable by 
policy-makers to perform a revenue-neutral tariff reform. This experiment has been 
carried out under two different assumptions: firstly, real wages are assumed to be rigid 
(with the exception o f  farmers’ wages), which implies that the effects of trade are
61 The calibration procedure can be found in Appendix 4.C, which reports the GAMS code of the 
model.
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manifested in changes in employment; and, secondly, real wages are assumed to be 
flexible and full employment is maintained.
Tables 4.4-4.6 report the economic impact of policy scenarios upon sectoral 
output, value added, and trade flows in Turkey. Tables 4.7-4.9 show the consequences 
on welfare and the distribution of income among Turkish urban and rural households. 
Finally, Table 4.10 shows the impact on Turkish employment.
Table 4.4 The impact on output and exports (Base year = 1(H))
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Exports Exports Exports Exports
Sectors Output EU RoW Output EU RoW
Agriculture 97.8 84.6 84.6 102.6 110.1 110.1
Mining 99.7 126.6 126.6 99.1 128.3 128.3
Food processed products 103.6 110.4 110.4 103.6 109.9 109.9
Beverages and tobacco 107.0 154.1 154.1 105.3 150.7 150.7
Textiles 115.0 148.2 116.1 98.8 102.6 80.4
Wearing apparel 94.3 108.7 54.0 121.5 162.7 80.9
Leather and fu r products 138.1 222.3 222.3 175.6 317.2 317.2
Footwear 107.8 186.1 186.1 106.2 182.2 182.1
Wood and wood products 101.0 137.1 137.1 99.2 130.5 130.5
Chemical products 103.3 136.4 136.4 105.8 146.1 146.1
Petroleum and coal products 89.3 44.4 44.4 88.3 41.7 41.7
Non-metallic mineral products 103.9 146.1 146.1 101.8 135.2 135.2
Metal products 108.8 129.0 129.0 107.7 126.4 126.4
Machinery 101.3 122.5 122.5 100.6 121.4 121.4
Transport equipment 101.6 149.2 149.2 100.8 148.3 148.3
electricity gas 99.2 55.9 55.9 96.6 48.9 48.9
Construction 100.0 . - 100.0 - .
Trade, restaurants and hotels 100.2 98.1 98.1 97.3 89.2 89.2
Transport and communication 101.2 104.2 104.2 100.3 103.3 103.3
Other services 99.1 96.2 96.2 97.4 90.5 90.5
Levsperes Quantity Index 101.7 116.6 108.4 100.7 114.2 109.1
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It is evident from Table 4.4 that the partial trade liberalisation policy favours a 
positive re-allocation of resources in Turkey: aggregate output, measured by the 
Leysperes quantity index, increases by 0.7%-1.7%. The major growing sectors are 
food processed products, beverages and tobacco, textiles (in the scenario with fixed 
wages), apparel (in the scenario with flexible wages), leather and fur products, 
footwear, chemical and non-metallic mineral products. These are the sectors where 
Turkey faces a comparative advantage and is in a position to compete with foreign 
countries, in particular with the European member states.62 63Despite the elimination of 
the VER in textiles towards the EU market, this sector might contract (i.e. scenario 
with flexible wages), if it is easy to switch sales from markets which are not 
constrained from VERs; and this has been postulated in this model by assuming a large 
elasticity of transformation among goods exported towards the EU and the RoW. In 
contrast, apparel rises in the flexible wages case, and contracts in the fixed wage case. 
The explanation used for textiles is also valid for apparel. However, apparel exports 
towards the previously restricted EU market expand to the detriment of exports to non 
EU countries for two further reasons: firstly, the European common external tariff rate 
in apparel is larger than the tariff rate levied on Turkish apparel imports from the non 
member states; and secondly, the domestic demand in apparel is now satisfied by a 
large increase of apparel imports from the EU, which were previously protected by a 
huge effective tariff. The commodities which are favoured by the trade policy are 
industrial products to the detriment of services. Agriculture might contract as it is still 
heavily protected.6' In fact, the value added in industry increases by 4.1%-5.4%; whilst 
the value added in agriculture increases by 2.5% in the scenario with flexible wages, 
but decreases by 5.4% in the scenario with fixed wages (see Table 4.5). In aggregate,
62 In support of this finding, it is important to consider a study by Celasun (1994), which measures the 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for 26 Turkish industries for the period 1987-89. This study 
shows that the sectors having a positive RCA value are texliles-clothing-shoes, furniture, ceramic- 
glass, food-beverage-tobacco, rubber-plastic, petrol refineries, and iron-steel.
63 In the future, the liberalisation of the European CAP and the enlargement of the CU agreement to 
agricultural commodities might favour the expansion of Turkish agriculture.
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GDP rises by 0.5%-0.9% in real terms. Hence, as a first finding, despite the aggregate 
impact on GDP being modest, the value added breakdown clearly shows that resources 
are reallocated favouring a remarkable expansion of the Turkish industrial sectors.
Table 4.5 The impact on the value added (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
GDP in real terms 100.9 100.5
- Agriculture 94.6 102.5
- Industry 105.4 104.1
- Services 99.1 96.8
Table 4.6 reports the impact on trade flows. The partial trade liberalisation 
policy in favour of the EU increases the trade budget deficit with the EU by 5.1%- 
38%, and raises the aggregate trade volume with respect to the GDP by almost 10%. 
The impact o f the CU on the import volume from the EU and the RoW is an indicator 
of the Vinerian trade creation and trade diversion effects. The volume of imports from 
both regions rises, and this implies that the CU agreement is not trade diverting. The 
latter outcome is due to the fact that Turkish tariffs levied on goods imported from 
non-member states are bigger than the European common external tariffs in most 
commodities (see Table 4.3).
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T able 4.6 The im pact on the trade flow s (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Trade balance deficit 100.0 100.0
Trade balance deficit with the EU 105.1 138.0
Trade balance deficit with the RoW 99.5 95.9
Trade volume/GDP 110.2 109.7
Volume of exports 113.0 111.9
Volume of exports to the EU 116.6 114.2
Volume of exports to the RoW 108.4 109.1
Volume of imports 109.8 109.0
Volume of imports from the EU 116.0 115.5
Volume of imports from the RoW 104.8 103.8
Volume of exports in agriculture 84.6 110.1
Volume of exports in industry 125.8 125.1
Volume of exports in services 101.1 96.8
Volume of imports in agriculture 108.7 97.3
Volume of imports in industry 110.5 110.0
V olume of imports in services 100.1 100.7
Also the volume of exports is positively affected by the trade policy rising by 11.9%- 
13%. In particular, industrial exports increase by almost 25%, especially toward the 
EU, thanks to the elimination of VERs in textiles and wearing apparel. So, in summary, 
Tables 4.4-4.6 indicate that the regional agreement with the EU leads to an enormous 
re-allocation o f resources in favour of manufacturing industries, expands trade volume 
and is not trade diverting.
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T able 4.7 T he im pact on welfare
Region Income class Fixed wages Flexible wages
1st group
Billions o f 
1990 TL
16.3
Base year 
100
101.3
Billions o f 
1990 TL
2.8
Base year 
100
100.2
2nd group 215.5 102.9 103.0 101.4
3rd group 180.5 101.4 -0.2 100.0
4th group 185.8 101.4 - 33.0 99.8
u 5 th group 166.3 101.3 - 66.6 99.5
r 6th group 145.0 101.2 - 79.0 99.3b 7th group 114.2 100.9 - 142.5 98.8
a 8th group 61.7 100.6 - 163-3 98.4
n 9th group 106.0 101.1 - 107.8 98.8
1 Oth group 84.5 101.1 -91.9 98.8
g 11 th group 111.8 100.7 - 278.8 98.1r 12th group 127.7 101.0 - 176.1 98.6
o 13th group 13.2 100.1 - 242.6 97.5
u 14th group 38.1 100.5 - 187.9 97.6
p 15 th group 33.1 100.6 - 132.9 97.7s 16th group 189.2 101.1 -317.3 98.2
17th group 161.7 101.9 -95.7 98.9
18th group 635.7 103.6 24.1 100.1
19th group 31.4 100.5 - 155.7 97.4
20th group 141.7 104.4 6.2 100.2
Urban Areas 2759.3 101.4 - 2135.2 99.1
1 st group 3.2 100.2 31.6 102.1
2nd group - 1.8 100.0 127.7 102.0
3rd group 58.1 100.5 222.6 102.1
4th group 29.7 100.2 311.2 102.4
R 5 th group - 32.1 99.8 285.2 102.2
u 6th group - 22.7 99.8 302.2 102.7
r 7th group -4.0 100.0 301.0 103.1
a 8 th group - 38.1 99.5 232.7 102.8
i 9th group - 58.8 99.2 214.6 102.8
1 Oth group - 38.7 99.2 162.0 103.4
g 11 th group - 113.0 99.0 346.1 103.1r 12th group -43.8 99.4 206.9 102.9
o 13th group 31.3 100.7 102.0 102.4
u 14th group 76.0 101.5 98.5 101.9
P 15th group 25.5 101.0 60.5 102.3s 16th group 38.6 100.6 98.6 101.6
17th group 16.0 100.3 168.1 103.5
18th group 50.8 101.1 97.3 102.0
19th group 14.8 101.9 - 7.3 99.1
Rural Areas ■9.1 100.0 3361.4 102.5
Turkey 2750.3 100.8 1226.3 100.4
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Table 4.7 reports the Hicksian equivalent variation for urban and rural 
household income groups and the aggregate measures o f welfare. The positive sign 
indicates an improvement for the household in question. The Hicksian equivalent 
variation indices are measured as a percentage o f household income. It is clear that as 
a consequence of the CU agreement, aggregate welfare for the nation as a whole rises, 
supporting the view that the preferential trading agreement with the EU is not trade 
diverting. In aggregate, the static welfare gains in Turkey are modest, as are typically 
found in most o f AGE models with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, 
dealing with trade liberalisation issues. As a percentage o f  household income, they 
range between 0.4% in the case o f flexible wages and 0.8% in the case o f  fixed wages. 
Namely, they range between 1226 and 2750 billions o f 1990 Turkish lira (470-1054 
million US dollars).64
The results on welfare become more interesting when the welfare impact is 
decomposed among urban and rural household income groups. In the scenario with 
flexible wages, the urban household groups suffer an aggregate welfare loss o f 2135 
billions o f 1990 Turkish lira, whereas rural households gain 3361 billions o f 1990 
Turkish lira. The opposite outcome is obtained in the scenario with fixed wages. 
However, in this case, rural household groups suffer a negligible welfare loss in 
aggregate. In summary, although the preferential trading agreement with the EU is not 
trade diverting, the welfare effects vary across the household groups, and according to 
the assumptions postulated for the labour market; the CU is potentially Pareto 
superior; and the welfare gains would be larger, and would benefit a greater number of 
household groups, if  policy-makers encourage institutions to bargain a wage rate such 
that the real wages remain constant.
The impact on the size distribution o f income, and the impact on the functional 
distribution o f  income, are shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. The first important finding is
M The average conversion factor for 1990 is an estimate of the IMF: 2608.6 Turkish Lira for 1 US 
dollar (IMF, 1995).
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Ithat the impact on overall inequality decreases in the full employment case in line with 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but increases in the scenario with fixed wages. The 
second striking result is that that main source o f inequality worsening (improving) is a 
large negative (positive) impact on the inter-group inequality among urban and rural 
household groups. It rises (decreases) by 6.5%-7.5% (10.3%-17.7%). These two 
different outcomes depend upon the performance of agricultural activities. In the 
scenario with fixed (flexible) wages, agriculture contracts (expands), thus reducing 
(increasing) agricultural capital and labour incomes (see Table 4.9), which are the main 
components of the private income in rural areas (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.8 The impact on the size distribution of income
(Base year = 1(H))
Generalised 
Entropy Index
Inequality Fixed wages Flexible wages
Overall inequality 100.5 98.0
-1 Within urban areas 99.9 98.2
Within rural areas 99.7 100.7
Between rural-urban areas 107.5 82.3
Overall inequality 100.7 98.2
0 Within urban areas 100.3 98.8
Within rural areas 100.1 100.4
Between rural-urban areas 107.4 82.5
Overall inequality 101.5 98.2
+ 1 Within urban areas 101.0 99.5
Within rural areas 100.7 99.9
Between rural urban areas 106.5 89.7
Overall inequality 103.6 97.8
+ 2 Within urban areas 102.7 100.4
Within rural areas 101.7 98.8
Between rural-urban areas 107.3 82.7
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It is important to emphasise the robustness of these results, which are independent of 
the choice upon the parameter 9 used to estimate the generalised entropy indices. It 
must be stressed that measures with positive value of 0 are particular sensitive to 
income differences at the top end of the income distribution, whilst measures with 
negative value ol 0 are more sensitive to very low income. This explains why the 
inequality within groups varies with 9 .
Table 4.9 The impact on the functional distribution of income
(Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
A -Capital income 100.7 99.1
- Agricultural income 97.2 103.7
- Non-agricultural income 101.5 98.1
B - Labour income 100.4 99.9
B .l • Skilled labour income 100.6 98.2
- Professional workers 100.3 97.9
- Managerial workers 101.5 99.0
- Clerical workers 100.6 98.2
B.2 - Basic skilled labour income 101.8 99.5
- Sales workers 101.2 98.5
- Service workers 100.2 99.0
- Non agricultural workers 102.4 99.7
- Other workers 102.1 99.4
B.3 - No-skilled labour income 97.4 103.2
- Agricultural workers 97.4 103.2
Basic skilled /  Skilled labour income 101.2 101.3
No-skilled/Skilled labour income 96.8 105.2
Basic skilled labour /  Capital income 101.1 100.4
No-skilled labour /  Capital income 96.7 104.2
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When the analysis on the income distribution effect is carried out by examining 
the impact on the functional distribution o f income, the results clearly indicate that in 
the scenario with flexible wages, the four ratios between (i) basic skilled and skilled 
labour incomes, (ii) no-skilled and skilled labour incomes, (iii) basic skilled labour and 
capital incomes, (iv) no-skilled labour and capital incomes, increase in line with the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, thus favouring a more equal distribution of income (see 
Table 4.9). In contrast, in the scenario with fixed wages, agricultural workers are 
worse off, thus leading to a rise in inequality. From the policy making point o f view, it 
is very important to know what the effects o f trade policies on income distribution are. 
The computed data for Turkey indicate that, despite the validity of the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem, overall income inequality might increase with trade. As a result, 
the analysis o f the trade impact on income distribution based on simplified two-sector, 
two-factors models, which define household groups according to their functional role, 
and under the assumption of full employment, might be misleading.
Table 4.10 reports the results concerning the impact of the CU agreement on 
Turkish employment, when real wages are constant. The only exception is the 
treatment of the agricultural category. Since agriculture in Turkey is a family-based 
activity, it is assumed that any effect of the trade policy is perceived on wages. The 
rigid real wages lead to an expansion of the aggregate labour demand by 1%, which 
implies that almost 148(XX) new jobs are created, as a consequence of the CU 
agreement. In the rigid real wage case, efficiency gains are not absorbed by wage 
increases but rather by employment creation.65 It is interesting to note that, as a 
consequence of the trade policy, 75% o f new jobs concern basic skilled non- 
agricultural workers, who are demanded by the growing manufacturing industries.
65 A similar result has been obtained by Mercenier (1995) in examining the impact of the European 
single market in 1992 on employment among the EU member states.
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IT able 4.10 The im pact on em ploym ent
Relative change 
(Base year = 100)
Number of new 
workers Share
Labour Input 101.0 147505 1.000
- Professional workers 100.3 2827 0.019
- Managerial workers 101.5 4901 0.033
- Clerical workers 100.6 5255 0.036
- Sales workers 101.2 18606 0.126
- Service workers 100.2 3050 0.021
- Agricultural workers 100.0 0 0.000
- Non agricultural workers 102.4 110251 0.747
- Other workers 102.1 2615 0.018
This finding is in line with the Krugman (1995) model if applied to a developing 
country, and with Wood’s results, according to which the cumulative demand for 
labour in manufacturing from 1985 to 1990 is increased by about 23 million in 
developing countries (Wood, 1994).
It is important to stress that, given the ex-ante large tariff rates (see Table 4.3), 
these results are obtained if the VAT rates used to perform a revenue-neutral tariff 
reform are uniformly increased by 55.8% in the case of fixed real wages, and by 57.6% 
in the case of flexible real wages. In other words, the standard VAT rate should rise 
from 12% (the prevailing rate in Turkey in 1990) to 18.7%-18.9%, which is reasonably 
close to the standard VAT rate applied in most of the European member states.
To evaluate the robustness of the above results, sensitivity analysis on the 
elasticity values has been carried out. All elasticities employed in this study have been 
divided by a factor of two in order to simulate the effects of the CU on a more rigid
economy, and multiplied by a factor o f  two in order to consider the case o f a more 
flexible economy. The results reported in Appendix 4.D clearly show that the 
direction o f  the variable changes is robust, however their precise size depends upon 
the value o f  the elasticities. Some variation in the individual sectoral impact also 
exists. In the case o f flexible wages, Turkey’s welfare gains range between 75 (less 
flexible economy) and 4124 (more flexible economy) billions o f  1990 Turkish lira, 
and the change in income inequality between rural and urban groups measured by the 
Theil index ( 0 = 1 )  ranges between - 8.5% (less flexible economy) and 0.6% (more 
flexible economy). In the case o f fixed real wages, Turkey’s welfare gains range 
between 1406 (less flexible economy) and 8433 (more flexible economy) billions of 
1990 Turkish lira, and the change in inequality between groups ranges between 7.9% 
(less flexible economy) and 15.3% (more flexible economy). The impact on 
employment ranges between 86000 (less flexible economy) and 432000 (more flexible 
economy) new jobs. Similar gaps exist for all other statistics estimated in the previous 
tables.
In conclusion, the numerical results suggest that the CU agreement is not trade 
diverting; it raises welfare, output, GDP and trade volume in Turkey. Despite the 
higher demand o f basic skilled labour, in line with the Stolper-Samuelson model, this 
trade agreement causes an increase in overall income inequality in the scenario with 
fixed wages, mainly due to the rising gap between rural and urban incomes as a 
consequence o f  the contraction o f the agricultural sector still heavily protected by 
trade barriers. In addition, it seems that this trade policy, accompanied by a fixed real 
wage policy allowing the creation o f new jobs, raises Turkey’s welfare, GDP, and 
output greater than in the case of flexible wages.
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[4.5] Conclusions
The aim o f this study is to analyse the impact of the CU agreement between Turkey 
and the EU on the welfare and the size distribution of income among urban and rural 
Turkish households; and on Turkey’s employment, sectoral output, GDP and trade 
flows. In order to examine the impact of the CU upon employment in Turkey, two 
main cases have been considered for the labour market: the standard case of flexible 
real wages with full employment, and the case of fixed real wages.
The numerical simulations show that the CU agreement with the EU is not 
trade diverting, raises the trade volume-GDP ratio and that resources are reallocated 
towards the industrial sector, which expands by 4.1%-5.4%. With regard to welfare, 
although aggregate gains are equal to 1226-2750 billions o f 1990 Turkish lira, the 
impact on urban and rural households’ welfare highly depends upon the assumption 
postulated for the labour market. In the scenario with fixed wages, urban households 
are better off and rural households are worse off; in the scenario with flexible wages, 
urban household are worse off and rural households are better off. However, in the 
fixed wage case, a large welfare gain in urban areas is accompanied by a negligible 
welfare loss among rural households.
The second important result is related to the issue of international trade and 
income inequality. Despite the owners of basic skilled labour being better off than both 
the owners o f skilled labour and the owners of capital, in line with the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem (as Turkey is a middle income developing country and, therefore, 
abundant o f the basic skilled labour factor), overall income inequality measured by the 
size distribution o f income might rise. In the scenario with fixed wages, the main 
source o f income inequality Is the inter-income inequality between urban and rural 
areas, which rises by almost 7%, due to an output fall in agriculture, a sector still 
protected and the principal income source of rural households. This result suggests 
that theoretical and applied analysis o f trade impact on the distribution o f income,
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carried out only with models which define household groups according to their 
functional role and under the full employment assumption, might be misleading.
As far as the issue of international trade and employment is concerned, if real 
wages are rigid, the preferential trading agreement with the EU leads to a rise in 
employment, as one would expect from the Krugman model applied to a developing 
country. The efficiency gains with trade, not being absorbed by a wage increase, 
generate the creation of 148000 new jobs (432(XX) in the case o f a more flexible 
economy), mainly basic skilled non-agricultural workers.
Finally, the welfare gains and the incremental GDP would be larger, if policy­
makers encourage institutions to bargain a wage rate, such that real wages remain 
constant. The sensitivity analysis on elasticities values confirm the overall conclusion 
that the preferential trading agreement with the EU, accompanied by a fixed real wage 
policy, creates new jobs in Turkey, raises Turkey’s welfare, output and GDP far 
greater than in the case of flexible wages, but also increases income inequality.
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CHAPTER 5
Summary and Concluding Remarks
Three trade policy issues have been examined in this thesis: export quotas in the form 
o f  VERs, endogenous export taxation and customs union. The CU between Turkey 
and the EU has been studied, applying a multi-labour, multi-household, multi-sector 
general equilibrium model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition to the 
Turkish economy; whereas export taxes and VERs have been analysed firstly, with an 
analytical model facing increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, and 
secondly, with an AGE model applied to Turkey in order to examine the quantitative 
relevance o f  the analytical findings.
With regard to VERs, this study analytically shows that a VER serves as an 
institution to protect incumbent firms o f  an exporting country. A VER is an entry 
barrier in the export market. It favours the concentration o f  industry, and allows 
established firms to better exploit economies o f scale by producing output at lower 
average cost. Since the break-even price for potential firms is the average cost, entry in 
the domestic market is also inhibited. A VER also allows the raising o f  the price cost 
margin in the export market. However, it is important to recognise that the smaller the 
country, the greater is the possibility o f  a larger monopoly power in the domestic 
market. From the social point o f view, two conventional effects from the elimination 
o f  a VER are usually considered: the rent loss effect and the export supply price effect.
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In this study, three further effects on welfare are examined: the global efficiency effect, 
the increased intermediate inputs cost effect and the variety effect. The global effect 
on welfare on an exporting country is analytically indeterminate. A general 
equilibrium model applied to Turkey supports the conjecture that with the elimination 
of a VER, a possible loss in social welfare, the higher average cost and the fall o f 
monopoly power o f  incumbent firms, are the key elements in understanding the 
rationale behind VERs.
As far as the export tax issue is concerned, Rodrik (1989), Helpman and 
Krugman (1989) employ a PE framework to show that under Cournot conjectures an 
optimal export tax is positive and negatively related to both the foreign demand 
elasticity (in absolute value) and industry concentration. I show that the PE formula is 
upwardly biased and may not be optimal in a GE setting. In addition, I show that the 
RHK export tax has an ambiguous impact on firm size. I use an AGE model for the 
Turkish economy to numerically explore the empirical relevance o f  these findings. In 
the model, the export tax estimated with the PE formula is larger than the computed 
export tax by a small factor ranging between 1.034 and 1.112. Most importantly, the 
numerical results support the view that the RHK export tax leads to a social welfare 
loss, which is larger in a context o f  sunk costs.
The numerical results regarding the CU agreement between Turkey and the EU 
show that, as a result o f  this regional agreement, Turkish trade with the RoW would 
not be diverted, and that the aggregate welfare gains to Turkey are around 1226-2750 
billions o f  1990 Turkish lira. Most importantly, urban (rural) Turkish groups benefit 
from the trade policy in the scenario with fixed (flexible) wages, and this substantially 
raises (decrease) income inequality between urban and rural household members. 
Despite the owners o f  basic skilled labour (abundant factor) being better off than the 
owners o f  skilled labour and capital (scarce factors), overall income inequality rises in 
the scenario with fixed wages, as the returns to capital and labour in agriculture fall. 
This finding suggests that an analysis only based on the functional distribution of
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income and under the typical full employment assumption might be misleading. In the 
case o f fixed real wages, the model predicts the creation o f 148000 new jobs, as the 
efficiency gains due to the trade policy are not absorbed by a wage rise but rather by 
employment creation. Sensitivity analysis seems to support this overall conclusion.
The results from all three studies inevitably have some limitations and provide 
insights for future research. In fact, the numerical model employed to study the CU 
agreement between Turkey and the EU can be extended by introducing imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale. These modelling features might 
substantially affect the numerical results described in Chapter 4, especially with regard 
to the welfare impact o f  VERs described in Chapter 2. However, an AGE model, with 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, which has the target o f 
quantifying regional agreements, needs reliable data to calibrate variables and 
parameters o f several imperfect competitive industries, and these are not yet available 
for the Turkish economy. This research might be extended by examining export taxes 
and quotas issues in a multi-regional framework, in order to allow the number of 
foreign firms to be treated endogenously and other countries to retaliate if they are 
worse o ff as a consequence o f  the trade policy adopted by the exporting country. In 
addition, one key assumption o f  Chapter 2 is represented by the fact that governments 
do not intervene in allocating export quota. An interesting extension might be the 
study o f the economic implications o f the elimination o f  VERs, when quota rents are 
allocated by governments, and firms are obliged to pay a premium in order to receive 
the documents for deliveries to the restrained markets.
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Appendix 2.A: Price elasticities in Bertrand and Cournot
[ 2. A. 11 Derivation o f firms ’ perceived elasticity o f domestic demand
An industry i faces an aggregate demand function which is represented by (2.7). If 
domestic goods are produced by symmetric firms, they can be treated as imperfect 
substitutes. Thus, the aggregate domestic demand at the third stage of the demand tree 
can be written as
where g , , is the elasticity o f substitution among n domestic varieties, t/„ ; and Pit arc 
demand parameters describing the consumer preferences for a brand s produced by 
sector i.
The solution of the dual problem yields
(2. A l) D ,=
-(s.-iys, '* n
is
where pd, = £ p >  pd„
(2.A2) du = P >  D,pd? p d u-'‘ ,
f i r  -
12.A. 1.1 ! Derivation o f  (2.15)
(2.A2) can be log-linearised as
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(2 .A 3 ) In di,  = ç, ln p ü + In Df + ç, In p d t -  ç, ln p d u .
By definition the derivative of (2. A3) with respect to ln p d is yields the firms’ 
perceived price elasticity of domestic demand ( x, ):
(2.A4) T =_rflng_ + (. d ln p d ,
d \ n p d ü d l n p d u
Since under Bertrand conjectures = P >  pdf' p d * , and since from
d p d u
(2.A2) P >  pdf' pd"  = ¿/¿,/d , , then by using the chain rule
(2.A5)
and
¿fin Di _ pd" dD, dpdj _ pdi, di, pd, BD, 
din  pd" A  dPdi dpd" PdiDi A  dp d ,’
(2.A6) dinpdj _ p d isdis 
d ln p d „ PdiDi
Given the symmetry assumption, (2.A6) and (2.A5) into (2.A4) yield
(2.A7) T. = Ç.+
pd, 3D,
D, Bpd, J n,------
By applying similar steps at the second stage of the demand tree, then
<2A8) 7 i Z  |r '
where 4*, denotes the consumption share for domestic goods and %, the absolute 
value of the price elasticity of aggregate demand.
(2.A8) into (2.A7) yields (2.15).
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[2 .  A . 1 .2 ]  D er iva t io n  o f  (2 .17)
The inverse demand function of (2.A2) is
(2.A9) Inpd^  = ln P „ + — InD, \ndis+\npdi.
Çi Çi
By definition the derivative of (2.A9) with respect to In du yields the inverse
of T, : 
(2.AIO) 1 _  1 d InD, 1 | dlnpd> 
T. d in  dis d in  dis
Since under Cournot conjectures = p„ D ^' ~di!~ , and since from (2.A2)
d d i s
P„ D ^ d ^  = p d j p d i , then by using the chain rule 
d  In Di _ pd u du(2.A l 1)
d ìn d i, M , A
Since, by using the chain rule, A_ > then
d d i s  3 A  d d i s
( 2  A 1 2 )  J l n M ,  _  p d j s d i s  D ,  d p d ,
d  In d i s  M , A  M  3 A  '
Given the symmetry assumption, (2.A12) and (2.A 11) into (2.A 10) yield
(2.A13) —  = ~ -  + — i A  3M; ç, + pd, 3D,
By applying similar steps at the second stage of the demand tree, then
(2.A14) A  dpd, 1------- +4*
pd, 3D, e,
J ____1_
e, Xi
(2.A14) into (2.A13) yields (2.17).
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12.A.2] Derivation o f  firm s’ perceived elasticity o f foreign demand
Assume that a representative foreign consumer gains utility by the following two 
stages utility function U' = g ' (£ ,) ,  where
(2.A15) E, =
-it.'«.-')
> 1 • ¿Yi, =1-
-5=1
is the elasticity o f substitution among n exported brands, ; and y u are demand 
parameters describing the preferences of the foreign consumer for a brand s exported 
by sector i.
The first order conditions yield the lower level demand:
(2.A16) eu = y j ’1 E ^w e} ' p w e f 1“ ,
where pwe: =
< c ~ C-id 
,Y is PWeis
I2.A .2.I I Derivation o f  (2.16)
By using (2.10), (2.A16) can be log-linearised as
(2.A17) lne* = ^ i lnYi, +  lnA1+ (^ ( -T i1)lnpH’ei - ^ i ln p w iit, ^ ¡ > 1 1 ,.
By definition the derivative of (2.A17) with respect to In pweis yields the 
firms’ perceived price elasticity of foreign demand (8 ,):
(2 .A I8)
d  In pweit
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Since under Bertrand conjectures d p w e jd  pwe„ = p w e j  pwe is Y  , then
(2.A19)
(  ~ Y~5'd \n p w e i ~ 5; p w e u 
d  In p w e ^  v Pwei J
In addition, by using (2.10) and (2.A16), since
pweU ets = Y„5, A tpw e, p w e a' ^ ‘ , then
(2.A20)
(  -  NK, ~ -  
p w e  i, eu
p w e:
\  ) Y ,P weis e“
Given the symmetry assumption (2.A20) and (2.A19) into (2.A18) yields
(2.16).
[2.A.2.2J Derivation o f  (2.18)
By using (2.10), (2.A16) can be log-linearised as
(2.A21) In pweit = lny„ + ^1 l ' InE, - - ¡ - ln e « .
&  ^ .
By definition, the derivative of (2.A21) with respect to In e*, yields the inverse
of 8 j :
(2.A22) i f 1 1 ^ tf In
8, Ui </ In e m
Since under Cournot conjectures dEt/ d  a , = i J ^ e J e „ j  , then
(2.A23)
d  In E.
d  In ei,
■=*- = Yi
y-Vi,
€ ij
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In since
pwe^ f .  = y 
(2.A24)
Given
(2.18).
addition, by using (2.10) and (2.A16),
„ ~eu'-'^  , then
y-vt. ~ ~
~ £«_ _  eu
I  is r ,  ~  ~
\  ‘ )  ¿ ,p w eu e »
S
the symmetry assumption, (2.A24) and (2.A23) into (2.A22) yields
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Appendix 2.B: Numerical model: the case of VERs
This appendix reports the algebraic formulation of the numerical model employed to 
study the economic impact of the elimination of the VERs in Turkish textiles and 
apparel. The appendix has been split into six sections: (i) equations related to prices 
and costs; (ii) equations related to production and factor demand; (iii) equations 
related to domestic and foreign trade; (iv) equations related to income; (v) equations 
related to final demand and intermediate demand; (vi) equations related to the market 
clearing conditions.
¡2.8.11 Price and cost equations
(2.B1)
(2.B2) py,y, = pd, D,/n, + pe, E,/n,
(2.B3)
---------RoW
(2.B6) pec„Ec„ = pwe™E™ + pwe
-------- RoW
crs M~‘crs
(2.B7) EU
(2.B8) pwe™ = pe?v { \+qri)
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(2.B10)
(2.B11)
(2.B12)
(2.B13) 
(2.B13a) 
(2.B 14) 
(2.B 14a)
(2.B15)
(2 .B 9 ) pd ,
W
PVj = 0 ; 1 [y °; w '* 1 + (i -  Y J  r~ a> ]
cî =pv> + Y ,aiiP>
ac, = w(Z,. + l f )  + r(k, +*,/ ) +  X  Pjaj,y,
t / = - - [ ( 1 - 4 '1> 1. + ‘PiX, ] -
V ni J
Ç.
1 _  1 1
Ç, «, Ç,e,
-+'VI 'l¡ z I l
, X,E, ,
8 , = - * U i - -  ) - J k
ni J ni
1 _  1 1 ( 5 . - B , )
8, Ç, n,
^ p d j D i
A  = ' _____
D>
¡2. B.2] Production and factor demand equations
(2.B16) = e c„[YOT^ J ° - ' 1)/<’“ -*-(l-Y c„ ) ^ ^ , (<I^ ,)/tT-
(2.B17) AZ.„, = eSL--,)Y ^ w --/w 2 r n„
(2.B18) = © ^ ( l - Y * , ) " "  r ~a‘" pv°r‘" Y„,
under Bertrand
under Cournot
under Bertrand
under Cournot
jo<r.'(oOT-i)
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(2.B20) *, = -  y. )*< r-< pv«- y.
(2 .B 1 9 ) /.
[2.B.3] Trade equations
(2.B21) (2y =A.[<p.A//M + ( l - q , , ) D j e>-l)]
(2.B23)
(2.B24)
(2.B25)
(2.B26)
(2.B27)
(2.B29)
(2.B22) — — =Mj _ fl-< P ; V 'Y  pdj Vj
D, { <P>
A4 f v =
f ----- EUpwnij
Pm,
M,
Mrlj°W =  AyJ~‘ (l — )**
r ------ Row \p w m .
Pmj
M,
= n £„ [ P - ^ " +1)/P" + (1- P ™ ) ^ r +1)/p'” ]P"'/(P‘"+1)
y, = ^¡-[piD<p‘+1)/p' + (l-P ,)£<p'+1)/p']P'/(P'+1)
£si
E„
pe„ y p"Y Pdcn NP~
i - P , CO /
(2.B28) Ej  = r ; [ a y(" » +1,/w»* + (l -  a . ln,- /(®-+,)
a .
V 1 _ ®cn y
/ ----- ey \®<«
pne„,
------A„tV
vP ^cr. /
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(2.B30)
f
E f v  = E ? ’
— \n ,
X,
p w e^
[2.B.4] Income equations 
(2.B31) JT,= {pyi - a c i)yi
(2.B32) ver™ = qriPe fv E?v
(2.B33) HR = wLÂB + rCÂP + ^ n in i + Y JveriEV
[2.B.5] Intermediate and final demand equations
(2.B34) x i = ' L ajrrXr, + ^ a„n,y,
crs i
(2.B35) c , - , ?
Pi
I2.B.6J Market clearing conditions
(2.B36) Qj = C j+  Xj
(2.B37) X  pwe j E + £  p w efuE fv = pw m ^ M*u +^  pwm *jn M*on
j  J J j
(2.B38) LÂB = J t ALa, + 'Z n l( l ,+ l ')
crs i
(2.B39) CÂP = 'Z A K cri+ J ,n ,( k i + k ')
crs i
(2.B40) py> = ac,
12»
V ariables (*):
a c i Average cost
A 4 „ Labour
AKcn Capital
Ci Marginal cost
Cj Private demand of goods
CÄP Aggregate capital stock
D j Demand for domestic commodity
D i Domestic commodities demanded in the base year
Exports
E fv Exports to the EU
E?U Exports to the EU in the base year
gRoW Exports to the RoW
HR Household revenues
k , Capital per firm
/ , Labour per firm
LAB Aggregate labour
M , Imports
M f v Imports from the EU
M * ° w Imports from the RoW
n i Number of firms
Pi Price of the final and the intermediate good
p 3 , Price of the domestic good in the base year
121
p d j
Pvi
pyi-------- EU
PWei
---- RoW
pwej--------- El)
pwrtij----- RoW
pw nij
Q,
r
y>
w
Xi
X,
A
%
k {
Price of domestically produced commodity
Value added price
Aggregate producer price
Price of exports to the EU
Price of exports to the EU
Price of exports to the RoW
Price of imports from the EU
Price of imports from the RoW
Composite commodity
Return to capital
Intermediate demand
Output per domestic firm
Output by the industry
Wage
Price elasticity of aggregate demand 
World price of similar exported goods 
Profit per firm 
Numeraire
Share of consumption of domestic goods in total consumption 
Parameters (*):
Leontief input-output coefficients.
Fixed amount of capital per firm
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l{  Fixed amount of labour per firm
v, Conjectural variation shift parameter
OLj Share parameter in the second nest CET function
P j  Share parameter in the CET aggregation function
8, Firm perceived elasticity in the export market
e  j Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods
<p j Share parameter in the Armington trade aggregation function
y j  Share parameter in the CES production function
t j Share parameter in the second nest Armington function
IT Price elasticity of export demand
GJj Elasticity in the second nest CET function
if  j Household budget shares
p j Elasticity in the CET aggregation function
a  j Elasticity of substitution among primary factors of production
x, Firm perceived elasticity in the domestic market
Elasticity of substitution among exported brands 
C, Elasticity of substitution among domestic brands
A j Shift parameter in the second nest Armington function
A y Shift parameter in the Armington trade aggregation function
r j Shift parameter in the second nest CET function
0 y  Shift parameter in the CES production function
Shift parameter in the CET aggregation function (*)
(*) Parameter and variables with a bar are set exogenously, crs and i denote sectors facing 
constant and increasing returns to scale, respectively ( j  = crs u  i ).
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Appendix 2.C: A Social Accounting Matrix for Turkey
[2.C.1 ] Introduction66
A SAM is an economy-wide data system in the form of a matrix, which describes, on 
the one hand, data on production and income generation, and on the other hand, the 
flows between the accounts of a nation at a specific point in time. The construction of 
a SAM is based on the following two features, as well as other fundamental properties: 
(i) the payments for a transaction by one account represent the receipts for the same 
transaction by another account; (ii) total income is always equal to total expenditure. 
Hence, as an accounting system, a SAM is fully articulated and its estimates are 
internally consistent. For these reasons, a SAM provides a useful statistical framework 
for addressing many development issues and to help assemble and calibrate AGE 
models.
Although Turkey has a long tradition of planning, no official attempt has been 
made to compile a SAM for Turkey. To my knowledge, there have been three main 
previous attempts to construct a SAM for Turkey. Senesen (1991) presented a SAM 
for 1973. Her study, which was actually carried out some years prior to eventual 
publication, is a straightforward enlargement of the 1973 1-0 table. Dervis, et al. 
(1982) compiled a 1973 SAM for Turkey, which was designed to reflect an open 
economy general equilibrium model to study the resource allocation effects o f some 
trade policy in Turkey. However, this SAM does not have a income distribution 
dimension. In a subsequent study, Oz.han (1988) constructed a SAM for 1983 using a 
framework developed by Richard Stone in the early 1960s. This SAM was also 
published in detail by the Turkish State Planning Organisation (Oz.han, 1989) and has
66 This section, written in collaboration with Gazi Ozhan, has been published in Economic System 
Research (De Santis and Ozhan, 1997).
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already proved to be very useful for analysing the income distribution effects o f 
stabilisation policies employed in Turkey during the 1980s (De Santis, 1996). 
However, the SAM constructed by Ozhan classifies imports and indirect taxes by 
users, rather than by type. This classification, conforming to the structure of the 1 -0  
tables, is not consistent with SAMs. In addition, some data sets have been constructed 
by modellers to study particular aspects o f the Turkish economy (Adelman, et al. 
1989; Celasun, 1986; Harrison, et al. 1993; Yeldan 1989) and these may be regarded 
as “implicit” SAMs. However, none o f the SAMs, explicit or implicit, have yet 
incorporated household survey information and hence have an income distribution 
dimension.
This study represents the first comprehensive and detailed 1990 SAM for 
Turkey. The design of this SAM is conditioned by AGE modelling perspectives. 
Hence, in the production accounts, a distinction is made between “activities” and 
“commodities”. This permits the domestic demand to be considered as a composite 
demand o f imported and domestically-produced goods, and the supply to be a 
composite o f domestic supply and export supply. This treatment of imported and 
domestically-produced commodities enables one to adopt the widely used Armington 
specification in AGE modelling literature, which assumes that products of different 
countries competing in the same market are imperfect substitutes. Whereas the 
treatment o f domestic and exported goods as imperfect substitutes allows modellers to 
employ the constant elasticity of transformation specification.67
The first stage to compile this SAM is to construct a macro SAM using 
available published macroeconomic data. The main statistical sources used to achieve 
this task are the Input-Output (I-O) table for 1990, the Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 
the Balance of Payments Statistics and the Annual Program published by the State 
Planning Organisation. The main statistical sources to compile the disaggregated SAM
67 This SAM has already proved to be very useful to calibrate a AGE model with trade features 
(Harrison, el al, 1996, 1997).
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are the Household Income and Consumption Expenditures Survey for 1987, the 
Manufacturing Industry Statistics, the Household Labour Survey and the Census of 
Population for 1990. Thanks to a good deal of compatibility between the different 
official statistical sources, a highly disaggregated SAM has been compiled containing 
226 accounts: (i) factors are disaggregated into 8 different types o f labour categories 
and 5 different types of capital (i.e. operating surplus); (ii) households are 
disaggregated according to their income size (20 classes) and to their geographical 
regions (rural/urban); (iii) companies are disaggregated into State Economic 
Enterprises and three private enterprises (i.e. non-agricultural production, trade and 
services); (iv) activities and commodities are each disaggregated according to the 1-0 
table 1990 classification, hence comprising 54 accounts in each case; (v) the capital 
account is disaggregated into private gross fixed capital formation, public gross fixed 
capital formation and changes in stocks.
Households have been disaggregated according to income classes because it 
may allow modellers to analyse the effects on the personal distribution of income 
through income inequality indices. In contrast, if modellers are interested in examining 
the effects o f their policy scenarios on the functional distribution o f income, the 
analysis o f income changes of the eight different labour categories may be more 
appropriate.
Most of the sub-matrices of the SAM, such as the disaggregation o f gross value 
added to factors o f production, the distribution of factor incomes to households, the 
disaggregation of private consumption, the disaggregation of net factor income from 
the rest o f the world, the disaggregation of tariffs and direct taxes, and the input- 
output structure, have all been compiled with precision using official published data.
In general, the disaggregated SAM has been compiled using rational criteria 
and by comparing the actual estimates with those produced by different official 
statistical sources.
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A first major area of difficulty concerned the disaggregation of the household 
consumption matrix. Since the private final consumption vector reported in the 1990 I- 
O table is obtained residually, the household consumption survey for 1987 has been 
employed to disaggregate private expenditures among households. Unfortunately, 
although the data are collected by income and commodity groups, the coverage of the 
commodity groups does not conform to the 1-0 classification. Sometimes the 
definition of commodities is not clear at all. Hence, firstly, the original 64 production 
sectors of the 1990 1 -0  table have been reduced to 54, and secondly, for some 
commodities personal judgements have been exercised to complete the estimates of 
this matrix. At a final stage, RAS has been applied to the household consumption 
expenditure matrix before inclusion in the disaggregated SAM.
A second area o f  difficulty concerned the disaggregation of net indirect taxes 
by type of domestic commodities. 1-0 tables usually report the net indirect taxes 
collected from domestic sectors. This classification by users is not appropriate if the 
main source of indirect tax revenues is VAT, as it is in the case of Turkey. Hence, the 
1-0 classification by user has been transformed to a classification by type of 
commodities. An unpublished document o f the Turkish Ministry of Finance and 
Custom has been used for this purpose.
A third area of difficulty regarded the allocation of the value added to the eight 
different labour categories. The Household Labour Survey, the Census o f Population 
and the Manufacturing Industry Statistics have been employed in a such way that the 
estimates for the wage and the labour force matrices would be consistent too. The 
RAS method has been employed to adjust the labour revenue matrix to accord with the 
data reported in the 1-0  table.
A fourth area o f  difficulty concerned the computation of the dividends and 
retained earnings of the private enterprises. Thus distinction is very important as 
retained earnings constitute a component of the capital account. Given the level of 
investment, an under- or overestimation of the retained earnings would directly affect
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other forms of savings, in particular private and foreign savings. A Capital Market 
Board rule has been adopted for this purpose, which states that at least 50%, and no 
more than 70% of the super normal profits, has to be distributed between shareholders.
Finally, household savings have been calculated as residuals after allowing for 
consumer expenditure and direct taxes. Our estimates indicate that the marginal 
propensity to save is 17.08% for Turkey as a whole, 10.12% for the urban areas and 
27.44% for the rural areas. It is important to note that according to the income 
distribution survey, the marginal propensity to save is 21.57% for Turkey as a whole, 
13.78% for the urban areas and 32.86% for the rural areas. Several Turkish 
economists and statisticians are not completely satisfied by the official estimates. They 
argue that the consumption level, in particular in the rural areas, has been under­
estimated. In addition, the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) of Turkey has re-estimated 
private final consumption for Turkey. The new computation clearly implies that a 
lower marginal propensity to save with respect to that estimated by the household 
survey is likely to be more appropriate for the Turkish economy.
In summary, most o f the transaction values have been estimated using different 
official statistical sources. The data employed, especially those published by the SIS, 
are qualitatively good and comprehensive. Only in the case of the Household 
Consumption Expenditures Survey was there a need for extensive effort to adapt it to 
SAM, and as a consequence of that a contraction of the production activity 
classification from the 1-0 table’s 64 sectors to the SAM ’s 54 sectors has been deemed 
necessary. The RAS method has been used only to compute a sequence of residual 
balance entries, and it has been applied only to the household consumption matrix and 
the labour revenue matrix.
I2.C.2I The aggregate SAM
The aggregate SAM for Turkey for 1990 is shown in Table 2.C1.
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The value added (357014 billions of TL) is allocated to various factors of 
production. However, in the aggregate SAM these factors are consolidated into a 
single account.
The factor income to households (174486 billions of TL) comprises the total 
compensation o f employees (107103 billions of TL).and the operating surplus 
originating from the primary sector, that is agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry and 
fisheries, and from the ownership of dwellings (67383 billions of TL). The rationale 
behind the allocation of the operating surplus of the primary sector to households is 
that according to the 1991 General Agricultural Census, 99% of agricultural holdings 
holds 83% of the agricultural land, whose size is less than 50 hectares. Thus, most of 
the agricultural output is produced by small household-based farms. Similarly, animal 
husbandry and fisheries are household-based activities. We also distribute the forestry 
operating surplus to households in order to treat all the primary sectors in the same 
way.
As far as the ownership of dwellings is concerned, this activity consists mainly 
o f actual and imputed rents on houses, which are usually collected directly by 
households.
The dividends distributed by companies to households (146866 billions o f TL) 
are calculated by subtracting the corporation tax, the interest paid by the SEE, the 
retained earnings and the dividends paid abroad from the total enterprise income. 
However, this will be explained in detail when the criteria used to estimate the retained 
earnings in the private sector are discussed.
The government transfers to households (4699 billions of TL) are calculated as 
residuals. The transfers from the ROW to households (8786 billions of TL) arc 
estimated using the data reported by the Central Bank o f the Republic o f Turkey. 
According to this official data source, the net remittances are equal to 3325 million of 
US dollars in 1990. The exchange rate used to convert into Turkish lira the 
transactions expressed in dollars has been calculated by dividing the net factor income
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from ROW expressed in TL (4117 billions of TL) to that expressed in US dollars 
(1558 million US dollars). So 1 US dollar is on average exchanged for 2642.5 TL. 
This estimate is approximately equal to the official average value which is equal to 
2607.6 TL for 1990.
The factor income to companies (156287 billions of TL) consists o f the 
operating surplus originating from mining, manufacturing activities and services net of 
the ownership of dwellings.
The government transfers to private enterprises (16990 billions of TL) are 
calculated as residuals, while those to SEE are equal to 1257 billions of TL.
The transfers from the ROW to enterprises comprise profits (741 million US 
dollars) and payments of interest (917 million of U S dollars) converted into domestic 
currency.
The taxes on income paid by households are equal to 18609 billions of TL. The 
corporation tax is equal to 4637 billions of TL, while the interest payment of the SEE 
to the government (3192 billions of TL) are calculated as residuals.
The indirect taxes on composite commodities (20514 billions o f TL), the 
import duties (13397 billions of TL), the consumption of fixed capital (26241 billions 
of TL) and all transactions relating to the activity and the commodity accounts are 
derived from the 1-0 table for 1990.
Household savings (54022 billions of TL) arc calculated as residuals alter 
allowing for consumer expenditure and direct taxes.
The retained earnings of the SEE (7902 billions of TL) are calculated as 
residuals, while those of the private enterprises (13543 billions o f TL) are estimated 
using a survey published by the Istanbul Chamber o f  Industry for 1990. The sum o f the 
private retained earnings, plus those of the SEE, is reported in Table C. 1.
The government budget deficit (11955 billions of TL) has been calculated as 
the sum of the consolidated budget deficit (11782 billions of TL) and the municipalities 
deficit (501 billions of TL), minus the local government surplus (328 billions of TL).
131
The capital transfers net o f reserves (16311 billions of TL) are calculated by 
summing up the change in official reserves and the current account of transactions with 
the ROW.
The sources o f  income for the rest o f  the world current account comprise 
dividends (161 million US dollars) and interest payments (890 million US dollars) from 
enterprises paid overseas, government transfers in the form of interest payments of the 
foreign debt (2375 million US dollars) and net imports, converted into domestic 
currency.
The change in official reserves is derived by converting the actual change (1308 
million US dollars) in domestic currency, while the current account deficit is derived 
residually. Unfortunately, the current account deficit is over-estimated. This is because 
the trade transactions evaluated with the national accounting system are quite different 
from the exports and imports which characterise the balance of payments. As a 
consequence, this estimate also affects the transaction value of the net capital activities.
According to the Turkish Ministry o f  Finance and Customs, the total 
government transfers are equal to 25020 billions of TL in 1990. 13966 billions of TL 
are used to pay the interest on the domestic (9613 billions of TL) and foreign (4353 
billions of TL) debts, while the remaining part is distributed to the SEE and to other 
accounts which cannot be classified by institutions. Once the public transfers to the 
SEE and to the ROW current account have been allocated, the remaining transfers are 
allocated to private enterprises and households as residuals. Also the SPO provides an 
estimate for the government transfers equal to 27126 billions of TL. However, it does 
not collect data concerning the distribution of public transfers to institutions.
It Is important to stress that most o f the transaction values estimated as 
residuals, such as the government transfers to households and private companies, the 
interest payment and the retained earnings o f the SEE, are usually considered 
exogeneously to the system of the equations in a modelling context. Hence, these ad 
hoc estimations will not materially affect the policy simulations.
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[2.C.3] The disaggregated SAM
The aggregated accounts have been disaggregated in the following way:
1 factors are disaggregated into 8 different types of labour and 5 different types of 
capital (i.e. operating surplus);
2 households are disaggregated according to their income size (20 classes) and to 
their geographical regions (rural/urban);
3 companies are disaggregated into SEE and three private enterprises (i.e. non- 
agricultural production, trade and services);
4 activities and commodities are each disaggregated according to the 1-0 table 1990 
classification, hence comprising 54 accounts in each case;
5 the capital account is disaggregated into private gross fixed capital formation, 
public gross fixed capital formation and changes in stocks.
The disaggregation o f the gross value added to factors o f production has been 
achieved by employing the 1-0 table for 1990, the Household Labour Surveys for 1990 
and 1992, the Census of Population and the Manufacturing Industry Statistics for 
1990.
The capital factor has been defined as operating surplus. Hence, the 1-0 table is 
an ample statistical source.
As far as the labour force is concerned, the Household Labour Survey 
distinguishes eight types of labour employed by nine main economic activities, such as 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, trade and services. As the definition of 
occupational placement of workers has been changed in 1992, the Household Labour 
Survey for 1992 has been employed to disaggregate the relevant data for 1990. To 
further disaggregate the labour force by activities, the Census of Population and the 
Manufacturing Industry Statistics data sets have been employed. The Census of
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Population provides data on the population according to occupation and economic 
activity, while the Manufacturing Industry Statistics indicates the number of people 
engaged in each manufacturing sector. The labour revenue matrix has been obtained by 
multiplying each element of the labour force matrix to the wage vector given by the 
Household Income Distribution Survey. The RAS method has been employed to adjust 
the matrix to accord with the data reported in the 1-0 table.
The income distribution survey for 1987 has been employed in order to 
disaggregate labour and capital income, government transfers and foreign remittances 
paid to households.
Factor income to enterprises is allocated to the SEE and three private 
companies. According to the Prime Ministry High Control Committee, 8.2% of the 
Turkish GDP at factor costs is produced by the SEE in 1990. In order to obtain the 
SEE operating surplus related to the non-agricultural activity (6176 billions of TL), 
trade (2163 billions of TL) and services (2482 billions of TL), the compensation of 
employees has been subtracted from the value added in each sector.
As far as the private enterprises are concerned, their operating surplus in each 
sector is calculated by subtracting the SEE operating surplus from the aggregate 
reported into the 1-0 table.
The government transfers to private enterprises are disaggregated according to 
the share of the operating surplus of each company.
The transfers of the rest o f the world current account to private and public 
enterprises are composed of 2423 billions of TL in the form o f interest and 1958 
billions o f TL in the form of capital income. The interest has been disaggregated 
according to the credit volume o f the private (31639 billions of TL) and public (36120 
billions o f TL) banks, while the capital income has been disaggregated according to the 
share of the operating surplus of each company.
The income tax paid by households is disaggregated using the direct tax rates 
for 1990. The taxable income comprises rent, labour and entrepreneurial incomes, with
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the exclusion o f agricultural income, which is tax-exempt. It is assumed that the 
average income of each household group is equal to the midpoint of the income class 
interval. Since the tax rates were unchanged between 1987 and 1990, and the class 
interval width for the households income classes increased by a scale factor equal to 
the inflation rate, the households income classes for 1990 have been calculated by 
multiplying those for 1987 by the scale factor 2.667. The tax burden on urban and rural 
household taxable incomes is 7.22% and 6.71%, respectively. While the tax burden on 
urban and rural household total incomes is 6.73% and 3.85%, respectively.
The corporation tax paid by the SEE is equal to 1196 billions of TL. The 
corporation tax paid by the private enterprises is disaggregated according to the 
magnitude of the enterprise income net of the interest payments abroad.
As far as indirect taxes net o f  subsidies are concerned, the 1 -0  table 1990 
reports the net indirect taxes collected from domestic sectors. This classification is not 
appropriate within a modelling context. Hence, the 1-0 classification by user has been 
transformed to a classification by type in order to allow modellers to apply the 
Armington specification. Unfortunately, the only official source which shows any 
disaggregation o f the value added tax by type of commodities is an unpublished 
document of the Turkish Ministry of Finance and Custom.
The disaggregation of the import duties, the consumption of the fixed capital 
and all the transactions relating to the activity and the commodity accounts are 
obtained from the 1-0 table 1990.
In order to disaggregate the private consumption vector between households, 
the Household Income and Consumption Expenditures survey for 1987 has been 
employed. A matrix with dimensions 35 commodities by 40 households can be easily 
derived from the survey. Twelve o f the remaining 19 commodities are zero entries in 
the 1 -0  table. Therefore, expenditures on 7 commodities have been estimated by 
assuming that some commodities of the survey incorporate more than one commodity 
o f the 1-0 table. For instance, the commodity 'cultural expenditures’ reported in the
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survey has been disaggregated between manufacture o f paper and paper products 
(code 135) and printing, publishing and allied industries (code 136).
At a final stage, RAS has been applied to the household consumption expenditure 
matrix before inclusion in the disaggregated SAM.
The capital account is employed as a dummy account in order to disaggregate 
aggregate investment between private investment, public investment and changes in 
stocks.
Household savings are disaggregated between the different income classes 
according to the income distribution survey for 1987. Our estimates indicate that the 
marginal propensity to save is 17.08% for Turkey as a whole, 10.12% for the urban 
areas and 27.44% for the rural areas. It is important to note that according to the 
income distribution survey, the marginal propensity to save is 21.57% for Turkey as a 
whole, 13.78% for the urban areas and 32.86% for the rural areas. Several Turkish 
economists and statisticians are not completely satisfied by these estimates. They argue 
that the consumption level in the rural areas has been under-estimated. Furthermore, 
the SIS has re-estimated private final consumption for Turkey. The new estimates for 
1987 show that this figure is equal to 51018 billions of TL rather than 31892 billions of 
TL as reported in the income distribution survey. Thus, it seems that a lower marginal 
propensity to save than the one estimated for 1987 by the survey is likely to be more 
appropriate for the Turkish economy.
The retained earnings of the private enterprises are estimated using a survey 
published by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry for 1990. This survey publishes all 
relevant data of the 5(H) largest industrial establishments in Turkey, 409 of which are 
private and 91 are public. The gross value added of the private enterprises comprises 
the 23% o f the GDP produced by the private industrial sector in Turkey. In addition, 
the share o f the value added of the industrial sector in the aggregate GDP at current 
producer prices is 25.3% in 1990. Thus, this survey is a good representation of Turkish 
private industrial enterprises. According to a Capital Market Board rule at least 50%,
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and no more than 70% of the super normal profit, has to be distributed between 
shareholders. It is assumed that the 48.82% of the super normal profit is retained by 
private enterprises in the form o f savings, while the 51.18% of it is distributed to 
shareholders. Hence, using this assumption and the already mentioned survey, we 
arrive at the conclusion that 13543 billions of TL can be treated as retained earnings of 
the private enterprises. It is important to emphasise that even if the dividends 
distributed to households are calculated as residuals, the underlying assumption behind 
this estimate can be summarised as follows: (i) all the operating surplus generated by 
services net o f  the ownership of dwellings is allocated to households; (ii) the rent, the 
interest payments and the 51.18% of the super normal profit o f the industrial sector 
are distributed to households.
With regard to services, the official statistics regarding trade, hotels, 
restaurants and other services show that the average number of employees for each 
establishment, and the ratio of the total persons engaged relative to employees. Both 
ratios indicate clearly that the service activity, with the exception of the financial 
institutions (i.e. banks, stockbrokers and foreign exchange offices), is mainly 
household-based. Unfortunately, similar data are not collected for construction, 
transport and communication. However, it is believed that many of these activities are 
also carried out by small enterprises. In conclusion, since the value added of the 
financial institutions is relatively small, relative to the value added in the “Financial 
Institutions and Insurance” account as a whole, the operating surplus generated from 
services can be entirely allocated to households.
With regard to the industrial sector, rent and interest payments are allocated 
directly to households as we do not have any data concerning transactions between 
enterprises.
The transfers of the SEE to the rest o f the world current account are equal to 
1080 billions o f  TL. The transfers o f the private companies paid overseas (1695 
billions of TL) are composed of 1270 billions of TL in the form o f interest payments
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and 425 billions of TL in the form of capital income. The interest has been 
disaggregated according to the share o f the operating surplus o f each company, while 
the capital income has been disaggregated according to the share of the foreign 
investment in each sector.
Since the disaggregated SAM for Turkey is quite large and comprises many 
zero entries, seven tables have been constructed to show the transactions between the 
disaggregated accounts.
Table 2.C2 shows the disaggregation of the gross value added to factors of 
production.<lS Table 2.C3 shows the source of income received by households and 
enterprises, and their current payments. Tables 2.C4 and 2.C5 show the urban and the 
rural household consumption expenditure on commodities, respectively. Table 2.C6 
shows the inter-industry transactions. Table 2.C7 shows the disaggregation of 
government consumption expenditure, private and public investment and changes in 
stocks, respectively. With regard to Table 2.C8, columns 1 and 2 show the 
disaggregation of domestic commodities and exports; columns 3 and 4 show the 
disaggregation of indirect taxes on composite commodities and duties on imports paid 
to government, respectively; and column 5 shows the imports net o f taxes coming from 
the rest o f the world.
I2.C.4/ Definition o f accounts
The disaggregated SAM for Turkey comprises 226 accounts. The code numbers used 
to identify the accounts have been organised as follows:
6* The first row and the first column of these tables designate the code numbers used to identify the 
accounts, as set out in the next section (2.C.4).
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/  - FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
Labour:
1. Scientific, technical, professional and related workers.
2. Administrative, executive and managerial workers.
3. Clerical and related workers.
4. Sales workers.
5. Service workers.
6. Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters.
7. Non-agricultural production and related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers.
8. Workers not classifiable by occupation.
Capital:
9. Rent.
10. Operating surplus in agriculture.
11. Operating surplus in non-agriculture.
12. Operating surplus in trade.
13. Operating surplus in services.
II - HOUSEHOLDS
Urban and Rural household (monthly disposable income groups - thousands of TL):
14 34 0-133
15. 35 133 - 267
16. 36 267 - 400
17 37 400 - 533
18. 38 533 - 667
19. 39 667 - 800
20. 40 800 - 933
21. 41 933 - 1067
22. 42 1067 - 1200
23. 43 1200- 1333
24. 44 1333- 1600
25. 45 1600- 1867
26. 46 1867-2133
27. 47 2133-2400
28. 48 2400 - 2667
29. 49 2667 - 4000
30. 50 4000 - 5333
31. 51 5333 - 13333
32. 52 13333 - 26667
33. 53 26667 - 66667
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I l l  - COMPANIES
Private enterprises:
54. Enterprises in non-agricultural sectors.
55. Enterprises in trade sectors.
56. Enterprises in services.
Public enterprises:
57. State economic enterprises.
IV -  GOVERNMENT
58. Government.
V - VI - VI I  A CTIVITIES COMPOSITE and IMPORTED COMMODITIES
Activities Composite Imports
59. 113 167 Agriculture and animal husbandry.
60. 114 168 Forestry.
61. 115 169 Fisheries.
62. 116 170 Coal mining.
63. 117 171 Crude petroleum and natural gas production.
64. 118 172 Iron ore mining.
65. 119 173 Non-ferrous ore mining, non-metallic mineral mining, 
stone quarrying.
66. 120 174 Slaughtering, preparing and preserved meat.
67. 121 175 Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables.
68. 122 176 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats.
69. 123 177 Grain mill products.
70. 124 178 Sugar.
71. 125 179 Manufacture of other food products.
72. 126 180 Alcoholic beverages.
73. 127 181 Soft drinks and carbonated water industries.
74. 128 182 Tobacco manufactures.
75. 129 183 Manufacture of textiles (inc. ginning).
76. 130 184 Manufacture of wearing apparel.
77. 131 185 Manufacture of leather and fur products.
78. 132 186 Manufacture of footwear.
79. 133 187 Manufacture of wood and wood products.
80. 134 188 Manufacture of wood furniture and fixtures.
81. 135 189 Manufacture of paper and paper products.
82. 136 190 Printing, publishing and allied industries.
83. 137 191 Manufacture of fertilisers.
84. 138 192 Manufacture of drugs and medicines.
85. 139 193 Manufacture of other chemical products.
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86. 140 194 Petroleum refineries.
87. 141 195 Manufacture of petroleum and coal products.
88. 142 196 Manufacture of rubber products.
89. 143 197 Manufacture of plastic products.
90. 144 198 Manufacture of glass and glass products.
91. 145 199 Manufacture of cement.
92. 146 200 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products.
93. 147 201 Manufacture of iron and steel.
94. 148 202 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal.
95. 149 203 Manufacture of fabricated metal products.
96. 150 204 Manufacture of machinery except electrical.
97. 151 205 Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment.
98. 152 206 Manufacture of electrical machinery.
99. 153 207 Manufacture of shipbuilding and repairing.
100. 154 208 Manufacture of railroad equipment.
101. 155 209 Manufacture of land transport vehicles and equipment.
102. 156 210 Manufacture of other transport equipment.
103. 157 211 Other manufacturing industries.
104. 158 212 Electricity.
105. 159 213 Gas manufacture and waterworks.
106. 160 214 Building construction, other construction.
107. 161 215 Wholesale and retail trade.
108. 162 216 Restaurants and hotels.
109. 163 217 Railway transport, other land transport, water transport, 
air transport.
110. 164 218 Communications.
111. 165 219 Financial institutions and insurance.
112. 166 220 Personal and professional services, public services, 
ownership of dwellings.
Vili - CAPITAL ACCOUNT
221. Gross capital formation.
222. Private gross fixed capital formation.
223. Public gross fixed capital formation.
224. Changes in stocks.
IX - REST OF THE WORLD CURRENT ACCOUNT
225. Rest of the world current account.
X - REST OF THE WORLD CAPITAL ACCOUNT
226. Rest of the world capital account.
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Table 2.C7 Disaggregation of public consumption
and gross capital formation (Billions of 1990 TL)
Code 58 277 278 279113 330 87 18 31091 14 183 0 0 -3 8 71 15 0 0 0 -1 31 16 293 0 0 119117 0 0 0 573118 0 0 0 - 6119 0 0 0 780120 563 0 0 58121 99 0 0 103122 51 0 0 -2 6 1123 59 0 0 -5 8 712 4 43 0 0 66212 5 299 0 0 52212 6 0 0 0 27127 7 0 0 134128 0 0 0 171129 71 36 52 1092130 407 7 2 64813 1 1 0 0 271132 175 0 0 222133 17 0 0 -1 4 0134 0 166 109 13713 5 133 0 0 18213 6 30 0 0 48137 0 0 0 -1 013 8 73 0 0 13139 103 0 0 -1 0 1140 1371 0 0 -4 2 3 2141 123 0 0 -5 8 1142 36 0 0 -2 3143 8 0 0 43144 36 0 0 -1 2145 28 0 0 -3 3146 41 0 0 -3 6 6147 24 0 0 940148 1 0 0 1649149 73 681 333 403150 585 7189 3533 445151 0 1189 18 269152 205 2 176 1031 1192153 0 365 197 104154 0 45 345 -1 2 815 5 35 4827 604 40815 6 0 838 73 -3 4157 98 1194 547 11158 408 0 0 0159 342 0 0 0160 223 37582 19696 0161 1068 4040 1632 2146162 283 0 0 0163 1109 1242 373 2813164 452 0 0 0165 637 0 0 0166 3 2 9 5 6 0 0 0
147
Table 2.C8 Domestic goods, exports,
C o d e DOM-COM 2 2 5(1 ) ( 2 )59 8 7 9 0 7 2 3 9 460 3 3 2 4 2 661 2 5 3 0 9 362 2 7 4 1 163 1 6 5 5 464 174 065 2 4 3 5 5 0 466 3 0 2 8 2 6 067 594 1 4 7 268 3 4 9 6 4 3 769 58 1 3 1 6 67 0 31 2 6 871 1 5 6 0 6 2 2 1 77 2 1 9 4 0 3 1 573 1 1 6 1 9 874 4 9 0 9 1 1 475 2 0 7 9 8 6 2 1 47 6 5 7 0 6 4 8 1 47 7 1 9 4 1 3 9 97 8 1 5 6 9 8 779 8 0 9 9 6 680 2 1 8 9 6 081 4 7 8 3 1 2 082 2 9 9 0 4 983 1 8 1 7 1 6 484 3 5 5 9 1 6 685 1 1 2 8 1 1 2 6 286 1 4 6 3 1 7 4 987 2 1 3 8 1 488 4 7 5 0 1 5 889 2 6 3 5 1 1 590 1 8 7 0 4 1 091 4 4 7 0 1 5 892 3 3 9 2 2 0 793 1 3 0 5 0 2 7 4 694 4 1 7 2 5 5 895 9 1 2 0 3 9 196 6 9 7 4 4 1 097 1 9 0 6 2 498 8 1 4 7 8 3 299 344 1 3 0100 310 0101 1 0 4 6 9 4 3 91 0 2 91 4103 4 4 4 6 3 6 61 0 4 9 5 3 2 8 51 0 5 2 3 8 7 2 91 0 6 5 6 0 1 5 0107 6 7 0 9 0 5 4 1 11 0 8 1 7 1 1 8 3 5 2 71 0 9 6 3 5 6 9 1 2 4 7 6110 5 7 9 7 58111 1 4 1 6 9 1 2 8112 6 2 4 4 1 1 1 2 6
taxes and duties (Billions of 1990 TL)
58 C o d e 58 225(3 ) (4 ) (5 )139 167 421 2 1 6 725 16 8 47 4313 169 2 12142 1 7 0 36 808198 171 17 9 9 1 67 1 7 2 9 18281 1 7 3 37 2715 1 7 4 54 4 7 612 1 7 5 9 4627 1 7 6 92 72 293 1 7 7 45 1670 1 7 8 69 80198 1 7 9 143 63 933 1 8 0 32 11039 181 6 302 1 8 2 9 6 8 92 2844 183 327 2 0 8 6243 1 8 4 11 57667 1 8 5 18 4 8 462 1 8 6 25 4064 1 8 7 43 121161 1 8 8 16 3978 1 8 9 2 5 8 7 6 3164 1 9 0 24 1090 191 1 2 6 6 5 856 1 9 2 81 8 1 563 19 3 1 9 8 4 6 8 6 066 93 1 9 4 1 7 7 9 1 6 3 93 1 9 5 33 20113 1 9 6 203 4 1 795 19 7 112 2 6 257 19 8 84 1 6 462 19 9 10 1 1 8102 2 0 0 175 4 1 5371 20 1 340 4 5 2 443 2 0 2 136 5 3 1 3172 2 0 3 382 1 0 3 7108 2 0 4 1 4 0 4 9 2 1 862 2 0 5 43 123300 2 0 6 1 2 6 7 4 3 7 59 2 0 7 67 5 0 80 2 0 8 5 61167 2 0 9 1 9 6 1 3 4 4 61 2 1 0 32 8 4 4269 2 1 1 461 2 0 1 80 2 1 2 1 1314 2 1 3 0 114 85 2 1 4 0 00 2 1 5 0 0376 2 1 6 0 1 2 2 01 1 6 0 2 1 7 0 2 1 2 8338 2 1 8 0 784 2 6 21 9 0 554 88 2 2 0 0 6 5 6
i n d i r e c t
C o d e
1131141151161171181191201211221231241251261271281291301311321331341351361371381391401411421431441451461471481491501511521531541 5 5156157158159160161162163164165166
148
Appendix 2.D The GAMS code: the case of VERs
$ T I T L E  T U R K E Y S A M : D I S A G G R E G A T E D  T R A D E  M O D E L  W IT H  T H E  E C  -  1 9 9 0$ O F F S Y M L I S T  O F F S Y M X R E F  O F F U P P E R  $ S T I T L E  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  A C C O U N T  S E TS E T SI  S E C T O R S  /A g r  A g r i c u l t u r eM in  M i n i n gF o o d  F o o d  p r o d u c t sD r i n k  B e v e r a g e s  t o b a c c oT e x t  T e x t i l e sW e a r  W e a r i n g  a p p a r e lL e a t  L e a t h e r  a n d  f u r  p r o d u c t sF o o t  F o o t w e a rW o o d  W o o d  a n d  w o o d  p r o d u c t sC h e m  C h e m i c a l  p r o d u c t sP e t r  P e t r o l e u m  a n d  c o a l  p r o d u c t sN m e t  N o n - m e t a l l i c  m i n e r a l  p r o d u c t sM e t  I r o n  s t e e l  a n d  n o n - f e r r o u s  m e t a lM a c h  M a c h i n e r yM t r a n  T r a n s p o r t  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  o t h e rE l g a s  E l e c t r i c i t y  G a s  a n d  w a t e r w o r k sC o n s  C o n s t r u c t i o nW h o l  W h o l e s a l e  r e t a i l  t r a d e  r e s t a u r a n t  a n d  h o t e l sT r a n  T r a n s p o r t  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n sO s e r  O t h e r  s e r v i c e s  /I R S ( I )  S E C T O R S  W IT H  I R S  / T e x t ,  W e a r  /C R S ( I )  S E C T O R S  W IT H  C R S  / A g r ,  M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,  N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  C o n s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e r  /T ( I ) T R A D A B L E S  / A g r ,  M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  T e x t ,  W e a r ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,  N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e r  /N T ( C R S )  N O N T R A D A B L E S  / C o n s  /T C R S ( I )  T R A D A B L E S  W IT H  C R S  / A g r ,  M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e rH C G ( I )  H O U S E C O N S G O O D S  / A g r ,  M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  T e x t ,  W e a r ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,  N m e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e r  /
W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,
L A B O U R F O R C E /P r o f P r o f e s s i o n a l  l a b o u rM a n a M a n a g e r sW h i t e W h i t e  c o l l a r sS a l e S a l e  w o r k e r sS e r v S e r v i c e  w o r k e r sF a r m A g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k e r sN f  a r m N o n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k e r sO t h e r O t h e r s  /H O U S E H O L D S  /U 1 4 U r b a n  1U 1 5 U r b a n  2U 1 6 U r b a n  3U 1 7 U r b a n  4U 1 8 U r b a n  5U 1 9 U r b a n  6U 2 0 U r b a n  7U 2 1 U r b a n  8U 2 2 U r b a n  9U 2 3 U r b a n  1 0U 2 4 U r b a n  1 1U 2 5 U r b a n  1 2U 2 6 U r b a n  1 3U 2 7 U r b a n  1 4U 2 8 U r b a n  1 5
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U 2 9 U r b a n 16U 3 0 U r b a n 17U 3 1 U r b a n 18U 3 2 U r b a n 19U 3 3 U r b a n 20R 3 4 R u r a l 1R 3  5 R u r a l 2R 3 6 R u r a l 3R 3 7 R u r a l 4R 3 8 R u r a l 5R 3  9 R u r a l 6R 4 0 R u r a l 7R 4 1 R u r a l 8R 4 2 R u r a l 9R 4 3 R u r a l 10R 4 4 R u r a l 11R 4 5 R u r a l 12R 4 6 R u r a l 13R 4 7 R u r a l 14R 4 8 R u r a l 15R 4 9 R u r a l 16R 5 0 R u r a l 17R 5 1 R u r a l 18R 5 2 R u r a l 191) U RBAN H O U S E H O L D S / 'U 2 5 , U 2 6 , U 27I) R U R A L H O U S E H O L D S / 1R 4 5 , R 4 6 , R 47
U 1 4 ,  U 1 5 , U 1 6 , U 1 7 , U 1 8 , U 1 9 , U 2 0 , U 2 1 , U 2 2 ,  U 2 3 , ,  U 2 8 , U 2 9 , U 3 0 , U 3 1 f U 3 2 , U 3 3 /
R 5 0 ,  R 5 1 , R 5 2  / R 4 0 , R 4 1 , R 4 2 , R 4 3 ,A L I A S  ( I , J ) ;$ S T I T L E  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  S O C I A L  A C C O U N T IN G  M A T R IX  F O R  T U R K E Y  -  1 9 9 0  T A B L E  V A R I E ( I , * )  M IS C E L L A N E O U S  P A R A M E T E R SI n d - T a x  D o m -C o m  E x p o r t  I m p o r t  D u t y  T A R E U  F U N D E U  G C O N  C A P - A C C  T E T A  PCM ARGA g r 16 7 9 3 9 2 7 2 5 1 3 3 0 7 9 4 6 9 7 . 5 1 1 8 .7 5 1 4 2 8 1 4 5M in 4 2 8 7 4 3 3 51 0 1 1 2 7 6 99 1 . 3 0 . 6 2 9 3 1 4 6 6 5F o o d 2 3 4 3 1 8 9 7 4 5 6 1 3 2 6 4 4 1 3 2 1 .4 1 7 4 .9 1 1 1 4 4 9 8 5D r i n k 7 3 8 0 8 2 5 2 6 2 0 6 8 1 0 0 6 3 1 .3 5 2 .8 8 3 3 2 5T e x t 8 4 4 2 1 6 4 2 6 2 1 4 2 4 1 4 3 2 7 1 7 .6 1 0 4 .9 7 1 1 1 7 9 5W e a r 2 4 3 5 9 4 9 4 8 1 4 5 8 7 11 1 . 5 5 . 9 4 0 7 6 5 8 5L e a t 66 2 0 0 7 3 9 9 5 0 1 18 2 . 2 8 . 5 1 2 7 1 5F o o t 62 1 6 3 1 87 65 2 5 3 . 1 1 1 .9 1 7 5 2 2 2 5W o o d 4 6 7 1 8 5 2 7 2 9 5 1 3 7 4 3 4 1 2 1 .7 1 1 9 .6 1 8 1 50 2 5C h e m 1 1 8 1 6 7 7 6 1 5 9 2 1 0 5 2 4 2 1 9 1 8 5 .1 1 1 3 5 .2 1 7 7 - 9 8 5P e t r 6 6 9 5 2 3 4 6 4 7 6 3 3 6 5 2 1 8 1 2 3 . 4 4 5 9 .6 1 4 9 4 -4 8 1 3 5N m e t 3 2 7 1 7 4 4 4 1 0 4 7 1 9 6 0 5 8 4 4 2 .0 2 8 9 .6 1 4 9 - 3 9 1 5M e t 4 1 5 1 7 6 3 6 3 3 0 4 1 0 3 1 3 4 7 6 8 . 4 2 2 6 .0 2 5 2 5 8 9 5M a c h 64 1 2 6 7 8 7 1 6 5 6 1 7 8 5 0 3 0 9 7 1 8 6 .3 1 6 7 7 .6 8 6 3 1 8 4 6 0 5M t r a n 4 4 6 1 6 1 0 6 93 9 9 4 0 3 2 5 2 6 1 4 1 .7 1 2 9 2 .2 1 3 3 9 3 9 6 5E l g a s 14 1 1 9 3 4 11 5 1 5 1 7 5 0 0 5C o n s 1 4 8 5 5 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 5 7 2 7 7 5W h o l 3 7 6 8 4 5 8 4 8 9 3 8 1 2 2 0 0 1 3 5 1 7 8 1 8 5T r a n 1 4 9 8 7 0 8 6 4 1 2 5 3 4 2 2 0 5 0 1 5 6 1 4 4 2 8 5O s e r 5 9 1 4 8 2 5 2 4 1 2 5 5 6 6 2 0 3 3 5 9 3 0 5+ E P S I E T A C  E T A R S IG M A IM P E C 1 5  E X P E C 1 5 E X P E C D U T YA g r 2 . 0 0 0 3 3 0 .9 4 5 69 1 1 1 6 6 0M in 0 . 5 0 0 3 3 0 .4 2 6 17 9 4 4 4 0F o o d 1 . 0 5 0 3 3 0 .9 4 5 1 3 2 3 2 4 3 7 0D r i n k 1 . 8 3 5 3 3 0 .8 8 6 58 17 0T e x t 2 . 0 0 0 2 2 0 .9 2 7 8 4 6 5 9 8 2 0 . 1 5W e a r 3 . 4 0 0 2 2 0 .9 2 7 12 4 0 0 0 0 . 3 0L e a t 3 . 4 0 0 2 2 0 .9 2 7 2 5 2 97 0F o o t 3 . 4 0 0 2 2 0 .9 2 7 9 2 5 0W ood 2 . 0 0 0 2 2 0 .8 9 9 7 3 9 57 0C h e m 1 . 7 6 2 2 2 1 .0 0 9 5 5 5 2 6 9 1 0P e t r 0 .4 0 0 2 2 0 .3 7 4 41 3 5 3 4 0N m e t 1 .1 6 9 2 2 0 .9 6 6 9 2 6 8 2 9 0M e t 0 . 7  62 2 2 0 .9 1 1 2 9 3 2 1 0 9 1 0M a c h 0 .8 3 9 2 2 1 .1 0 5 1 0 4 5 7 1 2 5 5 0M t r a n 1 . 5 1 1 2 2 1 .6 7 0 4 1 9 1 3 0 1 0E l g a s 2 . 0 0 0 2 2 1 .8 8 4 7 2 0C o n s 2 . 0 0 0 1 .9 8 8 0 0
U 2 4  , 
R 4 4  ,
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W h o l 2 . 0 0 0 1 1 1 . 5 5 7 5 9 3 3 9 3 1 0T r a n 2 . 0 0 0 1 1 1 . 8 9 0 1 0 7 3 5 5 1 3 0O s e r 2 . 0 0 0 1 1 2 . 0 1 0 3 2 2 5 5 2 0 ;T A B L E  I O ( J , I ) IN P U T  O U T P U T  1 9 9 0A G R M IN  F O O D D R I N K T E X T  W EAR L E A T  F O O T WOOD CH EMA G R 1 4 9 2 6 5 9  1 3 7 9 0 2 0 8 4 3 3 4 2 0 2 5 7  1 2 2 2 5 2 3M IN 13 1 5 1 7 1 1 4 4 1 0 19 2 5 6F O O D 2 0 5 8 3 7 0 5 1 2 6 6 1 1 4 5  3 8 2  4 6 17 2 4 6D R IN K 4 0 8 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0T E X T 1 3 4 0 3 1 8 1 5 8 2 7 8 3 7 2 4 64 50 62 2 2W EAR 0 3 13 5 1 1 0 0 7 1 4L E A T 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 4  3 4 0  5 0 2 1 0F O O T 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 82 5 0WOOD 9 6 8 31 7 2 2 3 1 5 2 5 6 1 5 5 4 4 8 1 4 2CH EM 3 0 0 8 7 6 5 5 0 8 5 3 5 1 4 8 8 7  4 8 5 6 1 5 7 1 4P E T R 2 3 6 7 3 6 8 5 8 9 4 7 64 1 4 5 1 5  1 1 2 4 6 1 7 5 6N M ET 3 4 5 2 9 1 8 3 1 6 5 3 0 2 2 8 1 2 9 1 4 8 1 9 0M ET 0 1 2 5 7 3 2 3 4 0 2 0 1 0 0 5 5M ACH 3 6 3 1 2 2 1 7 6 8 8 4 2 3 1 9 3 9 12 3 2 2 8M TRAN 3 5 7 3 10 9 9 8 65 7 4 6 2E L G A S 2 3 0 2 4 3 6 2 8 5 8 8 9 0 8 6 1 1  17 8 2 9 3 1 8WHOL 1 6 6 6 1 6 1 1 6 6 6 2 3 0 2 0 3 7 1 4 0 6  1 6 6  1 5 1 7 2 6 1 1 1 1T R A N 2 6 6 1 2 1 9 1 8 9 6 2 1 2 8 8 6 4 6 5 9 6  6 5 1 1 8 6 9 7 4O S E R 3 1 0 9 2 2 5 98 7 1 5 7 2 6 4 9 2 7 6 4 4  4 5 59 3 5 9 6+ P E T R NM ET M ET M ACH MTRAN E L G A S C O N S WHOL T R A N O S E RA G R 0 3 8 1 2 9 1 5 1 2 8 0 6 1 0 7 4 1M IN 1 0 2 4 6 7 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 2 17 1 3 4 5 1 2 2 7 80 3 0 9 2 8F O O D 0 1 0 0 3 2 0 1 9 4 0 3 57 60D R I N K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 9 2 2 2 1T E X T 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 63 2 0 7 7 1 8 9 4 8W EAR 3 1 1 13 1 8 7 4 0 15 6 5 1L E A T 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1F O O T 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 0WOOD 6 1 8 6 1 5 2 1 7 1 1 5 34 4 0 2 8 1 0 0 6 1 0 3 4 9 4CH EM 1 7 3 1 6 4 3 1 0 0 7 6 6 2 1 0 54 7 0 7 3 0 5 1 5 7 1 7 0 1P E T R 9 5 2 7 2 5 1 0 2 5 2 8 4 90 2 3 9 1 1 9 5 1 4 7 7 1 2 3 0 9 3 5 6N M ET 1 9 2 4 6 1 67 4 9 5 2 0 1 8 7 7 2 4 3 2 7 1 8 5 4 3 5 8M ET 2 6 1 1 2 8 2 4 9 6 2 9 7 3 9 3 6 7 6 1 9 2 0 62 7 3M ACH 3 0 2 3 5 6 2 0 4 7  63 6 6 8 3 8 5 1 7 0 7 1 7 2 1 4 1 6 1 5 1 9M TRAN 0 3 3 2 0 6 3 2 5 5 1 1 6 9 6 0 7 8 2 4 1 3 5 5 0E L G A S 1 2 8 1 2 2 8 1 3 7 0 3 7 8 1 6 5 6 3 4 2 1 5 9 8 6 2 3 6 4 5 3C O N S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0W HOL 4 2 2 8 6 6 1 3 2 8 1 6 4 3 1 2 7 8 2 4 9 3 5 6 4 3 3 1 1 4 0 1 9 1 4 3 7T R A N 4 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 3 1 1 3 7 7 8 0 2 4 2 2 3 5 9 5 4 9 7 9 3 9 3 3 2 1 3 8O S E R 1 4 4 7 3 3 3 7 5 7 8 4 4 4 3 1 7  5 1 6 1 4 7 8 3 1 2 7 5 5 3 4 9 5 ;T A B L E L A B I N C ( * , I ) L a b o u r  IN C O M E  A c t i v i t y  M a t r i xA G R M IN F O O D D R I N K T E X T W EAR L E A T  F O O T WOOD CH EMP R O F 0 2 4 7 1 4 9 1 0 8 1 0 9 37 3 7 7 8 1 0 3M ANA 2 2 6 31 2 2 0 1 5 8 1 6 0 5 4 4 10 1 1 4 1 5 2W H IT E 6 8 1 1 7 0 1 5 2 1 0 9 1 1 1 37 3 7 7 8 1 0 5S A L E 1 6 0 5 4 4 1 0 0 3 3S E R V 6 9 1 9 1 8 5 62 62 2 1 2 4 4 4 5 9FARM 4 6 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0N FA R M 3 9 3 1 4 5 8 1 9 8 5 1 4 3 4 1 4 4 9 4 9 1 3 8  9 5 1 0 3 2 1 3 7 0O T H E R 0 0 4 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 23 30C A P I T A L 5 8 6 4 5 3 7 8 7 5 1 5 9 2 7 9 8 6 4 8 3 2 3 7 1 7 9 4  3 2 6 4 6 8 1 4 7 8 1+ P E T R NM ET M ET M ACH MTRAN E L G A S C O N S WHOL T R A N O S E RP R O F 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 6 7 1 4 8 6 7 5 7 8 2 1 1 7 5 3 6 5 1 7 5 8 5M ANA 3 1 1 9 3 1 6 4 2 4 7 2 1 8 1 0 9 1 2 4 7 2 0 0 3 0 1 2 5 1 6W H IT E 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 1 7 0 1 5 1 1 0 1 2 4 0 6 2 0 6 6 1 2 1 0 8 1 2 8S A L E 0 4 4 6 4 5 1 4 6 3 9 3 8 5S E R V 1 2 7 5 64 9 6 84 2 4 4 2 9 4 6 5 5 0 1 9 5 5 2 4 8F ARM 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 5N FARM 2 7 4 1 7 4 0 1 4 8 1 2 2 3 1 1 9 7 0 1 1 4 1 1 0 0 7 4 1 5 9 2 4 3 5 6 5 0 0 2O T H E R 5 37 32 4 9 4 4 2 2 1 5 5 5 6 8 3 9 5C A P I T A L 4 6 0 7 5 3 3 9 2 5 4 4 7 5 5 4 2 7 2 6 5 1 4 0 1 0 4 6 6 5 0 6 6 8 4 4 8 9 5 2 6 1 4 7 ,T A B L E H H IN C O M E (H H , * )  H o u s e h o l d  I n c o m eP R O F  M ANA W H IT E  S A L E  S E R V  FARM  N FA R M  O T H E R  G O V  ROW C A P  I T  3 9  0 93 2 1  2 2 1  9 8 5 1  1 0  6 4 4 6U 1 4
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e l a s O ( i r s )  =  ( l / f i ( i r s )  + ( l / E P S K I R S )  -  l / £ i ( i r s )  ) / n O ( i r s )  +( QO ( 1 R S )  /HOMO ( 1 R S )  -  l / E P S K I R S )  ) *D O O ( 1 R S ) / (  n O ( i r s ) * Q 0 ( 1 R S ) * ( 1 + T D O ( 1 R S ) )  ) ) * * ( - l ) ;e l a s e O ( i r s ) =  ( l / f i e ( i r s )  + ( 1 / E T A C ( I R S )  -  1 / f i e ( i r s ) ) / n O ( i r s ) ) * * ( - ! ) ;
B E R T R A N D
* e l a s O ( i r s )  =  (1  -  1 / n O ( i r s ) ) * f i ( i r s ) +*  ( (1  -  D O O ( 1 R S ) / Q O ( 1 R S ) * ( 1 + T D O ( 1 R S ) ) ) * E P S I ( 1 R S )  +*  (H C M O ( 1 R S ) / Q O ( 1 R S ) ) * D O O ( 1 R S ) / Q O ( 1 R S ) * ( 1 + T D O ( 1 R S ) )  ) / n 0 ( i r s )* e l a s e O ( i r s )  = f i e ( i r s )  + ( E T A C (1 R S )
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 4*D I S P L A Y  e l a s O ,  e l a s e O ;
f i e ( i r s )  ) / n O ( i r s )
G E T  P R I C E S  A N D  C O S T  E Q U A T IO N SM C O ( 1 R S )  = ( ( (G A M M A ( 1 R S ) * * S I G M A ( 1 R S ) )  +* * ( 1 / ( 1 - S I G M A ( 1 R S ) ) ) ) / A D (1 R S ] ( ( 1 - G A M M A ( 1 R S ) ) * * S I G M A ( I R S ) ) )  ♦  SUM  (« J , A  ( J , 1 R S )  ) ;P D O ( 1 R S )  = M C O ( I R S )  / (1  -  1 / e l a s O ( i r s ) ) ;P E C O ( 1 R S )  = M C O ( I R S )  / (1  -  1 / e l a s e O ( i r s ) ) ;P D O ( C R S )  = 1 ;  P E C O ( C R S  ) = 1 ; P E R W O (C R S ) = 1 ;P E R W O ( 1 R S )  = P D O ( 1 R S ) ;P E O ( I ) $ T ( I ) = ( P E C O ( I ) * E C E E 0 ( I ) ♦  P E R W O ( I ) *E R O W 0 ( I ) ) / E 0 ( I ) ;  P Y O ( I )  = ( P D O ( I ) * D O 0 ( I ) ♦  P E O ( I ) * E 0 ( I ) ) / Y O ( I ) ;A V C O ( I R S )  = P Y O ( I R S ) ;P 0 ( J )  = (1  ♦  T D O ( J ) ) * P D 0 ( J ) ;P M O ( J )  = P D O (J )P C O ( J )  = P D O (J )P R O ( J )  = P D O ( J )P E C W O ( I )  = P E C O ( I ) * ( 1  + T E C O ( I ) ) ;P V O ( I )  = ( ( ( G A M M A ( I ) * * S I G M A ( I ) ) ♦  (* * ( 1 / ( l - S I G M A ( I ) ) ) ) / A D ( I )D I S P L A Y  M C O , A V C O , P Y O , P V O , P E C W O ; ( 1 - G A M M A ( I ) ) *  * S I G M A ( I ) ) )
* G E T  W A G E , R E N T , F I X E D  AND A V E R A G E  C O S T S ,  P R O F IT SWAGEO ( C R S  ) =  A D S ( C R S ) * GAM M A( C R S ) * P V 0 ( C R S )  * ( Y O ( C R S ) / A L O ( C R S )  ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A  ( C R S )  ) ;  R E N T O ( C R S )  = A D S ( C R S ) * ( 1 - GAM M A(C R S ) ) * P V O ( C R S ) * ( Y O ( C R S ) / A K O ( C R S ) ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A ( C R S ) ) ;W A G E O ( 1 R S )  =  A D S ( 1 R S ) ‘ GAM M A( 1 R S ) * P V 0 ( 1 R S ) *( Y O ( 1 R S ) / A L O ( 1 R S ) ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A  ( 1 R S )  ) ;R E N T O  ( 1 R S )  =  A D S ( 1 R S ) * ( 1 -G A M M A (1 R S )  ) * P V O  ( 1 R S ) *( Y O ( 1 R S ) / A K O ( 1 R S ) ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A  ( 1 R S )  ) ;F I X E D O  ( 1 R S )  = A V C O ( 1 R S ) * Y 0 ( 1 R S )  -  WAGEO < 1 R S  ) ‘ A LO  ( 1 R S  ) -  RENTO ( 1 R S )  *A K O  ( 1 R S )  -  S U M ( J ,  A ( J ,  1 R S )  ) * Y 0 ( 1 R S )  ;D I S P L A Y  W A G E O , R E N T O , F I X E D O ;
*  G E T  B E T A  FROM  C O S T M IN , QO FROM  A B S O R P T I O N , ARM FORM  A R M IN G T O NIM P D O M (T )  = ( I M P O ( T ) / D O O ( T ) ) “ ( 1 / E P S I ( T ) ) ;B E T A (T ) =  IM P D O M ( T ) / ( l+ I M P D O M ( T ) ) ;A R M (T )  =  QO ( T ) / (  ( B E T A ( T ) ‘ IM P O  (T ) “ ( ( E P S I  ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I  (T )  )♦  ( 1 - B E T A ( T ) ) * D O O ( T ) “  ( ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I ( T )  ) )“ ( E P S I ( T ) / ( E P S I ( T ) - l ) ) ) ;D I S P L A Y  A R M ;
*  G E T  TMT M 0 ( J ) $ T ( J )  =  T A R IF O  ( J )  / (PMO ( J )  ‘ IM P O  ( J )  - T A R I F O  ( J )  ) ; P W M O (J)  = P M O (J ) / ( 1  + T M O (J ) ) ;T C O ( J )  = T M O ( J ) ;T R O ( J )  = T M O ( J ) ;D I S P L A Y  T M O ;
* G E T  A L F A E  AN D  C E T S  FROM  C E T  F U N C T IO N  E L A ( I ) $ T ( I ) =  2 . 9 ;E D O M ( I ) $ T  ( I ) = ( D O 0 ( I ) / E 0 ( I ) ) “ ( 1 / E L A ( I )  ) ;A L F A E ( I ) $ T  ( I ) =  E D O M ( I ) / ( l + E D O M ( I ) ) ;C E T A  ( I ) $ T  ( I ) = ( A L F A E  ( I ) ‘ EO ( I ) “  ( ( E L A  ( I ) + 1 )  / E L A  ( I ) ) +( 1 - A L F A E  ( I ) ) *D O 0  ( I )  “  ( (E L A  ( I ) + 1 )  / E L A ( I )  ) ) “  ( E L A ( I )  / ( E L A ( I )  + 1 )  ) ; C E T S ( I ) $ T  ( I ) = YO ( I ) / C E T A ( I ) ;D I S P L A Y  A L F A E ,  C E T S ;
* G E T  S H A R E  A N D  S H I F T  FROM  C E T  F U N C T IO N  E L A E ( I ) $ T ( I ) =  5 ;E D O M E ( I )  $ T ( I )  = (EROWO ( I )  / E C E E O  ( I )  ) “  ( 1 / E L A E  ( I )  ) ;S H A R E ( I ) $ T ( I )  =  E D O M E ( I ) / ( 1 + E D O M E ( I ) )  ;C E T A E ( I )  $ T ( I )  = (S H A R E  ( I )  ‘ E C E E O  ( I )  “  ( ( E L A E  ( I )  + 1 ) / E L A E  ( I )  ) +( 1 - S H A R E  ( I )  ) ‘ EROWO ( I )  “  ( (E L A E  ( I ) + 1 )  / E L A E  ( I ) ) ) “  (E L A E  ( I )  / ( E L A E  ( I )  + 1 )  ) ; S H I F T ( I ) $ T  ( I ) = E O ( I ) / C E T A E ( I ) ;D I S P L A Y  S H A R E , S H I F T ;
*  G E T  A L F A  A N D  ARMM B Y  IN C L U D I N G  T A R I F F S  I N  I C E E  A N D  IR O WI C E E O ( J )  =  ( V A R I E ( J ,  " I M P E C 1 5 * ) * ( 1 + T C O ( J )  ) ) ;I R O W O ( J )  =  ( I M P O ( J ) - I C E E O ( J ) ) ;E P S I M ( T )  =  5 ;IC E E I R O W  ( T )  = ( I C E E O  ( T ) / IR O W O  (T ) ) “  ( 1 / E P S I M ( T )  ) ;A L F A ( T )  = I C E E I R O W ( T ) / ( 1 + I C E E I R O W ( T ) ) ;A R M M (T ) = I M P O ( T ) / (  ( A L F A ( T ) ‘ I C E E O ( T )  “ ( ( E P S I M ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I M ( T ) )♦  ( l - A L F A ( T )  ) ‘ IROW O (T ) “  ( ( E P S I M  (T )  - 1 )  / E P S I M  ( T )  ) )“  (E P S I M ( T ) / ( E P S I M ( T ) - 1 ) ) ) ;D I S P L A Y  A L F A ,  ARMM;
V A R IA B L E S  P E R  F I R M
n O ( c r s ) =  1 ;
y s O ( i ) =  Y O ( I )i /nO ( i
1 0 ( i >  = A L O ( I )i /n O ( i
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k O ( i )  =  A K O ( I ) / n O ( i ) ; l f O ( i r s )  =  A L F O ( I R S ) / n O ( i r s ) ; k f O ( i r s )  =  A K F O ( I R S ) / n O ( i r s ) ; f i x O ( i r s )  = F I X E D O ( I R S ) / n O ( i r s )
* G E T  S H H KT G K O  = 1 0 4 1 8 ;TWKO =  1 6 0 6 ;  D E P R E C O  =  4 7 6 8 5 ;* G E T  D T A XT O G O  = S U M  ( H H ,H H I N C O M E ( H H , * G O V * ) ) ;THWO = S U M  (H H , H H IN C O M E  (H H , 'R O W ' ) ) ;P R O F IT O  ( I R S )  = ( P Y O ( I R S ) - A V C O ( I R S ) ) * Y 0 ( I R S )  ; V E R R E N T O  ( I R S ) = T E C O  ( I R S ) ‘ E C E E O  ( I R S ) ;F K IN C O  =  S U M ( I R S , R E N T O ( I R S ) * ( A K O ( I R S )  ♦  A K F O ( I R S ) ) )  S U M (C R S , R E N T O (C R S ) * A K O (C R S ) )  + T G K O  + TWKO F L I N C O  =  S U M ( C R S ,W A G E O ( C R S ) * A L O ( C R S ) ) +S U M ( I R S , W A G E O ( I R S ) ‘ ( A L O ( I R S ) ♦  A L F O ( I R S ) ) ) ;  HRO =  3 3 4 8 3 6  ;H T A X O  =  S U M (H H , H H C O N S U M (■ H T A X ■ , H H ) ) ;D T A X  = H T A X O / H R O ; D I S P L A Y  D T A X ;
D E P R E C O  ;
T h e  a b s o r p t i o n  i n  t h e  SAM  c o n t a i n s  V A T .  T h i s  m u s t  b e  e x t r a c t e d  t o  g e t  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  g o o d s  m a r k e t .R e m e m b e r  t h a t  (1  + TDO (J )  ) = P 0 ( J ) / P D 0 ( J )
* G E T  M P S H , H B SHHCO = S U M (J , (1  + T D O ( J ) ) * H C M 0 ( J ) ) ;H B S  ( J )  $ H C M 0  ( J )  =  (1  ♦  T D O ( J ) ) * H C M 0 ( J ) / H H C O ;  D I S P L A Y  H B S ; H SO  = S U M (H H , H H C O N S U M (*  S A V “ , H H ) ) ;M PSH  =  H S O / ( H R O -H T A X O  ) ; D I S P L A Y  M P S H ;*  G E T  K S H RZ 0 ( J )  =  V A R I E  ( J ,  " C A P - A C C * ) / ( 1  ♦  TDO {J )  ) ;IN V O  = S U M (J , (1  + T D O ( J ) ) * Z 0 ( J ) ) ;K S H R (J )  =  (1  ♦  T D O ( J ) ) * Z 0 ( J ) / I N V O ;  D I S P L A Y  K S H R ;* G E T  G B SG C O ( J )  =  V A R I E (J , * G C O N * ) / ( 1  ♦  T D O (J )  ) ;T G C O  = S U M (J , (1 + T D O ( J ) ) * G C 0 ( J ) ) ;G B S (J )  =  (1  + T D O ( J ) ) * G C 0 ( J ) / T G C O ;  D I S P L A Y  G B S ;*  G E T  X OX 0 ( J )  =  S U M ( I , L E O N T I E F ( J , I ) ) / ( l  ♦  T D O (J ) ) ;*  E Q U I L I B R I U M  I N  T O E  G O O D S  M ARK ETG O O D M K T E Q  (J )  = Q 0 ( J )  -  (HCMO ( J )  ♦  G C O  (J )  ♦  ZO (J )  + XO  ( J )  ) ; D I S P L A Y  G O O D M K T E Q ;
V A R I A B L E S
F R E E  V A R I A B L E S  TO G THW H S  G S  WS Z ( J )  TWG A G  L A B  A G C A P
G O V ER N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  T O  H O U S E H O L D S  R E M IT T A N C E S  FROM  A B R O A D  H O U SH O L D  S A V I N G S  G O V ER N M E N T  S A V I N G S  F O R E IG N  S A V I N G SIN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N  G O V ER N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  ABR OAD  E X C E S S  DEM AND F O R  L A B O U R  E X C E S S  DEMAND F O R  C A P I T A L‘ W E L F A R E  I N D IC A T O R  F O R  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO NU T I L I T Y  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N  V A R IA B L E  ;P O S I T I V E  V A R IA B L EM C ( I R S )  M A R G IN A L  C O S TA V C ( I R S )  A V E R A G E  C O S T S
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f i x ( i r s )n ( i )E ( I )e l a s ( i r s ) e l a s e ( i r s )  T D  ( I )T C  ( J )T R  (J )T E C ( J )P E C ( I )P E C W ( I R S ) P E R W ( I ) P V ( I )P ( J )P D ( J )PM  (J )P C ( J )P E  ( I )P R ( J )P Y ( I )W AGER E N TP W M ( J)C P I  X ( J )  y s  ( i )
H i)k ( i )D ( J )I M P (J )I C E E ( J )I R O W ( J )Q< J )E E U ( I )E R O W ( I )F K I N CF L I N CH RHCMS A VI N VI N T A XT D T HT A R I FD E P R E CT G KTWKRG C  (J )T G C O N  H C  (J )P R O F I T ( I R S )  V E R R E N T ( I R S )
F I X E D  C O S T SN U M B ER  O F  S Y M M E T R IC  F IR M S  E X P O R T SF IR M  P E R C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U TF IR M  P R E C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  E X P O R T SI N D I R E C T  T A X  ON D O M E S T I C  C O N S U M P T IO NT A R I F F  O N  IM P O R T S  FR O M  C E ET A R I F F  O N  IM P O R T S  FR O M  ROWT A R I F F  ON E X P O R T S  IM P O S E D  B Y  C E EP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  E CW OR LD P R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  E CP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  ROWN E T  O R  V A L U E  A D D E D  P R I C EC O M P O S IT E  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT Y  JD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT YD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R TD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T  FROM  C E ED O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  E X P O R T SD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T  FROM  ROWD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U TW AGER E N TW O R LD  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT Y  M IM P O R T E DL E Y S P E R E S  P R I C E  IN D E X  O F  D O M E S T IC  G O O D SIN T E R M E D IA T E  IN P U T S  DEM ANDD O M E S T I C  P R O D U C T IO N  O F  C O M P O S IT E  G O O D SC O M P E N S A T IO N  O F  E M P L O Y E E SO P E R A T I N G  S U R P L U SD O M E S T I C  DEM AND O F  C O M M O D IT IE SIM P O R T SIM P O R T  FROM  E CIM P O R T  FROM  ROWC O M P O S IT E  C O M M O D IT YE X P O R T S  TO W ARD S C E EE X P O R T S  TO W ARD S ROWF A C T O R  IN C O M EL A B O U R  IN C O M EH O U S E H O L D  IN C O M EH O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  M A T R IXA G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G SA G G R E G A T E  IN V E S T M E N T  O N  JI N D I R E C T  T A X  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  N E T  O F  E X P O R T S  D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E  T A R I F F S  ON IM P O R T S  D E P R E C I A T I O NN E T  G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M SN E T  ROW T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M SG O V E R N M E N T  IN C O M EG O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO NT O T A L  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO NH O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO NP R O F I T S  R A T ER E N T  ON V E R s
E Q U A T I O N S
E Q U A T I O N S* *  P r i c e  E q u a t i o n sA B S O R P T (J )  P M D E F (J )P C D E F (J )P R D E F (J )P Y D E F ( I )P E D E F ( I )P D D E F ( I R S )  C O U R N O T D ( I R S ) B E R T R A N D ( I R S ) P E C D E F ( I R S ) C O U R N O T E ( I R S ) B E R T R A N E ( I R S )
V A L U E  O F  D O M E S T IC  S A L E SD E F I N I T I O N  O F  D O M E S T IC  IM P O R T  P R I C ED E F I N I T I O N  O F  D O M E S T IC  IM P O R T  P R I C E  F R O M  EUD E F I N I T I O N  O F  D O M E S T IC  IM P O R T  P R I C E  F R O M  ROWD E F I N I T I O N  O F  P R O D U C E R  P R I C ED E F I N I T I O N  O F  P R I C E  F O R  E X P O R T SD E F I N I T I O N  O F  D O M E S T IC  P R I C EF I R M  P E R C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  D O M E S T I C  O U T P U T  F IR M  P E R C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U T  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  W ORLD P R I C E  F O R  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  E C  F IR M  P E R C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  E X P O R T S  F IR M  P E R C E I V E D  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  F O R  E X P O R T S
P E C W D E F ( 1 R S )  P V A D E F ( I )C P I N D E X D E F I N I T I O N  O F  P R I C E  F O R  E X P O R T S  T O  TH E  E C  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  A C T I V I T Y  O R  V A L U E  A D D E D  P R I C E  L E Y S P E R E S  P R I C E  IN D E X  O F  D O M E S T IC  G O O D S
P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n sO U T P U T C R (C R S ) A G G L C R S ( C R S )  A G G K C R S ( C R S )  O U T P U T I R ( I R S ) A G G L I R S ( I R S )  A G G K I R S ( I R S )  M A R G C O S T ( I R S ) A V C D E F ( I R S ) F I X E D C O S T ( I R S )T R A D E  E Q U A T IO N S
G R O S S  D O M E S T I C  O U T P U T  C R SA G G R E G A T E  L A B O U R  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  C R S  A G G R E G A T E  C A P I T A L  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  C R S  G R O S S  D O M E S T I C  O U T P U T  I R S  A G G R E G A T E  L A B O U R  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  I R S  A G G R E G A T E  C A P I T A L  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  I R S  M A R G IN A L  C O S T S  A V E R A G E  C O S T S  F I X E D  C O S T S
A R M IN G T O N (T ) A R M IN G T O N T (N T ) C O S T M IN ( T )  A R M IN G IM P ( T )  C O M IM P (T )C E T ( I )E X P C E T ( I ) C E T N T ( N T )  E X P O R T ( I ) E C D E M A N D ( I R S )I n c o m e  E q u a t i o n s
A R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  T R A D A B L E SA R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  N O N T R A D A B L E SC O S T  M I N I M I Z A T I O N  F O R  C O M P O S IT E  G O O DC E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  IM P O R T SC O S T  M I N I M I Z A T I O N  F O R  C O M P O S IT E  IM P O R TC E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  T R A D A B L E SC E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  E X P O R T SC E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  N O N T R A D A B L E SE X P O R T  S A L E  M A X IM IZ A T IO NE X P O R T  D E M A N D  B Y  E C
V E R R E N T S ( I R S ) F A C K I N C  F A C L I N C  H H IN CT a x  e q u a t i o n s
R E N T  ON V E R s  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E
D IR T HIN D T A XT A R I F F SG Y D E F
D I R E C T  T A X E S  O N  H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E  I N D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  T A R I F F  ON IM P O R T S  G O V E R N M E N T  IN C O M ES a v i n g s  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n sS A V D E F  H H S D E F  G S D E F  Z D E F C ( C R S )  Z D E F I ( 1 R S )
A G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G S  H O U S E H O L D S  S A V I N G S  G O V E R N M E N T  S A V I N G S  IN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N  IN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N
E x p e n d i t u r e  E q u a t i o n sI N T D E F ( J )  H H C D E F C ( C R S )  H H C D E F I ( 1 R S )  G O V C D E F C ( C R S )  G O V C D E F I ( 1 R S )
IN T E R M E D IA T E  DEMAND H O U SE H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  H O U SE H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO N  G O V ER N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO NM a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n sL A B M A R K E TC A P M A R K TG O O D E Q C (C R S ) G O O D E Q I ( I R S )  B O P E Q  S A V I N V E Q  P R O F E Q ( I R S )O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o n
L A B O U R  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  C A P I T A L  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  C R S  G O O D S  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  I R S  G O O D S  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  B A L A N C E  O F  P A Y M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  S A V I N G S  IN V E S T M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  P R O C E  E Q U A L S  A V E R A G E  C O S T
O B J O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N  ;
EQUATION ASSIGNMENTP r i c e  E q u a t i o n sA B S O R P T ( J ) . .  P M D E F ( J ) . .  P C D E F ( J ) . .  P R D E F ( J ) . .P Y D E F ( I ) . .P E D E F ( I ) $ T ( I ) . .P D D E F ( 1 R S ) . .C O U R N O T D ( 1 R S ) . .
P ( J ) * Q ( J )  = E =  (1 ♦  T D ( J ) ) ‘ ( P M ( J ) ‘ I M P ( J )  ♦  P D ( J ) ‘ D ( J ) ) ;  P M ( J ) ‘ I M P ( J )  = E =  P C ( J ) * I C E E ( J )  + P R ( J ) ‘ I R O W ( J ) ;P C ( J )  = E =  P W M ( J) ‘ ( 1 + T C ( J ) ) ;P R ( J )  = E =  PWM(J ) * ( 1 + T R (J ) ) ;P Y ( I ) ‘ n  ( i  ) * y s ( i ) = E =  P D ( I ) * D ( I )  + P E ( I ) ‘ E ( I )  ;P E  ( I  ) = E =  ( P E C ( I ) ‘ E E U ( I )  + P E R W ( I )  * E R O W ( I )  ) / E ( I ) ;P D ( 1 R S )  = E =  M C ( 1 R S )  / (1  -  1 / e l a s ( 1 r s  ) ) ;e l a s ( i r s )  = E =  ( l / f i ( i r s )  +( 1 / E P S I ( 1 R S )  -  1 / f i  ( i r s )  ) / n ( i r s )  +( Q ( 1 R S )  /H C  ( 1 R S )  -  l / E P S K I R S )  ) *P D ( 1 R S ) ‘ D ( 1 R S ) / (  n ( i r s ) * P ( I R S ) * Q ( I R S )  )‘ B E R T R A N D ( 1 R S ) . .  e l a s ( i r s )  = E =  (1  -  1 / n ( i r s ) ) * f i ( i r s ) ♦*  ( ( 1 -  P D ( 1 R S ) * D ( 1 R S ) / ( P ( 1 R S ) * Q ( 1 R S ) )  ) * E P S I ( I R S )  +*  (H C  ( 1 R S  ) /Q  ( 1 R S )  ) ‘ P D  ( 1 R S )  * D  ( 1 R S  ) / (P  ( 1 R S  ) ‘ Q  ( 1 R S  ) ) ) / n ( i r s ) ;P E C D E F ( 1 R S ) . .  C O U R N O T E ( 1 R S ) . .
‘ B E R T R A N E ( 1 R S ) .  P E C W D E F ( 1 R S ) . .  P V A D E F ( I ) .  .
C P I N D E X . .
P E C ( I R S )  = E =  M C ( 1 R S )  / (1  -  1 / e l a s e  ( i r s ) ) ;e l a s e ( i r s )  = E =  ( l / f i e ( i r s )  +( 1 / E T A C ( 1 R S )  -  1 / f i e ( i r s ) ) / n ( i r s )  ) * * ( - ! ) ;e l a s e ( i r s )  = E =  f i e ( i r s )  ♦  ( E T A C ( I R S )  -  f i e ( i r s )  ) / n ( i r s )P E C W ( 1 R S )  = E =  P E C ( 1 R S )  *  ( 1 + T E C ( 1 R S  ) ) ;P V ( I )  = E =  ( (  (GAMMA ( I )  “ S I G M A ( I )  ) ‘ W A G E “  ( l - S I G M A ( I )  ) ♦( ( 1 -GA M M A ( I ) ) “ S IG M A  ( I )  ) ‘ R E N T “  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( I  ) ) )“  ( 1 / ( l - S I G M A ( I ) ) ) ) / A D ( I )  ;C P I  = E =  SUM  ( J ,  P D  ( J )  *D O O  ( J )  ) /SUM  ( J ,  P D O  ( J )  *D O O  ( J )  ) ;
“  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n s  *  C R S  S E C T O R S  O U T P U T C R (C R S ) . .y s  ( e r s )  = E =  A D  (C R S  ) * (GAMMA ( C R S  ) ‘ 1 ( e r s  ) “  ( ( S I G M A  ( C R S  ) - 1  ) / S I G M A  ( C R S  ) ) + ( 1 -G A M M A  ( C R S )  ) ‘ k ( c r s )  “  ( ( S IG M A  ( C R S )  - 1  ) / S I G M A  ( C R S )  ) ) v (S I G M A ( C R S ) / ( S I G M A (C R S ) - ! ) ) ;A G G L C R S ( C R S ) . .1 ( e r s ) = E =  y s  ( e r s )  *  (A D S  (C R S )  ‘ GAMMA ( C R S  ) * P V ( C R S )  /W AG E) “ S I G M A ( C R S )  ;
A G G K C R S (C R S ) . .k  ( e r s  ) = E =  y s  ( e r s )  * (A D S  ( C R S )  *  ( 1 -G A M M A  ( C R S )  ) * P V  ( C R S )  / R E N T ) “ S I G M A ( C R S )  ; “  1 R S  S E C T O R S‘ O U T P U T I R ( 1 R S ) .  * y s ( i r s ) = E =  A D  ( 1 R S )  *  (GAMMA ( 1 R S )  * 1  ( i r s  ) “  ( ( S I G M A  ( 1 R S  ) - 1  ) / S I G M A  ( 1 R S )  ) ( 1 -GA M M A ( 1 R S )  ) * k ( i r s )  “  ( ( S I G M A ( 1 R S )  - 1  ) / S I G M A  ( 1 R S )  ) )“  ( S I G M A ( I R S ) / ( S I G M A ( I R S ) - 1 ) )  ♦  I C O ( 1 r s )  ♦  k f O ( i r s ) ;
A G G L I R S (1RS) . .1 ( i r s )  
A G G K I R S (1RS)..k ( i r s )
M A R G C O S T (1RS)..
=E= y s ( i r s ) * ( A D S ( 1 R S ) ‘ G A M M A ( 1 R S ) ‘  P V ( I R S )  /W AG E) “ S IG M A  ( 1 R S )  ;
= E =  y s ( i r s ) * ( A D S ( 1 R S ) * ( 1 -G A M M A ( 1 R S ) ) *P V ( I R S )  / R E N T ) “ S IG M A  ( 1 R S )  ;MC ( 1 R S )  = E =  ( ( (GAMMA ( 1 R S )  “ S IG M A  ( 1 R S )  ) ‘ W A G E “  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( 1 R S  ) ) ♦  ( (1 -G A M M A  (1 R S )  ) “ S IG M A  ( 1 R S )  ) ‘ R E N T * *  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( 1 R S  ) ) )“  ( 1 / ( l - S I G M A ( I R S )  ) ) ) / A D ( I R S )  ♦  S U M  ( J ,  A  ( J ,  1 R S ) ‘ P  ( J ) / P O  ( J )  ) ;
A V C D E F ( 1 R S ) . .  
F I X E D C O S T ( 1 R S ) . .
A V C ( I R S )  = E =  ( W A G E * l ( i r s )  + R E N T * k ( i r s ) ) / y s ( i r s ) +S U M (J , A ( J , 1 R S ) * P ( J ) / P 0 ( J ) )  + f  i x ( i r s ) / y s ( i r s ) ;f i x ( i r s )  = E =  W A G E * l f O ( i r s )  + R E N T * k f 0 ( i r s ) ;
* *  T R A D E  E Q U A T I O N SA R M IN G T O N (T )  . . Q  ( T )  = E =  A R M ( T ) * ( B E T A ( T ) * I M P ( T ) * * (  ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I ( T ) ) ♦( 1 - B E T A  ( T )  ) * D ( T ) * * (  ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I ( T ) ) ) * * ( E P S I ( T ) / ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 )  ) ;A R M IN G T O N T ( N T ) . .  Q ( N T )  = E =  D (N T ) ;C O S T M I N ( T )  . . I M P ( T )  / D  (T )  = E =  ( P D ( T ) / P M ( T ) * B E T A ( T ) / ( 1 - B E T A ( T ) ) ) * * E P S I ( T ) ;A R M I N G I M P ( T ) . .  I M P ( T )  = E =  A R M M ( T ) * ( A L F A ( T ) * I C E E ( T ) * * ( ( E P S I M ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I M ( T ) ) + ( l - A L F A ( T ) ) * I R O W ( T ) * * ( ( E P S I M ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I M ( T ) ) ) * * ( E P S I M ( T ) / ( E P S I M ( T ) - 1 ) )C O M IM P  (T )  .  . I C E E ( T ) / I R O W ( T )  = E =  ( P R  (T )  / P C  (T )  * A L F A  ( T )  / ( 1 - A L F A  ( T )  ) ) *  * E P S I M  (T )C E T ( I ) $ T ( I ) . .  n ( i ) * y s ( i ) = E =  C E T S ( I ) * ( A L F A E ( I ) * E ( I ) * * ( ( E L A ( I ) + 1 ) / E L A ( I ) ) + ( l - A L F A E ( I )  ) * D ( I ) *  * (  ( E L A ( I ) + 1 ) / E L A ( I ) ) ) *  * ( E L A ( I ) / ( E L A ( I  ) + 1  ) ) ;
E X P C E T ( I ) $ T ( I ) . .  E  ( I  ) = E =  S H I F T ( I ) * ( S H A R E ( I ) * E E U ( I ) * * ( ( E L A E ( I ) + 1 ) / E L A E ( I ) )( 1 - S H A R E ( I )  ) *  E R O W ( I ) *  * (  ( E L A E ( I ) + 1 ) / E L A E ( I )  ) ) * * ( E L A E ( I ) / ( E L A E ( I ) + 1 ) ) ;C E T N T  (N T ) .  . Y S  (N T ) = E =  D  (N T ) ;E X P O R T ( I ) $ T C R S ( I ) . .  E E U ( I ) / E R O W ( I ) = E =( ( 1 - S H A R E ( I ) ) * P E C ( I ) / ( S H A R E ( I ) * P E R W ( I ) )  ) * * E L A E ( I ) ;E C D E M A N D ( 1 R S ) . .  E E U ( I R S )  = E =  E C E E O ( 1 R S ) * ( P E C W O ( 1 R S ) / P E C W ( 1 R S ) ) * * E T A C ( 1 R S )* *  I n c o m e  E q u a t i o n sV E R R E N T S  ( 1 R S )  . . V E R R E N T  ( 1 R S )  = E =  P E C ( 1 R S ) * T E C ( 1 R S ) * E E U ( 1 R S ) / P E C O ( 1 R S ) ;F A C K I N C . .  F K I N C  = E =  S U M ( 1 R S , R E N T * n ( i r s ) *  ( k ( i r s )  ♦  k f O ( i r s ) ) ) +S U M ( C R S , R E N T * n ( c r s ) * k ( c r s ) ) ♦  T G K  + TWK -  D E P R E C  ;F A C L I N C . .  F L I N C  = E =  S U M ( C R S ,W A G E * n ( c r s ) * 1 ( c r s ) )  +S U M ( 1 R S , W A G E * n ( i r s ) *  ( l ( i r s )  ♦  I f 0 ( i r s ) ) ) ;H H I N C . . H R  = E =  S U M ( 1 R S , P R O F I T ( 1 R S ) * n ( i r s ) * y s ( i r s )  ) ♦S U M ( 1 R S , V E R R E N T ( 1 R S ) )  + F L I N C  + F K I N C  + T H G  + THW ;
* *  T a x  e q u a t i o n sD I R T H . .  T D T H  = E =  D T A X * H R ;I N D T A X . . IN T A X  = E =  S U M ( J ,  T D (J ) * ( P M (J ) * I M P (J ) / P M O (J )  ♦  P D (J ) * D (J ) / P D O (J ) ) ) T A R I F F S . .  T A R I F = E =  S U M (J , T C (J ) *P W M (J ) * I C E E (J )  ♦  T R (J ) *P W M (J ) * I R O W (J ) ) ;G Y D E F . .  R  = E =  T D T H  + I N T A X  + T A R I F  ;
* *  S a v i n g s  S A V D E F . . H H S D E F . .  G S D E F . .
a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n sS A V  = E =  D E P R E C  + H S  ♦  G S  ♦  W S;H S  = E =  M P S H * ( 1 - D T A X ) * H R ;G S  = E =  R  -  T G C O N  -  T H G  -  TWG -  T G K ;
E x p e n d i t u r e  E q u a t i o n sZ D E F C ( C R S ) . .  Z D E F I ( 1 R S ) . .I N T D E F ( J ) . .  H H C D E F C ( C R S ) . .
(1 -fT D O  ( C R S )  ) * Z  ( C R S )  = ( 1 + T D O ( 1 R S ) ) * Z ( 1 R S )  =( 1 + T D O ( J ) ) #X ( J )  =E= H C ( C R S )  = E =  H B S ( C R S )
E =  K S H R ( C R S ) * I N V ;E =  K S H R ( I R S ) * I N V ;S U M ( I , A ( J , I ) * n ( i ) * y s ( i ) ) ;* ( 1 - M P S H ) * ( 1 - D T A X ) * H R / P ( C R S ) ;
HHCDEFI(1RS)..G O V C D E F C ( C R S ) . .  G O V C D E F I ( 1 R S ) . . ( 1 + T D O ( C R S ) ) * G C ( C R S )  = E =  G B S ( C R S ) * T G C O N ;( 1 + T D O ( 1 R S ) ) * G C ( 1 R S )  = E =  G B S ( 1 R S ) * T G C O N ;
HC(IRS) =E= HBS(IRS)*(1-MPSH)* (1-DTAX)*HR*PD0(1RS)/P(IRS)
* *  M a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n sL A B M A R K E T ..  A G L A B  = E =  S U M ( c r s , n (c r s ) * 1 ( c r s ) )  ♦S U M ( i r s , n ( i r s ) * ( l ( i r s )  + l C O ( i r s ) ) ) ;A G C A P  = E =  S U M ( c r s , n ( c r s ) * k ( c r s ) ) +S U M ( i r s , n ( i r s ) * ( k ( i r s ) ♦  k f O ( i r s ) ) ) ;
Q (C R S ) = E =  H C ( C R S )  ♦  G C ( C R S )  ♦  Z ( C R S )  ♦  X ( C R S ) ;Q  ( 1 R S  ) = E =  H C ( 1 R S  ) G C ( I R S )  ♦  Z ( I R S )  ♦  X ( I R S ) ;S U M ( I , P E C ( I ) * E E U ( I ) / P E C O ( I ) )  ♦  S U M ( I , P E R W ( I ) * E R O W { I ) / P E R W O ( I ) )  ♦  S U M ( 1 R S , V E R R E N T ( 1 R S ) )  ♦  TWK ♦  WS ♦  THW = E =S U M ( J , P C ( J ) * I C E E ( J ) / P C O ( J )  ♦  P R (J ) * I R O W (J ) / P R O (J ) )  -  T A R I F  + TW G;
C A P M A R K T ..
G O O D E Q C ( C R S ) . G O O D E Q I ( 1 R S ) .
S A V I N V E Q . .P R O F E Q ( I R S ) . .* *  O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o nO B J . .  U T I L I T Y  = E =  1* M O D E L  S E T U P  -  I N I T I A L I Z A T I O N
S A V  = E =  I N V  ;P Y ( I R S )  = E =  A V C ( I R S )  ♦  P R O F I T ( 1 R S ) ;
n . L ( c r s )  =  1 ;  n . L ( i r s )  = n O ( i r s ) ;M C . L ( I R S )  =  M C O ( 1 R S ) ;A V C . L ( I R S )  =  A V C O ( 1 R S ) ;V E R R E N T .L ( 1 R S )  = V E R R E N T O ( 1 R S ) ;  f i x . L ( i r s )  =  f i x O ( i r s ) ;  e l a s . l ( i r s )  = e l a s O ( i r s ) ;  e l a s e . l ( i r s )  =  e l a s e O ( i r s ) ;T H G . L  = T H G O ;T H W .L  =  TH W O;T W G .L  = 6 2 7 3 ;T G K . L  = T G K O ;T W K .L  = TW K O ;H S . L  = H S O ;D E P R E C .L  = D E P R E C O ;F K I N C . L  = F K I N C O ;F L I N C . L  = F L I N C O ;H R .L  = H R O ;H C . L ( J )  = H C M O ( J ) ;W S .L  = 1 2 8 5 9  ;I N V . L  = I N V O ;S A V . L  = 1 0 2 6 0 8 ;G C . L ( J )  = G C O ( J ) ;T G C O N .L  =  T G C O ;E . L ( I ) = E 0 ( I ) ;E E U . L ( I ) = E C E E O ( I ) ;E R O W .L ( I )  = E R O W O ( I ) ;G S . L  = - 1 1 9 5 5 ;Z . L ( J )  = Z 0 ( J ) ;X . L ( J )  = X 0 ( J ) ; y s . L ( i )  = y s O ( i ) ; l . L ( i )  = 1 0 ( 1 ) ;  k .  L  ( i  ) = kO  ( i  ) ;D . L ( J )  = D O O ( J ) ;I M P . L ( J )  = I M P O ( J ) ;I C E E . L ( J )  = I C E E O ( J ) ;I R O W . L ( J )  = I R O W O ( J ) ;Q .  L ( J )  = Q O ( J ) ;T D T H .L  = H T A X O ;I N T A X . L  = S U M ( J , I N D T A X O ( J ) ) ;T A R I F . L  = S U M (J , T A R I F O (J ) ) ;T E C . L ( I )  = T E C O ( I ) ;T C .  L ( J )  = T M O ( J ) ;T R . L ( J )  = T M O ( J ) ;T D .  L ( I ) = T D O ( I ) ;R .  L  = 5 2 5 2 0 ;A G L A B .L  = S U M ( C R S , A L O ( C R S ) ) ♦  S U M ( 1 R S , A L O ( 1 R S )  ♦  A L F O ( I R S ) ) ;
C P I . L  =  1 ;  P E . L ( I )  =  P E O ( I ) ;  P E C . L ( I )  = P E C O ( I ) ;  P E C W .L ( I R S )  =  P E C W O ( I R S ) ;  P E R W .L ( I )  = P E R W O ( I ) ;  P . L ( J )  = P O (J ) ; P D . L ( J )  = P D O (J ) ; P M . L ( J )  = P M O (J ) ; P Y . L ( I )  = P Y O ( I ) ;  P C . L ( J )  = P C O (J ) ; P R . L ( J )  = P R O (J ) ; P V . L ( I )  = P V O ( I ) ;  P W M .L ( J )  = P W M O ( J ) ;  W A G E . L  =  1 ;  R E N T .L  =  1 ;  P . L O ( J )  = O . O l ;  P C . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1  P R . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P D . L O ( J )  =  0 . 0 1 ;  P M . L O ( J )  =  0 . 0 1 ;  P Y . L O ( I )  =  0 . 0 1 ;  P E C . L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P E C W .L O ( I R S )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P V . L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;W A G E . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;  R E N T . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;  C P I . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;P E C W . U P ( 1 R S )  = P E C W O ( 1 R S )  ;
AGCAP.L = SUM (CRS, AKO (CRS) ) ♦ SUM ( 1RS, AKO ( 1RS) ♦ AKFO(IRS));
* C L O S U R E  R U L E SC P I . F X  =  C P I . L ;P W M .F X ( J )  = P W M .L ( J )  ;P E R W .F X ( I )  =  P E R W .L ( I )  ;P E C .F X ( C R S )  = P E C .L ( C R S )  ;P R O F I T . F X ( 1 R S )  =  0 ;T R . F X ( J )  = T R . L ( J ) ;T E C . F X ( I ) = T E C . L ( I ) ;T D . F X ( J )  =  T D . L ( J ) ;T H G . F X  = T H G .L ;T H W .F X  =  T H W .L ;T W G .F X  =  T W G .L ;T G K . F X  = T G K . L ;T W K .F X  = T W K .L ;D E P R E C .F X  =  D E P R E C .L ;I M P . F X ( N T )  = 0 ;I C E E .F X ( N T )  = 0 ;I R O W .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;E .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;E E U .F X ( N T )  = 0 ;E R O W .F X ( N T )  = 0 ;T G C O N .F X  = T G C O N .L ;W S .F X  =  W S .L  ;G S . F X  =  G S . L ;I N V . F X  =  I N V . L ;A G L A B .F X  = A G L A B . L ;A G C A P .F X  = A G C A P .L ;  n . F X ( c r s )  =  n . L ( c r s ) ;M O D E L  T U R K A G 9 0  S Q U A R E  B A S E  M O D E L / A L L  / ;
SOLVE TURKAG90 MAXIMIZING UTILITY USING NLP;
Appendix 3.A Numerical model: the case of an export tax
This appendix reports the algebraic formulation of the numerical model employed to 
study the economic impact of the introduction of the RHK export tax in Turkish 
textiles and apparel. The appendix has been split into six sections: (i) equations related 
to prices and costs; (ii) equations related to production and factor demand; (iii) 
equations related to domestic and foreign trade; (iv) equations related to income; (v) 
equations related to final demand and intermediate demand; (vi) equations related to 
the market clearing conditions.
13.A. 11 Price and cost equations
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(3.A8) act = w(l, + l f )  + r(k, + k f )  + X  P jO tf, j y ,
(3.A 9) [, i + M
‘  } - C‘
(3.A10) T | ' ~ Ç + ( l  Ç.)
(3. A l l )
^ p d j D j
A  = _____
^ P d i D i
j
[3.A.2] Production and factor demand equations
(3.A12) n „  =  © ot[Yc„ ¿ j J « - " * -  + ( 1 - 7 ^ A K j ' " - ' * -
(3.A13) = e t - - ' )y ° ~ w - ° - p v ° 7 Y c„
(3.A14) AKcr, =  0 ( ^ - ' ) ( l  -  Yc„ ) • -  r - -  pv"r yc„
(3.A15) /, = 0 ( <’'-,)7 > - ° ' p v r ' 7 i
(3.A16) *< = 0 i , '-,)( l - Y i ) " r - ' p v l" y <
13.A .31 Trade equations
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13.A .4] Income equations 
(3.A 23) Ki = (py, -  ac, )yt
(3.A 24) H R = w LA B  + rC A P + Y j n ,n i +'ZJteiEi
[ 3. A. 5] Intermediate and final demand equations 
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13.A .6] Market clearing conditions
(3.A27) Q> =  c i +  x j
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crs i j
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(3.A30) CAP = J lAK„+J^nf(kt+kf)
crs i
with fixed costs
(3.A3()a) CAP = £ A K c„ + £ n?ki
crs i
with sunk costs
(3.A31) py, =  ac,
Variables ( * ) :
aCi Average cost
ALcr, Labour
AKC„ Capital
Ci Marginal cost
P , Private demand of goods
CAP Aggregate capital stock
D f Demand for domestic commodity
Dj Domestic commodities demanded in the base year
73* Foreign domestic goods
E, Export demand
HR Household revenues
k, Capital per domestic firm
/, Labour per domestic firm
Ta b Aggregate labour
Imports
n t Number of firms
Pi Price of the final and the intermediate good
Pdj Price o f the domestic good in the base year
Pdj Price of domestically produced commodity
Pvi Value added price
pyj Aggregate producer price
P^crs World price of exports
Pwei World price of exports
pwrrij World price of imports
Qj Composite commodity
r Return to capital
X , Intermediate demand
y, Output per domestic firm
Yc„ Output by the industry
w Wage
X: World price of similar exported goods
T1‘ Price elasticity of export demand
Profit per domestic firm
A Numeraire
169
Parameters (*):
ajj Leontief input-output coefficients.
k{ Fixed amount of capital per domestic firm
l{  Fixed amount of labour per domestic firm
v, Conjectural variation shift parameter
P, Share parameter in the CET aggregation function
e j Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestically produced
<p, Share parameter in the Armington trade aggregation function
Yj Share parameter in the CES production function
r|f Price elasticity of domestic demand
Xj Conjectural variation parameter
1)  j Household budget shares
p; CET elasticity in the production possibility frontier
a .  Elasticity of substitution among primary factors of production
Elasticity of substitution among exports and foreign domestic goods 
C, Share parameter in the foreign Armington trade aggregation function
A j Shift parameter in the first nest Armington trade aggregation function
Qj Shift parameter in the CES production function
£2, Shift parameter in the CET aggregation function
(*) Parameter and variables with a bar are set exogenously, crs and i denote sectors facing 
constant and increasing returns to scale, respectively ( j  = crs s j  i ).
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Appendix 3.B The GAMS code: the case of an export tax
♦ ( S e t s ,  d a t a  s e t  a n d  c a l i b r a t i o n  o f  s o m e  p a r a m e t e r s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  A p p e n d i x  2 . D )  
$ T I T L E  T U R K E Y S A M : D I S A G G R E G A T E D  T R A D E  M ODEL -  1 9 9 0
P A R A M E T E R l a m d a O ( i r s )  E P S I 1 ( 1 R S )  B E T A 1 (1 R S )  E X P D O M 1 ( 1 R S )
C O N JE C T U R A L  V A R I A T I O NA R M IN G T O N  E L A S T I C I T Y  I N  T H E  F O R E I G N  R E G IO N  A R M IN G T O N  S H A R E  P A R A M E T E R  I N  T H E  F O R E IG N  R E G IO N  U S E D  F O R  B E T A l
♦ D U M M IE S  T O  H O L D  I N I T I A L  D O l (1 R S )E L A S O ( 1 R S )  E T A C O ( 1 R S )  P E C W O (J )
D A T AF O R E I G N  P R O D U C T IO NP R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  O F  D O M E S T I C  DEM A N D P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  O F  F O R E I G N  DEM A N D W O R LD  P R I C E  F O R  E X P O R T S
C A L I B R A T I O N  O F  SO M E  S H I F T  AN D  S H A R E  P A R A M E T E R S
* G E T  E L A S T I C I T I E S  A N D  M A R K -U P  V A R I A B L E S
E P S I 1 ( - T E X T ' ) =  2 . 2 ;E P S I 1 { " W E A R " ) = 4 . 4 ;D O l ( " T E X T " )  = 7 9 6 2 3 6 ;D O l ( " W E A R " )  =  5 4 3 9 0 3 ;E X P D O M 1 ( I R S ) = ( E 0 ( I R S ) / D O l ( I R S ) ) * * ( 1 / E P S I 1 ( I R S ) ) ;B E T A l  ( I R S )  = E X PD O M 1 ( I R S )  / (1 + E X P D O M 1  ( I R S )  ) ;E T A C O ( I R S )  = E P S I l ( I R S )  ♦  ( 1 - E P S I 1 { I R S ) ) * B E T A 1 ( I R S ) * * E P S I 1 ( I R S )  /( ( 1 - B E T A 1 ( I R S ) ) * * E P S I 1 ( I R S )  ♦  B E T A l ( I R S ) ♦ ♦ E P S I 1 ( I R S )  )E L A S O ( I R S ) = E T A C O ( I R S ) ;  l a m d a O ( i r s )  =  2 ;P E C W O ( I R S )  =  M C O ( I R S )  / ( 1 -  (1  + l a m d a O ( i r s ) ) / ( n O ( i r s ) ♦ E T A C O ( I R S ) ) ) ;
*  G E T  P R I C E S
P E C W O (C R S )  = 1 ;A V C O ( I R S ) = P E C W O ( I R S ) ;P D O ( I )  = P E C W O ( I ) ;  P M O ( J )  =  P E C W O ( J ) ; P Y O ( I )  = P E C W O ( I ) ;
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VARIABLES
F R E E  V A R I A B L E STH G G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S T O  H O U S E H O L D STHW R E M IT T A N C E S  FROM  A B R O A DH S H O U S H O L D  S A V I N G SG S G O V E R N M E N T  S A V I N G SWS F O R E I G N  S A V I N G SZ ( J ) IN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R O F  O R I G I NTWG G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S A B R O A DA G  L A B E X C E S S  DEM AND F O R  L A B O U RA G C A P E X C E S S  DEM AND F O R  C A P I T A L
* W E L F A R E  I N D I C A T O R  F O R  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO NU T I L I T Y  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N  V A R I A B L E  ;
P O S I T I V E  V A R IA B L E
M C ( I R S )A V C ( I R S )  t c ( i r s )  n ( i )R V E R ( I R S ) e l a s ( i r s ) E T A C ( i r s ) T D  ( I )T E C ( I )P E C W ( I ) P V ( I )P ( J )P D  ( J )PM (J )P Y ( I )WAGER E N TP W M (J)C P I  X ( J )  y s  ( i )  
l(i) 
k(i)D D ( J )I M P (J )  p r o f i t ( i r s ) 
Q(J>E ( I )
M A R G IN A L  C O S T  A V E R A G E  C O S T S  T O T A L  C O S TN U M B E R  O F  S Y M M E T R IC  F I R M SE X P O R T  T A X  R E V E N U E SDEM A N D P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T YE X P O R T  P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T YI N D I R E C T  T A X  ON D O M E S T I C  C O N S U M P T IO NO P T I M A L  Q U O T A  P R E M IU M  -  T A X  ON E X P O R T SP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T SN E T  O R  V A L U E  A D D E D  P R I C EC O M P O S IT E  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT Y  JD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT YD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R TD O M E S T I C  P R I C E  O F  D O M E S T I C  O U T P U TW AGER E N TW O R LD  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT Y  M IM P O R T E DC O N S U M E R  P R I C E  IN D E XIN T E R M E D IA T E  IN P U T S  DEM A N DD O M E S T IC  P R O D U C T IO N  O F  C O M P O S IT E  G O O D SC O M P E N S A T IO N  O F  E M P L O Y E E SO P E R A T I N G  S U R P L U SD O M E S T IC  C O M M O D IT IE SC O M P O S IT E  IM P O R T SR E T U R N  O N  P R O F I T SC O M P O S IT E  C O M M O D IT YE X P O R T S
l a m d a ( i r s ) C O N JE C T U R A L  V A R I A T I O NF K I N C F A C T O R  IN C O M EF L I N C L A B O U R  IN C O M EHR H O U SE H O L D  IN C O M ES A V A G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G SIN V A G G R E G A T E  IN V E S T M E N T  ON JI N T A X ( J ) I N D I R E C T  T A X  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  'TDTH D I R E C T  T A X E S  O N  H O U SE H O L D  IN C O M ET A R I F T A R I F F S  O N  IM P O R T SD E P R E C D E P R E C I A T I O NT G K N E T  G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M STWK N E T  ROW T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M SR G O V ER N M E N T  IN C O M EG C  ( J ) G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO NT G C O N T O T A L  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO NH C ( J ) H O U SE H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N ;
E Q U A T I O N S
E Q U A T I O N S
* *  P r i c e  a n d  C o s t  E q u a t i o n s  *
A B S O R P T ( J ) V A L U E  O F  D O M E S T I C  S A L E SP M D E F ( J ) D E F I N I T I O N  O F  D O M E S T IC IM P O R T ’ P R I C EP Y D E F C R S ( C R S ) D E F I N I T I O N  O F  P R O D U C E R P R I C E I N C R SP Y D E F I R S ( I R S ) D E F I N I T I O N  O F  P R O D U C E R P R I C E I N I R SP V A D E F ( I ) D E F I N I T I O N  O F  A C T I V I T Y O R  V A L U E A D D E D  P R I C EM A R K U P D ( I R S ) M ARKUP R U L E  F O R  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U TM A R K U P E ( I R S ) M ARKUP R U L E  F O R  E X P O R T SE X P D E M E L A ( I R S ) P R I C E  E L A S T I C I T Y  O F  E X P O R T  DEM A N DM A R G C O S T ( I R S ) M A R G IN A L  C O S T SO P T E X T A X ( I R S ) O P T IM A L  T A X  O N  E X P O R T SA V C D E F ( I R S ) A V E R A G E  C O S T ST O T C O S T ( I R S ) F I X E D  C O S T SC P I N D E X CO N SU M E R  P R I C E  IN D E X
* *  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n s
O U T P U T C R (C R S ) A G G L C R S ( C R S )  A G G K C R S (C R S ) A G G L I R S ( 1 R S )  A G G K I R S ( 1 R S )
G R O S S  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U T  C R SA G G R E G A T E  L A B O U R  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  C R S  A G G R E G A T E  C A P I T A L  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  C R S  A G G R E G A T E  L A B O U R  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  I R S  A G G R E G A T E  C A P I T A L  D E F I N I T I O N  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  -  I R S
TRADE EQUATIONS
A R M IN G T O N (T ) A R M IN G T O N T (N T ) C O S T M I N (T ) C E T I R S ( 1 R S )  D O S U P P L Y ( T C R S )  E S U P P L Y ( T C R S )  C E T N T ( N T )  E D E M A N D ( 1 R S )
A R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  T R A D A B L E S  A R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  N O N T R A D A B L E S  C O S T  M I N I M I Z A T I O N  F O R  C O M P O S IT E  GOO D  C E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  I R S  S U P P L Y  OD  D O M E S T IC  C O M M O D IT IE S  S U P P L Y  O F  E X P O R T SC E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  N O N T R A D A B L E S  E X P O R T  DEMAND
I n c o m e  E q u a t i o n s
R E N T V E R S { 1 R S )  F A C K I N C  F A C L I N C  H H IN C
T a x  e q u a t i o n s
P R O F I T SC A P I T A L  IN C O M E  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E
D I R T HI N D T A X ( J )T A R I F F SG Y D E F
D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E  I N D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  T A R I F F  ON IM P O R T S  G O V E R N M E N T  IN C O M E
S a v i n g s  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n s
S A V D E F  A G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G SH H S D E F  H O U S E H O L D S  S A V I N G SG S D E F  G O V E R N M E N T  S A V I N G S
E x p e n d i t u r e  E q u a t i o n s
Z D E F ( J )  I N T D E F ( J )  H H C D E F C ( C R S )  H H C D E F I ( 1 R S )  G O V C D E F (J )
IN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N  IN T E R M E D IA T E  DEM AND H O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  H O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO N
M a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n s
L A B M A R K E T  C A P M A R K T  G O O D E Q C (C R S ) G O O D E Q I ( 1 R S )  B O P E Q  S A V I N V E Q  P R O F E Q ( 1 R S )
L A B O U R  M A R K ET  E Q U I L I B R I U M  C A P I T A L  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  C R S  G O O D S  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  I R S  G O O D S  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  B A L A N C E  O F  P A Y M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  S A V I N G S  IN V E S T M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  P R I C E  E Q U A L S  A V E R A G E  C O S T
Objective Function
O B J  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N
* *  E Q U A T IO N  A S S IG N M E N T  
* *  P r i c e  a n d  C o s t  E q u a t i o n s
A B S O R P T (J ) . . P ( J ) * Q ( J )  = E =  (1  ♦  TD  (J ) ) * ( P M  (J ) * I M P (J ) + P D ( J ) * D D ( j ) ) ;
P M D E F ( J ) . . P M (J )  = E =  PWM(J ) * (  1 + T M O (J )  ) ;
P Y D E F C R S ( C R S ) . . P Y ( C R S ) * Y S ( C R S )  = E =  P D ( C R S ) * D D  ( C R S )  + PEC W  (C R S ) * E  (C R S ) ;P Y D E F I R S ( I R S ) . . P Y ( I R S ) * n ( i r s ) * y s ( i r s )  = E =  P D ( I R S ) * D D ( I R S )  ♦( P E C W  ( I R S )  -  T E C ( I R S )  ) * E ( I R S ) ;
P V A D E F ( I ) .  . P V ( I )  = E =  ( ( (GAMMA ( I ) * * S I G M A  ( I ) ) *W A G E * *  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( I ) ) ♦  ( ( 1 -GA M M A ( I ) ) * * S I G M A  ( I )  ) * R E N T *  *  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( I ) ) )*  * ( 1 / ( 1 - S I G M A ( I ) ) ) ) /  A D  ( I ) ;
M A R K U P D ( I R S ) . . P D ( I R S )  = E =  M C ( I R S )  / ( 1  -  ( 1  ♦  l a m d a ( i r s ) )  / ( n ( i r s ) * e l a s ( i r s )  ) ) ;
M A R K U P E ( I R S ) . . P E C W ( I R S )  = E =  M C ( I R S )  / ( 1  -  l a m d a p a r ( i r s ) / E T A C ( i r s ) ) ;
E X P D E M E L A ( I R S ) .
E T A C ( I R S )  = E =  E P S I 1 ( I P .S )  ♦  ( 1 - E P S I 1 <I R S ) ) * B E T A 1 ( I R S ) * * E P S I 1 ( I R S ) *P E C W ( I R S ) * * ( 1 - E P S I 1 ( I R S )  ) /( ( 1 - B E T A 1  ( I R S )  ) * * E P S I 1  ( I R S )  *P ECW 0 ( I R S )  * *  ( 1 - E P S I 1  ( I R S )  ) ♦  B E T A 1 ( I R S ) * * E P S I 1  ( I R S )  * P E C W ( I R S ) * * ( 1 - E P S I 1 ( I R S )  ) ) ;
M A R G C O S T ( I R S ) . . M C ( I R S )  = E =  ( ( (GA M M A( I R S ) *  * S I G M A ( I R S ) ) *W A G E * * ( 1 - S I G M A ( I R S ) )  ( ( 1 -GA M M A ( I R S ) ) * * S I G M A  ( I R S )  ) * R E N T *  *  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( I R S ) ) )* * ( 1 / ( l - S I G M A ( I R S ) ) ) )  / A D ( I R S )  ♦  S U M (J , A (J , I R S ) * P (J ) / P O (J ) )
O P T E X T A X ( I R S ) . . T E C ( I R S )  = E =  P E C W ( I R S ) *(1  -  (1  ♦  l a m d a ( i r s ) ) /  ( n ( i r s ) * E T A C ( i r s ) ) )  -  M C ( I R S ) ;
A V C D E F ( I R S ) . . A V C ( I R S )  = E =  T C ( I R S )  / y s ( i r s )  ;
T O T C O S T ( I R S ) . . T C ( i r s )  = E =  W A G E * l f O ( i r s )  + R E N T * k £ 0 ( i r s ) ♦  W A G E * K i r s )  ♦  R E N T * k ( i r s ) +S U M (J , A (J , I R S )  * y s ( i r s ) * P ( J ) / P O ( J ) ) ;
CPINDEX.. CPI =E= SUM(J,PD(J)*DOO (J) ) / SUM(J,PDO(J)*DOO(J));
r* *  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n s  
* C R S  S E C T O R S  
O U T P U T C R (C R S ) . .
y s ( c r s )  = E =  A D ( C R S ) * ( G A M M A (C R S ) * 1 ( c r s ) *  * ( ( S I G M A ( C R S ) - 1 ) / S I G M A ( C R S ) )  +( 1 - G A M M A ( C R S ) ) * k ( c r s ) * * ( ( S I G M A ( C R S ) - 1 ) / S I G M A ( C R S ) ) )* * ( S I G M A ( C R S ) / ( S I G M A ( C R S ) - 1 )  ) ;A G G L C R S (C R S ) . .
1 ( c r s ) = E =  y s  ( c r s ) * ( A D S ( C R S ) * G A M M A ( C R S ) * P V ( C R S ) / W A G E ) * * S I G M A ( C R S ) ; 
A G G K C R S ( C R S ) . .
k ( c r s )  = E =  y s ( c r s ) * ( A D S ( C R S ) M l - G A M M A ( C R S ) ) * P V ( C R S ) / R E N T ) * * S I G M A ( C R S ) ; 
* *  I R S  S E C T O R S  
A G G L I R S ( I R S ) . .
l ( i r s )  = E =  y s ( i r s ) * ( A D S ( I R S ) * G A M M A ( I R S ) *P V  ( I R S ) / W A G E ) *  * S I G M A ( I R S ) ;A G G K I R S ( I R S ) . .
k ( i r s )  = E =  y s  ( i r s ) * ( A D S ( I R S ) * ( 1 -G A M M A ( I R S ) ) *P V ( I R S ) / R E N T ) *  * S I G M A ( I R S ) ;
* *  T R A D E  E Q U A T I O N S
A R M I N G T O N ( T ) . .  Q  (T )  = E =  A R M ( T ) * ( B E T A ( T ) * I M P ( T ) * * (  ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I ( T ) ) +( 1 - B E T A (T ) ) * D D ( t ) * * ( ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I ( T ) ) ) * *( E P S I ( T ) / ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 )  ) ;
A R M IN G T O N T ( N T ) . .  Q ( N T )  = E =  D D ( N T ) ;
C O S T M I N ( T ) . .  ( I M P ( T )  / D D (T ) )  = E =( ( P D (T ) / P M (T ) ) *  B E T A (T ) / ( 1 - B E T A (T ) )  ) * * E P S I ( T ) ;  C E T I R S ( I R S ) . .  n ( i r s ) * y s ( i r s )  = E = C E T S ( I R S )  *( A L F A E ( I R S ) * D D ( I R S ) *  * ( ( E L A ( I R S ) + 1 ) / E L A ( I R S ) )  ♦(1  -  A L F A E  ( I R S ) ) * E  ( I R S ) *  *  ( ( E L A  ( I R S )  + 1 ) / E L A  ( I R S )  ) )* *  ( E L A  ( I R S )  / ( E L A  ( I R S ) + 1 ) ) ;
D O S U P P L Y ( T C R S ) . .
D D ( T C R S )  = E =  Y S ( T C R S ) * C E T A D J ( T C R S ) * ( A L F A E ( T C R S ) * * ( - E L A ( T C R S ) ) ) *( P D ( T C R S ) / P Y ( T C R S )  ) *  * E L A ( T C R S ) ;
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ESUPPLY(TCRS)..
E ( T C R S )  = E =  Y S ( T C R S ) ‘ C E T A D J ( T C R S ) * ( ( 1 - A L F A E ( T C R S ) ) * * ( - E L A ( T C R S ) ))( P E C W ( T C R S ) / P Y ( T C R S )  ) * * E L A ( T C R S ) ;
C E T N T ( N T )  . . Y S ( N T )  = E =  D D ( N T ) ;
E D E M A N D ( I R S ) . . E ( I R S )  = E =  D O l ( I R S ) * (  P E C W O ( I R S ) / P E C W ( I R S )  ) * * E P S I 1 ( I R S ) *  ( B E T A 1 ( I R S ) / ( 1 - B E T A 1 ( I R S )  ) ) *  * E P S I 1 ( I R S ) ;
* *  I n c o m e  E q u a t i o n s
R E N T V E R S  ( I R S )  . . R V E R ( I R S )  = E =  T E C ( I R S ) * E ( I R S )  ;
F A C K I N C . . F K I N C  = E =  S U M ( I R S , R E N T * n ( i r s ) *  ( k ( i r s )  + k f O ( i r s ) ) )  +S U M ( C R S , R E N T * n ( c r s ) * k  ( c r s ) )  + T G K  + TWK -  D E P R E C  ,
F A C L I N C . . F L I N C  = E =  S U M ( C R S ,W A G E * n ( c r s ) * 1 ( c r s ) ) +S U M ( I R S , W A G E * n ( i r s ) *  ( l ( i r s )  + l f O ( i r s ) ) ) ;
H H I N C . . H R  = E =  SU M  ( I R S , R V E R  { I R S ) ) + F L I N C  +  F K I N C  + TH G  + THW +SUM  { I R S , P R O F I T ( I R S ) * n ( i r s ) * y s ( i r s ) ) ;
* *  T a x  e q u a t i o n s
D I R T H . . T D T H  = E =  D T A X * H R ;
I N D T A X ( J )  .  . I N T A X ( J )  = E =  T D ( J ) * ( P M ( J ) * I M P ( J ) / P M O ( J )  + P D (J ) * D D (J ) / P D O (J )
T A R I F F S . . T A R I F = E =  S U M (J , T M O ( J ) * P W M ( J ) * I M P ( J ) ) ;
G Y D E F . . R  = E =  T D T H  ♦  S U M ( J , I N T A X ( J ) ) + T A R I F  ;
* *  S a v i n g s  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n s
S A V D E F . . S A V  = E =  D E P R E C  + H S  + G S  + W S ;
H H S D E F . . H S  = E =  M P S H  * ( 1 - D T A X ) * H R ;
G S D E F . . G S  = E =  R  -  T G C O N  -  T H G  -  TWG -  T G K  ;
*  *  E x p e n d i  t u r e E q u a t i o n s
Z D E F ( J )  . . ( 1 + T D O (J ) ) * Z (J )  = E =  K S H R (J ) * I N V ;
I N T D E F (J ) . . ( 1 + T D O ( J ) ) * X ( J )  = E =  S U M ( I , A ( J , I ) #n ( i ) * y s ( i )  ) ;
H H C D E F C ( C R S ) . H C ( C R S )  = E =  H B S ( C R S ) * ( 1 - M P S H ) * ( 1 - D T A X ) * H R / P ( C R S ) ;
H H C D E F I ( 1 R S ) . H C ( I R S )  = E =  H B S ( I R S ) * ( 1 - M P S H ) * ( 1 - D T A X ) * H R * P Y 0 ( 1 R S ) / P ( I R S )
G O V C D E F ( J ) . . ( 1 + T D O ( J ) ) * G C ( J )  = E =  G B S ( J ) * T G C O N ;
* *  M a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n s
L A B M A R K E T .. A G L A B  = E =  S U M ( c r s , n ( c r s ) * 1 ( c r s ) ) +S U M ( i r s , n ( i r s ) * ( 1 ( i r s )  + l f O ( i r s ) ) ) ;
* *  W i t h  f i x e d  c o s t s
C A P M A R K T .. A G C A P  = E =  S U M ( c r s , n ( c r s ) * k ( c r s ) ) +S U M ( i r s , n ( i r s ) * ( k ( i r s ) + k f O ( i r s ) ) ) ;
* *  W i t h  s u n k  c o s t s
C A P M A R K T . . A G C A P  = E =  S U M ( c r s ,  n ( c r s ) * k ( c r s ) ) + S U M ( i r s , n ( i r s ) * k ( i r s ) )
G O O D E Q C ( C R S )  . Q ( C R S )  = E =  H C ( C R S )  ♦  G C ( C R S )  ♦  Z ( C R S )  + X ( C R S ) ;
G O O D E Q I ( 1 R S ) . Q ( 1 R S )  = E =  H C ( 1 R S )  + G C ( I R S )  + Z ( I R S )  ♦  X ( I R S ) ;
B O P E Q . . S U M ( I .P E C W ( I ) * E ( I ) / P E C W O ( I ) ) ♦  TWK ♦  WS  + THW= E =  SU M  ( T ,  PM (T ) * I M P  ( T )  /PMO (T )  ) -  T A R I F  + TWG ;
S A V I N V E Q . . S A V  = E =  I N V  ;
P R O F E Q ( 1 R S ) . . P Y ( I R S )  = E =  A V C ( I R S )  + P R O F I T ( 1 R S ) ;
* *  O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o n
O B J .  . U T I L I T Y  = E =  1 ;
* M O D E L  S E T U P  •- I N I T I A L I Z A T I O N
n . L ( c r s )  =  1 ;  n . L ( i r s )  =  n O ( i r s ) ;  l a m d a . L ( i r s )  = l a m d a O ( i r s  M C . L ( 1 R S )  = M C O ( I R S ) ;A V C . L ( 1 R S )  = A V C O ( 1 R S ) ;R V E R . L ( 1 R S ) 0 ;e l a s . l ( i r s ) e l a s O ( i r s ) ;E T A C . L ( i r s )  T H G . L  =  TH GO T H W .L  = THWO T W G .L  = 6 2 7 3
E T A C O ( i r s ) ;
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T G K .L  = T G K O ; T W K .L  = T W K O ;H S . L  =  H S O ;D E P R E C .L  =  D E P R E C O ;F K I N C . L  =  F K I N C O ;F L I N C . L  =  F L I N C O ;H R .L  = H R O ;H C . L ( J )  =  H C M O ( J ) ;W S .L  =  1 2 8 5 9  ;I N V . L  = I N V O ;S A V . L  =  1 0 2 6 0 8 ;G C . L ( J )  =  G C O ( J ) ;T G C O N .L  =  T G C 0 ;G S . L  =  - 1 1 9 5 5 ;Z . L ( J )  =  Z O ( J ) ;X .  L ( J )  =  X O  ( J )  ; y s . L ( i )  = y s O ( i ) ; l . L ( i )  =  1 0 ( 1 ) ;k . L ( i ) =  k O ( i ) ;D D . L ( J )  =  D O O ( J ) ;E . L ( I ) =  E O ( I ) ;I M P . L ( J )  =  I M P O ( J ) ;P R O F I T . L ( I R S )  =  0 ;Q .  L ( J )  =  Q O ( J ) ;T D T H .L  =  H T A X O ;I N T A X . L ( J )  =  I N D T A X O ( J ) ;T A R I F . L  =  SU M  (J ,  T A R I F O  (*J) ) ;T O .  L  ( I R S )  =  A V C . L ( I R S )  * y s . L ( i r s )  ;T E C . L ( I )  =  0 ;T D . L ( I )  =  T D O ( I ) ;R .  L  =  5 2 5 2 0  ;A G L A B .L  =  S U M (C R S , A L O ( C R S ) )  ♦  S U M ( I R S , A L O ( I R S ) + A L F O ( I R S ) ) ;  A G C A P .L  =  S U M ( C R S ,A K O ( C R S ) ) + S U M ( I R S , A K O ( I R S ) + A K F O ( I R S ) ) ;
C P I . L  = 1 ;  P E C W .L ( I )  =  P E C W O ( I ) ;  P . L ( J )  = P O (J ) ; P D . L ( J )  = P D O ( J ) ;Y .  L ( I )  = P Y O ( I ) ;  P V . L ( I )  =  P V O ( I ) ;  P W M .L ( J )  =  PW MO(J ) ; W A G E . L  = 1 ;  P . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P D . L O ( J )  =  0 . 0 1 ;  P M . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P Y . L O ( I )  =  0 . 0 1 ;  W A G E . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;  R E N T . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;  E .U P ( I R S )  = E O ( I R S ) ;  P E C W .L O ( I R S )  E T A C . L O ( I R S )  =  1 . 0 1 ;
P M . L ( J )  = P M O ( J ) ; R E N T . L  = 1 ;  P V . L O ( I )  =  0 . 0 1 ;=  P E C W O ( I R S ) ;
♦ C L O S U R E  R U L E SE L A S . F X ( i r s ) =  E L A S . L ( i r s ) ;  C P I . F X  = C P I . L ;P R O F I T .F X ( I R S )  = P R O F I T . L ( I R S ) ; P W M .F X ( J )  = P W M .L ( J )  ; P E C W .F X ( C R S )  =  P E C W .L ( C R S )  ; T D . F X ( J )  = T D . L ( J ) ;T E C . F X ( C R S )  = T E C . L ( C R S ) ;T H G .F X  =  T H G . L ;
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T H W .F X  = T H W .L ; T W G .F X  = T W G .L ;  T G K .F X  = T G K . L ;  T W K .F X  = T W K .L ;  D E P R E C .F X  = D E P R E C .L ;  I M P . F X ( N T )  =  0 ;  E .F X ( N T )  = 0 ;
TGCON.FX = TGCON.L; 
WS.FX = WS.L ;
GS.FX = GS.L;
INV.FX = INV.L;
AGLAB.FX = AGLAB.L; 
AGCAP.FX = AGCAP.L; 
n.FX(crs) = n.L(crs);
M O D E L T U R K A G 9 0  S Q U A R E  B A S E  M ODEL / A L L  / ; 
S O L V E  T U R K A G 9 0  M A X IM IZ I N G  U T I L I T Y  U S I N G  N L P ;
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Appendix 3.C: Calibration of the foreign demand elasticity
Assume that a hypothetical foreign consumer purchases domestic goods and Turkish 
exports as their substitute. In addition, assume that the elasticity of substitution ( £ ,)  is 
constant. In this case, the foreign consumer faces the following problem: 
m&z{pwe,E, + *  ,£>,*)
where Q ‘ denotes foreign total sectoral demand.
The solution o f this problem is A
d ;
-C« / \
1 Xil  Ci J l P'»ei j . By assuming that
at the benchmark x, = pwe , , then =
' J L^ '  
D'
+ 1 . Given , the absolute value
of the foreign demand elasticity can be calibrated as follows: 
Hi = £,■+ (l~ C ,■)£?'[(!-£,■) +  ?*'] • In order to calibrate I employed OECD
data related to 18 countries to which Turkey ships almost all textiles and apparel 
exports (Table 3.C1). The amount of domestic goods consumed by the foreign 
consumer ( D- ) is given by domestic production plus imports, minus exports. By using 
the data below, and by converting these firstly, into US dollars and secondly, into 
Turkish lira (TL/1$ = 2607.6), I estimate that the total 18 OECD countries 
consumption in textiles is 796236 million Turkish lira and in apparel 543902 million 
Turkish lira.
Table 3.C1: Value of production, exports and imports in 18 OECD  
countries, 1990 (million countries’ respective currencies)
Production Exports Imports Exchange
Textiles Apparel Textiles Apparel Textiles Apparel (1 $)
Australia 5052 3329 1531 80 1976 628 1.281
Austria 43044 18181 27009 8391 27904 19148 11.370
Belgium 240139 89994 219945 57410 130779 93747 33.418
Canada 6228 7063 661 272 3206 2645 1.167
Denmark 10404 4762 5575 3563 6657 4859 6.189
Finland 3693 3638 1055 1711 3670 1373 3.824
France 115718 74190 37651 20773 50036 32427 5.445
Germany A m i 25011 20056 9011 25430 23375 1.616
Greece 641233 168162 184213 170523 217842 49337 158.510
Italy 63590000 33259000 15361000 9363000 8825000 2419000 1198.100
Japan 7561000 5480000 777000 59000 1194000 892000 144.790
Netherlands 5940 2290 7790 8070 7885 6588 1.821
Norway 3326 1050 1062 267 5050 5773 6.260
Portugal 885822 307959 343005 338169 28120 41229 142.550
Spain 976 637 164604 46603 236100 288264 101.930
Sweden 3979 1284 4201 1701 10392 11311 5.919
UK 8791 5052 3177 1222 4604 2901 0.563
US 84034 47269 7459 1829 12619 20129 1.000
Source: OECD (1995), The OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis 1975-1994, Paris.
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Appendix 4.A Numerical model: the CU agreement
This appendix reports the algebraic formulation of the numerical model employed to 
study the economic impact and the income distribution effects of the CU agreement 
between Turkey and the EU on the Turkish economy. The appendix has been split into 
eight sections: (i) equations related to prices; (ii) equations related to production and 
factor demand; (iii) equations related to domestic and foreign trade; (iv) equations 
related to income; (v) equations related to taxes; (vi) equation related to savings and 
investment; (vii) equation related to final demand and intermediate demand; (viii) 
equations related to the market clearing conditions.
[4 .A .1 ] Price equations
(4.A2)
(4.A1)
(4.A3)
(4. A4)
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(4. A 10) w“ = H ““ E«5V.-?r
r o - « )
(4. A 11)
S  pdi D> 
U = - t ------------
Y .p d , D ’
[4. A .2] Production  a n d  fa c to r  inputs equations 
(4.A12) Y. = min
(4.A13)
(4.A14)
(4.A15)
(4.A16)
(4.A17)
(4.A18)
¿a v;
a a_ ji i
^ = X I[y;AL;(o'-,)/,,' + y “AL“(<,'-,K  + ( i - y ’ - y
a l : = x_  y ( 0 ' _1) y; Pv,
a l : = x
AK, = x i 0'-1»
u PVi
\  w, J
( i —yT - y?)—r
L, = H ' {K'~x)
K  = h ; ^ '
f
S i,—v w.y
a l :
f
5„ —
V W*J
a l :
[4.A .3 ]  Trade equations
(4. A 19) Q, = + (l -  (jj ]e'/<E,1)
M c ( l - O -•/
(4.A20) — ^  =
D, V J l P,nj J
j a , / ( o , - l )
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(4.A21) M fu = —
(4.A22)
(4.A23)
(4.A24)
(4.A25)
ev \
pm,
A/r
M ^ W M f
Pm,
Yt = <J>,^ <p,£f(^ +1)/+l + ( l-(p ,)D ,^ +'^ j
E, _ f C\ PE,
A l  <Pf J l  M  J
E r  = b ; p.+pr'c-p.p(  E V  \Pei-----RoW
KPwei )
iz+O Tfe)
( --------RoW \ -K + * ) ‘
(4.A26) £ * oB' =  B71 ( 1 -P ,)  +  P ^ ( l - P , r +1 PWeiEU
l Pe> )
i,+i)] (%+i)
E f
[4.A.4] Income equations 
(4.A27)
(4.A28)
VER?v =  qr™ p e fv E fv
HR* = XCi,5>,A, + £& L2> .A i +Cr[rAif'Wr-  DEPK“*' j +
f
C rr ^ rA K ^ r -D E P K "* * '+ '£ V E R ,EI
(4.A29) R = VATTAX +  CONTAX +  DTAX + TARIFF
I4.A.5] Tax equations
(4.A30) DTAX = J ^ td h( \ - X ,  )HRh
h
(4.A31) VATTAX = '^ Jtnf(pdnfDnf + pm cn,M^f -  p„f X n/) (non fuel goods) 
nf
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(4.A32) (fuel) j  = n f  u  /CONTAX = Y Jh  (Pdf Df + P”if  M cf  )
/
(4.A33) TARIFF = £  tm fv ^ m ^ M ™  +  £  tm*oW ~ ^ * ° W M*°w
J i
¡4.A.6] Savings and investment equations 
(4.A34) Sh = x „ ( l- td k)HRh
(4.A35) B D = T G C -R  
(4.A36) SAV = ^ S h + DEPK + C A -B D
h
(4.A37) I i =Qj lN V
14.A. 71 Expenditure equations 
(4.A38) Xj = '£ a iiYi
(4.A39) Cj =  X  O -  X* )(1 - t d „ ) ^
* Pi
(4.A40) GCJ =  m; fG C
14.A. 81 Market clearing conditions 
(4.A41) Qi =C j +GCj + X j + I j
(4.A42) £  p S i?  E‘u + £  ~p^ e*°WE*°w + C4 = £  Mf" + £< < j  j
(4.A 43) ZAS, = X 4
i
(4.A44) M flu = X ^
i
(4.A45) C A P = '^ A K i
i
(4.A46) SAV = 7NV
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Variables (*):
AK, Aggregate capital
BD Budget deficit
Cj Private demand of goods
CÄ Current account deficit
CAP Aggregate capital stock
Dj Domestically produced commodities
D j Domestically produced commodities in the base year
DEPK Fixed capital depreciation in agriculture
DEPKnasr Fixed capital depreciation in non-agricultural activities
DTAX Direct tax
E,c Aggregate exports
Ef" Exports to the EU
jjsRdW Exports to the RoW
G C , Government spending on goods
h Investment by sector of destination
IN V Aggregate investment
Sectoral skilled labour
Liu Sectoral unskilled labour
LAB, Aggregate skilled labour ------------
LABU Aggregate unskilled labour
A /f Aggregate imports
M fv Imports from the EU
M"°w Imports from the RoW
Pi Price of the Armington good
Pdj Price of domestically produced commodities
Pdj Price of domestically produced commodities in the base year
Pef Composite price of exports
Pef" Supply price of exports to the EU
pmf Composite price of imports
pmfu Domestic price of imports from the EU
pm*°w Domestic price of imports from the RoW
py> Aggregate producer price-------- EU
pw et Price o f exports to the EU prevailing in the EU market-------- RoWPWei Price of exports to the RoW prevailing in the RoW market--------- E l)
pw n ij Price of imports produced by the EU net of duties--------- RoW
pwrttj Price of imports produced by the RoW net of duties
R Government revenues
r Rent on capital inputs
S, Household savings
SAV Aggregate savings
TARIFF Tariffs
TGC
v,
Aggregate government spending on goods 
Value added
VATTAX Value added tax
VER,™ Rents from voluntary export restraints agreements with the EU
xa Raw-material inputs
X  j  Aggregate intermediate demand
Yt Output by sectors
w, Wage o f skilled labours
wu Wage of unskilled labours
w ' Average wage of skilled labour
w“ Average wage of unskilled labour
£2 Aggregate domestic price index - numeraire
Parameters
a ' Value added requirement per unit of sectoral output
av Leontief input-output coefficients.
c/rf" Export quota premium on Turkish goods in terms of tariff equivalent
tj Indirect tax rate
tdh Direct tax rate on household income
tm f"  Effective import tariff rates on EU goods
tm joW Effective import tariff rates on RoW goods
a  j Share parameter in the second nest Armington function
Pj Share parameter in the second nest CET aggregation function
5„ Share parameter of skilled labour function
5 IU Share parameter of unskilled labour function
y ‘ Share parameter of the value added function
Y* Share parameter of the value added function
E , Elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods
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<p,
•Pi
8,
n,
Sj
c r
CL
CL
raa,?r
/ic
«
c:
* *
Vj
A J
B,
X,
A ,
h;
H“
Share parameter in the first nest CET aggregation function 
Elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic production 
Investment share on commodities.
Elasticity of transformation among exports to different regions
Share parameter in the first nest Armington trade aggregation function
Household marginal propensity to save
Elasticity of substitution among primary factors of production
Share parameter o f the agricultural capital income to households
Share parameters of skilled labour income to households
Share parameters of unskilled labour income to households
Share parameters of non-agricultural capital incomes to households
Elasticity of substitution among skilled labours
Elasticity of substitution among unskilled labours
Fixed shares o f government spending on goods
Fixed shares of household spending on goods
Elasticity of substitution among imports from different regions
Shift parameter in the second nest Armington function
Shift parameter in the second nest CET aggregation function
Shift parameter o f  the value added function
Shift parameter in the first nest Armington trade aggregation function 
Shift parameter in the first nest CET aggregation function 
Shift parameter in the aggregate skilled labour function 
Shift parameter in the aggregate unskilled labour function
(*) Parameter and variables with a bar are set exogenously
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A ppendix 4.B The m easurem ent o f inequality
The study focuses on the inequality “within” and “between” urban and rural groups. 
The data source does not provide any additional information concerning the income 
redistribution within each income class group. Thus, complete equality between 
household members within each income class group is postulated and the income 
arithmetic mean for each representative household member of a given income class 
group, hrh, divided by the so called “true” cost of living index, Ph, (Shoven and 
Whalley, 1992) is employed to measure income inequality.
Jenkins (1991) and Cowell (1995) investigate the properties of different 
measures o f inequality widely used in the economics literature in a simple fashion. It 
can be shown that for 0 approaching zero,
As reported by Cowell (1984), the disaggregated version o f the generalised 
entropy measure is given by:
where GEBw and GEW, represent the inequality measure “within” and “between” 
each group g, respectively; i, the share of total income held by g's  household 
members; mg the g's  population share; and G the number of mutually exclusive 
groups, that is the urban and the rural groups.
(4.B1)
and that for 0 approaching one,
(4.B2)
n
(4.B3) GEe = £ , > ; - eG £^  +  GEeb ,
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GE%W is calculated as if each group were a separate population, whilst GEeb 
is derived by assuming that every household member within a given group receive 
the g ’s mean income (Jenkins, 1991):
(4.B4) GEah — - 1e 2 - e 2 X*=1
r h r T ^
- 1
where hr™ is the mean income within the group in real terms. 
Jenkins (1991) also shows that:
(4.B5)
and that 
(4.B64)
lim GE%b = -  mg log {hr™ / h r m),
lhn GEeb = £  i, \og(hrgm /h r m ) .
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A ppendix 4.C The G AM S code: the CU agreem ent
* ( S e t s ,  d a t a  s e t  a n d  c a l i b r a t i o n  o f  s o m e  p a r a m e t e r s  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  A p p e n d i x  2 .D )  
$ T I T L E  T U R K E Y S A M : D I S A G G R E G A T E D  T R A D E  M O D E L W ITH  T H E  E C  -  1 9 9 0
N A G R ( I )  N O N  A G R I C U L T U R E  / M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  T e x t ,  W e a r ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,  N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h , M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  C o n s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e r  /
C U ( I ) C U S T O M G O O D S  / M i n ,  D r i n k ,  T e x t ,  W e a r ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , P e t r ,  N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s  /
I N D ( I )  G O O D S  S U B J E C T  T O  V A T  / A g r ,  M i n ,  F o o d ,  D r i n k ,  T e x t ,  W e a r ,  L e a t ,  F o o t ,  W o o d , C h e m , N m e t ,  M e t ,  M a c h ,  M t r a n ,  E l g a s ,  C o n s ,  W h o l ,  T r a n ,  O s e r  /
S K  S K I L L E D L A B O U R  /P r o f  P r o f e s s i o n a l  l a b o u rM a n a  M a n a g e r sW h i t e  W h i t e  c o l l a r s  /UN U N S K I L L E D L A B O U R  /S a l e  S a l e  w o r k e r sS e r v  S e r v i c e  w o r k e r sF a r m  A g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k e r sN f a r m  N o n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  w o r k e r sO t h e r  O t h e r s  /
T A B L E H H I N C O M E ( H H ,* ) H o u s e h o l d I n c o m e
K A G R K N A G R K T R A D E K S E R VU 1 4 3 1 1 6 2 5U 1 5 7 0 1 8 7 2 4 7 4 0 5U 1 6 1 8 1 5 9 9 5 7 1 1 0 4 1U 1 7 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 7 1 1 6 4 1U 1 8 2 9 3 1 2 8 8 1 5 0 0 2 3 1 5U 1 9 2 8 9 1 3 9 3 1 5 5 5 2 2 6 2U 2 0 3 0 9 1 6 7 7 1 9 0 2 2 8 1 8U 2 1 2 4 1 1 7 2 6 1 4 4 5 2 7 1 6U 2 2 2 4 4 1 4 9 4 1 9 0 6 2 2 0 6U 23 9 7 1 3 8 9 1 4 3 8 1 5 1 1U 2 4 2 4 3 2 8 4 9 2 8 1 1 4 1 3 7U 2 5 3 7 5 2 1 2 6 2 5 9 4 3 6 1 1U 2 6 2 8 5 1 5 8 0 2 3 6 0 2 7 1 2U 27 1 3 4 1 4 6 7 1 8 5 4 2 0 2 7U 2 8 8 2 7 5 2 1 5 8 7 1 5 5 7U 2 9 4 7 4 4 3 2 4 3 2 9 2 4 9 6 3U3 0 1 8 3 2 0 4 0 1 9 8 7 2 3 7 2U 3 1 2 2 9 5 9 8 6 3 0 8 7 4 9 5 1U 3 2 1 1 2 3 0 2 5 6 8 2 1 1 5 4U3 3 0 2 4 8 9 5 3 9 1 2R 3 4 3 1 0 2 4 4 7 9R 3 5 1 6 9 6 1 6 3 7 0 6 3 5R3 6 2 9 2 5 6 4 3 5 2 8 1 4 7 7R 3 7 4 4 9 0 6 6 8 8 6 9 1 6 2 0R3 8 4 9 5 2 6 5 0 1 2 4 3 1 6 4 3R 3 9 4 8 2 2 3 7 7 8 1 7 1 5 2 5R 4 0 4 6 7 5 5 8 3 5 7 8 1 1 5 2R 4 1 4 0 5 0 6 2 1 6 5 1 1 4 8 6R 4 2 3 9 5 8 4 3 8 98 7 8 2 8R 4 3 2 9 4 1 1 9 9 4 0 5 4 6 3
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R 4 4 6 4 2 6 5 9 9 9 8 1 1 5 5 2R 4 5 3 6 4 8 4 1 7 8 0 4 1 0 0 9R 4 6 1 6 0 4 3 1 6 1 1 0 2 6 9 0R 4 7 1 5 0 6 4 0 4 1 0 5 5 1 5 3 4R 4 8 9 0 2 2 3 0 7 4 3 3 5 0R 4 9 1 5 9 8 3 3 8 1 1 9 3 1 7 2 1R 5 0 2 4 4 1 6 3 8 7 2 2 6 3 1R 5 1 1 3 5 4 4 8 9 4 3 4 1 4 6 2R 5 2 2 7 5 7 9 0 1 5 5 ;
P A R A M E T E R T C O (J ) T A R I F F R A T E  ON IM P O R T ST R O (J ) T A R I F F R A T E  ON IM P O R T SC E T O ( J ) COMMON E X T E R N A L T A R I FG A M M A L S K ( I ) G A M M A L U N ( I ) T E T A S K ( I ) T E T A U N ( I ) C E S V ( I )L P R S K ( I ) D E L T A S K (S K , I ) L S K C E S ( I ) L F S K ( I )L F S S K ( I )L P R U N ( I ) D E L T A U N ( U N , I )  L U N C E S ( I )L F U N ( I )L F S U N ( I ) S H H S K L (H H , S K ) S H H U N L (H H , U N ) S H H K (H H ) S H H K A G R (H H )
P R O D U C T IO N  F U N C T IO N  S H A R E  P A R A M E T E R  P R O D U C T IO N  F U N C T IO N  S H A R E  P A R A M E T E R  C E S  E L A S T I C I T Y  B ETW EEN  S K I L L E D  C E S  E L A S T I C I T Y  BETW EEN U N S K I L L E D  U S E D  F O R  A DU S E D  F O R  S K I L L E D  L A B O U RS H A R E  P A R A M E T E R S  F O R  S K I L L E D  L A B O U RU S E D  F O R  S K I L L E D  L A B O U RS K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F U N C T IO N  S H I F T  P A R A M E T E RS K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F U N C T IO N  S H I F T  P A R A M E T E R  A D J U S T E DU S E D  F O R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U RS H A R E  P A R A M E T E R S  F O R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U RU S E D  F O R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U RU N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F U N C T IO N  S H I F T  P A R A M E T E R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F U N C T IO N  S H I F T  P A R A M E T E R  A D J U S T E D  S H A R E  O F  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  T O  H O U S E H O L D S  S H A R E  O F  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  T O  H O U S E H O L D S  S H A R E  O F  N O N  A G R I C U L T U R A L  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  TO  HH S H A R E  O F  A G R I C U L T U R A L  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  T O  HH♦ D U M M IE S  T O  H O L D  I N I T I A L  D A T AT A R E C O (J )  F U N D E C O ( J )  T A R R W O (J )  F U N D R W O (J )  I C E E N E T (J )  IR O W N E T (J ) PW M C O (J )PW M RO(J )P V O ( I )W L S K IOW LUNKOS K L I N C O ( S K , I )  U N L I N C O ( U N , I )  L S K I O ( I )L U N K O ( I )T R I N C OH S K L I N O ( H H ,S K )  H U N L I N O ( H H ,U N )  F S K L I N C O ( S K )  F U N L I N C O ( U N )  D E P R E C O  D E P A G R O
T A R I F F S  F R O M  E C  IM P O R T S  F U N D  F R O M  E C  IM P O R T S  T A R I F F S  F R O M  ROW IM P O R T S  F U N D  F R O M  ROW  IM P O R T S  N E T  IM P O R T  F R O M  C E E  N E T  IM P O R T  F R O M  ROW W ORLD P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T S  FR O M  T H E  E C  W ORLD P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T S  FROM  T H E  ROW V A L U E  A D D E D  P R I C E  S K I L L E D  W A G E  U N S K I L L E D  W AG E S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F O R C E  B Y  S E C T O R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  F O R C E  B Y  S E C T O R  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  M A T R IX  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  M A T R IX  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  B Y  C A T E G O R Y  C A P I T A L  D E P R E C I A T I O N  P L U S  F IR M  S A V I N G S  I N  NON A G R I C U L  C A P I T A L  D E P R E C I A T I O N  I N  A G R I C U L T U R E
* *  C A L I B R A T I O N  O F  A L L  S H I F T  AN D S H A R E  P A R A M E T E R S  * *
* *  G E T  E L A S T I C I T I E ST E T A S K ( I )  = 2 ;  T E T A U N ( I ) =  5 ;
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S K L I N C O  ( S K , I )  = L A B I N C  ( S K , I )  ;U N L I N C O  (U N , I )  =  L A B I N C  (U N , I )  ;L S K I O ( I )  = S U M ( S K ,S K L I N C O ( S K ,  I )  ) ; L U N K O ( I )  = SUM  ( U N , U N L IN C O  (U N , I )  ) ; G A M M A L S K ( I ) = ( L S K I O ( I ) * * ( 1 / S I G M A (I  ) )
* GET GAMMA, AD
) / ( L S K I O ( I  ) “  ( 1 / S I G M A ( I ) )  +L U N K O ( I ) “  ( 1 / S I G M A ( I  ) ) + A K O ( I ) * * ( 1 / S I G M A (I ) )  ) ;G A M M A L U N ( I ) = ( L U N K O ( I ) * * ( 1 / S I G M A ( I  ) ) L U N K O ( I )  “  ( 1 / S I G M A ( I ) ) ) /  ( L S K I O ( I ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A ( I ) ) A K O ( I  ) “ ( 1 / S I G M A ( I ) )  ) ;C E S V ( I ) $ G A M M A L U N ( I )  =  ( GAM M ALSK ( I  ) ‘ L S K I O  ( I  ) “ ( ( S IG M A  ( I  ) - 1  ) / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) + GAMMALUN ( I  ) * LUNKO ( I  ) * * (  (S IG M A  ( I  ) - 1  ) / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) +( 1 -  G A M M A L S K ( I ) -  GAM M A LU N ( I ) ) * A K O ( I ) “ ( ( S I G M A ( I ) - 1 ) / S I G M A ( I ) ) )“ ( S I G M A (I ) / ( S I G M A (I)- 1) ) ;A D  ( I  ) $ C E S V ( I ) =  Y O ( I ) / C E S V ( I ) ;A D S ( I  ) = A D ( I ) *  * ( ( S IG M A  ( I ) - 1 ) / S I G M A ( I ) )  ;D I S P L A Y  G A M M A L S K , GAM M A LU N ;*  G E T  D E L T A S KL P R S K ( I )  = SUM  ( S K ,  S K L I N C O  ( S K , I  ) “  ( 1 / T E T A S K  ( I  ) ) ) ;D E L T A S K  ( S K , I  ) =  S K L I N C O  ( S K , I )  “  (1  / T E T A S K  ( I  ) ) / L P R S K  ( I  ) ;  D I S P L A Y  D E L T A S K  ; L S K C E S  ( I  ) = SUM  (S K $ D E L T A S K  (S K ,  I  ) ,  D E L T A S K  ( S K ,  I  ) ‘ S K L I N C O  (S K ,  I  )* * (  ( T E T A S K ( I ) - 1 ) / T E T A S K ( I  ) ) ) ;L F S K ( I )  = L S K I O  ( I  ) *  L S K C E S  ( I  ) *  *  (T E T A S K  ( I  ) / ( 1 - T E T A S K  ( I  ) ) ) ;L F S S K ( I )  =  L F S K  ( I  ) *  *  ( T E T A S K  ( I  ) - 1  ) ;*  G E T  D E L T A U NL P R U N ( I )  = SUM  (U N , U N L IN C O  (U N , I  ) * *  ( 1 / T E T A U N  ( I  ) ) ) ;D E L T A U N  (U N , I )  = U N L IN C O  ( U N , I  ) *  *  { 1 /T E T A U N  ( I  ) ) /L P R U N  ( I  ) ;  D I S P L A Y  D E L T A U N ; L U N C E S  ( I  ) = SUM  (U N $ D E L T A U N  (U N , I )  ,  D E LT A U N  ( U N , I  ) ‘ U N L IN C O  ( U N , I  )“ ( ( T E T A U N ( I ) - 1 ) / T E T A U N ( I ) ) ) ;L F U N ( I )  = LUNKO ( I  ) *  L U N C E S  ( I  ) *  *  ( T E TA U N  ( I  ) / ( 1  -T E T A U N  { ! ) ) ) ;L F S U N ( I )  = L F U N ( I )  “  (T E T A U N  ( I ) - 1 )  ;
P V O ( I )  = ( ( GA M M A LSK  ( I )  “ S I G M A ( I )  + GA M M A LU N  ( I  ) *  ‘ S IG M A  ( I  ) +( 1 -G A M M A L S K ( I ) -G A M M A L U N ( I ) ) *  ‘ S I G M A ( I ) ) “ ( 1 / ( 1 - S I G M A ( I ) ) )  ) /  A D ( I ) ;*  G E T  W A G E , R E N TW L S K I O  ( I )  = A D S ( I ) ‘ G A M M A L S K ( I ) * P V 0 ( I ) * (Y O  ( I ) / L S K I O ( I ) )  “ ( 1 / S I G M A ( I ) ) ;W LU N K O  ( I  ) = A D S  ( I  ) ‘ GAM MALUN ( I  ) ‘ PVO ( I )  ‘  ( YO  ( I  ) /LUN KO  ( I  ) ) *  *  ( 1 / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) ;R E N T O  ( I )  = A D S  ( I )  *  ( 1 -G A M M A L SK  ( I  ) -G A M M A L SK  ( I )  ) * P V 0  ( I  ) * ( YO ( I  ) /A K O  ( I  ) ) “  ( 1 / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) ;
*  G E T  T C ,  T R , F U N D S  T A R I F O  ( J )  = V A R I E (J ,  * D U T Y  * ) ;I C E E N E T  (J )  = V A R I E  ( J ,  ‘ IM P E C 1 5 *  ) ;IR O W N E T  (J )  = I M P O ( J )  -  IC E E N E T  ( J )  -  T A R I F O  ( J )  ;T A R E C O  ( J )  = V A R I E  (J , ■  T A R E U  * ) ;F U N D E C O ( J )  = V A R I E  ( J ,  ’ F U N D E U ' ) ;TA R R W O  (J )  = V A R I E  (J ,  'T A R R W  ) ;FU N D R W O  (J )  = T A R IF O  ( J )  -  ( T A R E C O  ( J )  ♦  F U N D E C O  (J )  ♦  TARRW O ( J )  ) ;= ( T A R E C O (J ) ♦  F U N D E C O ( J ) ) / ( P C O ( J ) ‘ I C E E N E T ( J ) ) ;= ( T A R R W O ( J) +  F U N D R W O ( J) ) / ( P R O ( J ) ‘ I R O W N E T ( J ) ) ;T C O ( J )  ♦  F E C O ( J ) ) ;T R O ( J )  ♦  F R W O ( J ) ) ;
T C O (J ) $ T  ( J )T R O (J ) $ T (J )PWMCO ( J )  = P C O ( J ) / ( 1  P W M R O ( J)  = P R O (J ) / ( 1
* G E T  C E TC E T O ( I  ) = V A R I E ( I , * C O M E X T A R I F ■ ) ;*  G E T  S H H KD E P A G R O  = 2 4 1 ;
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D E P R E C O  =  4 7 6 8 5  -  D E P A G R O ;P R O F I T O ( I ) = T E C O ( I ) * E C E E O ( I )  ;T R I N C O  = SUM  ( I ,  ARO ( I )  + P R O F IT O  ( I ) )  ♦  T G R O  ♦  TWRO -  D E P R E C O  -  ARO ( " A G R *  ) ; R I N C O ( H H )  =  H H IN C O M E ( H H , ’ C A P I T * )  -  H H IN C O M E ( H H , " R A G R " )  ;S H H R ( H H )  = R I N C O ( H H ) / T R I N C O ;  D I S P L A Y  S H H R ;S H H R A G R  ( HH ) =  HHIN C O M E (H H , " K A G R * ) / (  A R O ( * A G R " ) -  D E P A G R O  ) ;  D I S P L A Y  S H H R A G R  *  G E T  S H H L , D T A XH S R L I N O ( H H ,S R )  = H H IN C O M E (H H , S R ) ;H U N L I N O ( H H ,U N )  =  H H IN C O M E ( H H , U N ) ;F S R L I N C O ( S R )  =  S U M ( I , S K L I N C O ( S K , I ) )  ;F U N L I N C O  (U N ) = S U M ( I , U N L I N C O ( U N ,I ) )  ;S H H S R L  (H H , S R ) $ H S R L I N O (H H , S R ) = H S R L I N O (H H , S R ) / F S R L I N C O (S R ) ; D I S P L A Y  S H H S R L ; S H H U N L  ( H H , U N ) $ H U N L IN O  (H H , UN) =  H U N L IN O  (H H , U N ) / F U N L I N C O  (U N ) ; D I S P L A Y  S H H U N L ; T H G O ( H H )  =  H H I N C O M E ( H H ,* G O V ') ;T H W O (H H ) =  H H I N C O M E ( H H ,' R O W ) ;H R O (H H ) =  S U M ( S R ,H S R L I N O ( H H ,S R ) ) + S U M (U N , H U N L I N O (H H , U N ) ) + R I N C O ( H H )  + H H I N C O M E ( H H ,- R A G R * ) + T H G O (H H ) + T H W O (H H );
V A R I A B L E S
F R E E  V A R I A B L E ST H G (H H ) TH W (H H )H S (H H )G SWSZ ( J )TWG IN T A X  S R L A B ( S R )  UN L A B  (UN) A G C A P
G O V ER N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  T O  H O U S E H O L D S  R E M IT T A N C E S  FR O M  A B R O A D  H O U SH O L D  S A V I N G S  G O V ER N M E N T  S A V I N G S  F O R E IG N  S A V I N G SIN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N  G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  A B R O A D  I N D I R E C T  T A X  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  N E T  O F  E X P O R T S  A G G R E G A T E  S U P P L Y  O F  S R I L L E D  L A B O U R  A G G R E G A T E  S U P P L Y  O F  U N S R I L L E D  L A B O U R  A G G R E G A T E  S U P P L Y  O F  C A P I T A L* I N D I C A T O R  F O R  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO NU T I L I T Y  O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N  V A R IA B L E  ;P O S I T I V E  V A R I A B L EP R O F I T ( J )  V A T  T D  ( I )T C  (J )T R  (J )T E C ( J )P E  ( I )P E C ( I ) P E C W (V E R ) P E R ( I ) P V ( I )P ( J )P D  (J )PM (J )P C ( J )P R  (J )P Y ( I )W L S R I ( I )W L U N R ( I )W A G E S R ( S R )W A G E U N (U N )R E N TC P IX ( J )Y ( I )L S R I ( I )
P R O F I T SI N C R E A S E  I N  V A T  R A T EI N D I R E C T  T A X  O N  D O M E S T IC  C O N S U M P T IO NT A R I F F  R A T E  ON IM P O R T S  FROM  E CT A R I F F  R A T E  ON IM P O R T S  FROM  ROWT A R I F F  ON E X P O R T S  IM P O S E D  B Y  E CP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T SP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  E CW ORLD P R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  E CP R I C E  O F  E X P O R T S  T O  T H E  ROWN E T  O R  V A L U E  A D D E D  P R I C EC O M P O S IT E  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT Y  JD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  C O M M O D IT YD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R TD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T  FROM  E CD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  IM P O R T  FROM  ROWD O M E S T IC  P R I C E  O F  D O M E S T IC  O U T P U TC O M P O S IT E  WAGE -  S K I L L E DC O M P O S IT E  W AGE -  U N S K I L L E DW AGE B Y  S K I L L E D  C A T E G O R YW AGE B Y  U N S K I L L E D  C A T E G O R YR E N TC O N SU M E R  P R I C E  IN D E X  IN T E R M E D IA T E  IN P U T S  DEMAND D O M E S T IC  P R O D U C T IO N  O F  C O M P O S IT E  G O O D S  C O M P O S IT E  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R
L U N K ( I ) L S K ( S K , I )  L U N ( U N ,I ) A K  ( I  )D O ( I  )I M P ( J )I C E E ( J )I R O W ( J )Q ( J )E C E E ( I ) E R O W ( I )E  ( I  )F K I N CF S K L I N C ( S K )  F U N L I N C ( U N )  H R (H H ) H C M (H H )S A V
INVT D T HT A R I FD E P R E CT G KTWKRG C ( J )T G C O N  H C ( J )
C O M P O S IT E  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  L A B O U R  F O R C E  B Y  S K I L L E D  C A T E G O R Y  L A B O U R  F O R C E  B Y  U N S K I L L E D  C A T E G O R Y  O P E R A T IN G  S U R P L U S  D O M E S T IC  D E M A N D  O F  C O M M O D IT IE S  IM P O R T SIM P O R T  F R O M  C E E  IM P O R T  FR O M  ROW C O M P O S IT E  C O M M O D IT Y  E X P O R T S  T O W A R D S C E E  E X P O R T S  T O W A R D S ROW T O T A L  E X P O R T SNON A G R I C U L T U R A L  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  H O U S E H O L D  IN C O M E  H O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  M A T R IX  A G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G S  A G G R E G A T E  IN V E S T M E N T  ON J  D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON H O U SE H O L D  IN C O M E  T A R I F F S  O N  IM P O R T S  D E P R E C I A T I O NN E T  G O V E R N M E N T  T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M S  N E T  ROW T R A N S F E R S  T O  C A P I T A L - F I R M S  G O V E R N M E N T  IN C O M E  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO N  T O T A L  G O V E R N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO N  H O U S E H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N ;
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* *  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n sO U T P U T ( I ) A G S K L A B ( I )A G U N L A B ( I ) A G G K A P ( I ) S K L A B D E M ( S K , I )  U N L A B D E M (U N , I )
G R O S S  D O M E S T I C  O U T P U T  A G G R E G A T E  D E M A N D  F O R  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  A G G R E G A T E  D E M A N D  F O R  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  A G G R E G A T E  C A P I T A L  DEMAND S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  DEM AND F U N C T IO N  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  DEM AND F U N C T IO N* *  T R A D E  E Q U A T I O N SA R M IN G T O N (T )  A R M IN G T O N T ( N T )  C O S T M I N ( T )  A R M IN G IM P ( T )  C O M I M P ( T )C E T ( I )
A R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  T R A D A B L E S  A R M IN G T O N  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  N O N T R A D A B L E S  C O S T  M I N I M I Z A T I O N  F O R  C O M P O S IT E  GOO D  C E S  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  IM P O R T S  C O S T  M I N I M I Z A T I O N  F O R  C O M P O S IT E  IM P O R T  C E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  T R A D A B L E S
C E T N T ( N T )  E S U P P L Y ( I ) E X P O R T ( I ) E X P C E T ( I )* *  I n c o m e  E q u a t i o n sP R O F I T S ( I )  F A C K I N C  F A C S K L I N C ( S K )  F A C U N L IN C ( U N )  H H I N C ( H H )* *  T a x  e q u a t i o n sD I R T HV A T T A X ( J )I N D T A XT A R I F F SG Y D E F
C E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  N O N T R A D A B L E S  E X P O R T  S U P P L Y  F U N C T IO N  T O T A L  E X P O R T SC E T  S P E C I F I C A T I O N  F O R  E X P O R T S
R E N T S  ON V E R sNON A G R IC U L T U R A L  C A P I T A L  IN C O M E  S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  IN C O M E  H O U SE H O L D  IN C O M E
D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON H O U SE H O L D  IN C O M EI N D I R E C T  T A X E S  ON V A L U E  A D D E D  (C O N S U M P T IO N  D E F I N I T I O N )  C O N S U M P T IO N  T A X  ON P E T R O L E U M  P R O D U C T S  T A R I F F  ON IM P O R T S  G O V ER N M E N T  IN C O M E* *  S a v i n g s  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n sS A V D E F  A G G R E G A T E  S A V I N G SH H S D E F ( H H )  H O U S E H O L D S  S A V I N G SG S D E F  G O V E R N M E N T  S A V I N G SZ D E F ( J )  IN V E S T M E N T  B Y  S E C T O R  O F  O R I G I N* *  E x p e n d i t u r e  E q u a t i o n s IN T E R M E D IA T E  DEMAND P E T R O L E U M  IN T E R M E D IA T E  DEM A N D H O U SE H O L D  C O N S U M P T IO N  G O V ER N M E N T  C O N S U M P T IO N
I N T D E F ( J )IN T P D E FH H C D E F ( J )G O V C D E F ( J )* *  M a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n sS K L A B M ARKT UN L A B M A R K T  C A P M A R K TG O O D E Q ( J )B O P E QS A V I N V E Q
S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  M ARK ET E Q U I L I B R I U M  U N S K I L L E D  L A B O U R  M ARK ET E Q U I L I B R I U M  C A P I T A L  M A R K E T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  G O O D S  M A R K ET E Q U I L I B R I U M  B A L A N C E  O F  P A Y M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M  S A V I N G S  IN V E S T M E N T  E Q U I L I B R I U M* *  O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o nO B J O B J E C T I V E  F U N C T IO N  ;* *  E Q U A T I O N  A S S IG N M E N T
P r i c e  E q u a t i o n sA B S O R P T N (J ) . .  P M D E F ( J ) . .  P C D E F ( J ) . .  P R D E F ( J ) . .P Y D E F ( I ) . .P E D E F ( I ) $ T ( I ) . .  P E C D E F ( V E R ) . .  P E R D E F ( I ) $ T ( I ) .
P ( J ) * Q ( J )  = E =  (1 ♦  V A T * T D (J ) ) * ( P M (J ) *  IM P  (J )  ♦  P D ( J ) * D O ( J ) ) ;  P M ( J ) * I M P ( J )  = E =  P C ( J ) * I C E E ( J )  ♦  P R  (J ) * IR O W (J ) ;P C ( J )  = E =  PW MCO(J ) * ( 1  ♦  T C (J ) ) ;P R (J )  = E =  PWMRO(J ) * ( 1  ♦  T R (J ) ) ;P Y ( I ) * Y ( I ) = E =  P D ( I ) * D O ( I ) ♦  P E ( I ) * E  ( Z  ) ;P E (I) = E =  ( P E C (I ) * E C E E (I ) ♦  P E R ( I ) * E R O W ( I ) )/E(I);P E C ( V E R )  = E =  P E C W ( V E R ) / ( l + T E C ( V E R ) ) ;P E R ( I ) = E =  P E R W O ( I ) ;
P V A D E F ( I ) . . P V ( I )  = E =  ( ( ( G AM M A LSK  ( I  ) “ S IG M A  ( I  ) > ‘ W L S K I  ( I  ) * *  { 1 - S I G M A  ( I  ) )( GAM MALUN ( I  ) “ S I G M A ( I )  ) ‘ W L U N K ( I ) “  ( l - S I G M A ( I )  ) + ( ( 1 -G A M M A L S K  ( I )  -G A M M A L U N  ( I )  ) “ S IG M A  ( I )  ) ‘ R E N T *  *  ( 1 - S I G M A  ( I  ) ) ) “ ( 1 / ( l - S I G M A ( I ) ) ) ) / A D ( I )  ;W A G E S K D E F ( I ) . .  W A G E U N D E F ( I ) . .  C P I N D E X . .
W L S K I ( I ) W L U N K ( I ) C P I  = E =
= E =  S U M (S K , W A G E S K ( S K ) *  L S K ( S K , I ) = E =  S U M (U N , W A G E U N (U N ) *  L U N (U N , I ) S U M (J , P D ( J ) * D O O ( J ) ) / S U M ( J , P D O ( J )
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* ‘  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  F a c t o r  I n p u t s  E q u a t i o n s  “  F i r s t  s t a g eO U T P U T  ( I  ) .  .  Y  ( I  ) = E =  A D  ( I  ) *  (G A M M A LSK  ( I  ) * L S K I  ( I  ) “  ( ( S I G M A  ( I  ) - 1  ) / S I G M A  ( I  ) ) +GAM MALUN ( I  ) * L U N K ( I )  “  ( ( S I G M A  ( I  ) - 1  ) / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) + ( l - G A M M A L S K ( I ) - G A M M A L U N  ( I )  ) * A K ( I ) “ ( ( S I G M A  { I  ) - 1  ) / S IG M A  ( I  ) ) )“ ( S I G M A ( I ) / ( S I G M A ( I ) - 1 ) ) ;“  S e c o n d  s t a g eA G S K L A B ( I ) . . L S K I ( I ) = E = Y  '( i : 1 * (A D S ( I ] 1‘ G A M M A L S K ( I ) ‘ P V ( I )  / W L S K I ( I )  ) “ S I G M A ( I )A G U N L A B ( I ) . . L U N K ( I ) = E = Y  i( I ! 1 * (A D S i( I ) i ‘ GAM MALUN ( I  ) * P V  ( I  ) /W L U N K  ( I  ) ) “ S IG M A  ( I  )A G G K A P ( I ) . . A K  ( I  ) = E =  Y ( I ) * ( A D S ( I ) ( 1 -G A M M A L S K  ( I )  -G A M M A L U N  ( I )  ) * P V ( I )  / R E N T )“ S I G M A ( I ) ;“  T h i r d  s t a g eS K L A B D E M ( S K , I ) . .L S K ( S K , I ) = E =  L F S S K ( I ) * L S K I ( I ) ‘( D E L T A S K ( S K , I ) ‘ W L S K I ( I ) / W A G E S K ( S K  ) ) *  * T E T A S K ( I  ) ;U N L A B D E M ( U N ,I ) . .L U N ( U N ,I ) = E =  L F S U N ( I ) *  L U N K ( I ) *( D E L T A U N (U N , I ) ‘ W L U N K ( I ) / W A G E U N ( U N ) ) “ T E T A U N ( I ) ;“  T r a d e  E q u a t i o n sA R M IN G T O N  ( T )  .  .  Q ( T )  = E =  ARM (T ) *  ( B E T A  ( T ) ‘ IM P  (T ) “  ( ( E P S I  ( T ) - 1  ) / E P S I  (T )  ) +( 1 - B E T A (T ) ) ‘ D O ( T )  * * (  ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 ) / E P S I  (T ) ) ) “ ( E P S I ( T ) / ( E P S I ( T ) - 1 )  ) ;A R M IN G T O N T ( N T )  .  .  Q ( N T )  = E =  DO (N T ) ;C O S T M IN  ( T )  .  . IM P  ( T )  / D O  (T )  = E =  ( P D  (T )  / PM (T ) * B E T A  (T ) / ( 1 - B E T A  (T )  ) ) *  *  E P S I  (T )A R M IN G IM P  ( T )  . . IM P  (T ) = E =  ARMM (T ) * ( A L F A  (T ) ‘ I C E E  (T )  “  ( ( E P S I M  (T )  - 1  ) / E P S I M  (T )  ) ♦  ( l - A L F A ( T )  ) ‘ IR O W  ( T )  “  ( ( E P S I M ( T )  - 1 )  / E P S I M ( T )  ) ) “  ( E P S I M ( T )  / ( E P S I M ( T )  - 1 )  )C O M IM P  (T )  . .  I C E E ( T ) / I R O W ( T )  = E =  ( P R  (T )  / P C  (T )  ‘ A L F A  ( T )  / ( 1 - A L F A  ( T )  ) ) *  * E P S I M  (T )
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“  S a v i n g s  a n d  I n v e s t m e n t  E q u a t i o n sS A V D E F . . S A V  = E =  D E P R E C  + D E P A G R O  + S U M ( H H ,H S ( H H ) ) + G S  + W S ;H H S D E F ( H H ) . . H S ( H H )  = E =  M P S H (H H ) * ( 1 - D T A X ( H H ) ) ‘ H R ( H H ) ;G S D E F . . G S  = E =  R  -  T G C O N  -  S U M ( H H ,T H G ( H H ) ) -  TWG -  T G K ;Z D E F ( I ) . . ( 1 + T D O  ( I ) ) * Z ( I )  = E =  K S H R ( I ) * I N V ;
* *  E x p e n d i t u r e  E q u a t i o n sI N T D E F ( J ) $ I N D ( J ) . .  I N T P D E F . . X ( J )  = E =  S U M ( I , A ( J , I ) * Y ( I ) ) ;( 1 + T D O ( " P E T R ' ) ) * X ( " P E T R ' ) = E =  S U M ( I , A ( " P E T R ' , I ) * Y ( I ) ) ;H H C D E F ( J ) . . H C ( J )  = E =  S U M ( H H ,H B S ( J ,H H ) * ( 1 - M P S H ( H H ) ) * ( 1 - D T A X ( H H ) ) *  
H R ( H H ) ) / » ( J ) ;G O V C D E F (J ) . . ( 1 + T D O  ( J ) ) ‘ G C ( J )  = E =  G B S ( J ) ‘ T G C O N ;
“  M a r k e t  C l e a r i n g  C o n d i t i o n sS K L A B M A R K T (S K ) . .  U N L A B M A R K T (U N ) . . S K L A B ( S K )  = E =  S U M ( I , L S K ( S K , I ) ) ;  U N L A B ( U N )  = E =  S U M ( I , L U N ( U N , I ) ) ;* U N L A B M A R K T ( *  F a r m " ) . .  U N L A B ( " F a r m *  ) = E =  S U M ( I ,L U N ( ' F a r m ' , I ) ) ;C A P M A R K T .. A G C A P  = E =  S U M ( I , A K ( I ) ) ;G O O D E Q ( I ) . . Q ( I ) = E =  H C ( I ) + G C ( I ) + Z ( I )  ♦  X ( I ) ;B O P E Q . . S U M ( I , P E C ( I ) * E C E E ( I ) ) + S U M ( I , P E R ( I ) *E R O W ( I ) )  ♦SUM  ( I , P E C  { I ) ‘ T E C ( I ) * E C E E ( I ) ) + TWK + WS + S U M (H H , T H W ( H H ) ) = E =  S U M ( J ,  PWMCO ( J )  * I C E E ( J )  ) ♦  S U M (J ,P W M R O (J ) * I R O W (J ) ) ♦  TWG
SAVINVEQ.. SAV =E= INV ;
* *  O b j e c t i v e  F u n c t i o nO B J . . U T I L I T Y  = E =  1 ;* M O D E L  S E T U P  -  I N I T I A L I Z A T I O NP R O F I T . L ( I )  = P R O F I T 0 ( I ) ;V A T .L  =  1 ;T H G .L ( H H )  =  T H G O ( H H ) ;T H W .L ( H H )  = T H W O ( H H );T W G .L  = 6 2 7 3 ;T G K . L  =  T G K O ;T W K .L  =  T W K O ;H S .L ( H H )  = H S O ( H H ) ;D E P R E C .L  = D E P R E C O ;F K I N C . L  =  T K I N C O ;F S K L I N C .L ( S K )  =  F S K L I N C O ( S K ) ;F U N L I N C . L (U N ) =  F U N L I N C O ( U N ) ;H R .L ( H H )  =  H R O ( H H ) ;H C M .L ( H H )  =  S U M (J , H C M O (J , H H ) ) ;H C . L ( J )  =  H C O ( J ) ;W S .L  =  1 2 8 5 9  ;I N V . L  =  I N V O ;S A V . L  =  1 0 2 6 0 8 ;G C . L ( J )  =  G C O ( J ) ;T G C O N .L  =  T G C  0 ;E C E E . L ( I )  = E C E E O ( I ) ;  E R O W .L ( I )  =  E R O W O { I ) ;  E . L ( I )  =  E 0 ( I ) ;G S . L  = - 1 1 9 5 5 ;Z . L ( J )  =  Z O ( J ) ;X .  L ( J )  =  X O ( J ) ;Y .  L ( I ) = Y O ( I ) ;L S K . L ( S K , I )  =  S K L I N C O ( S K , I ) ; L U N .L ( U N ,I )  =  U N L I N C O ( U N , I ) ;L S K I . L ( I )  =  L S K I O ( I ) ;  L U N K . L ( I )  =  L U N K O ( I ) ;S K L A B .L ( S K )  =  S U M ( I , L S K . L (S K , I ) ) ;  U N L A B .L ( U N )  = S U M <I , L U N . L (U N , I ) ) ;  A K . L ( I ) =  A K O ( I ) ;A G C A P . L  =  S U M ( I , A K O ( I ) ) ;D O . L ( J )  = D O O ( J ) ;I M P . L ( J )  = I M P O ( J ) ;  I C E E . L ( J )  = I C E E O ( J ) ; I R O W . L ( J )  =  I R O W O ( J ) ;Q .  L ( J )  = Q O ( J ) ;T D T H .L  = S U M (H H , H T A X O (H H ) ) ;I N T A X . L ( J )  = I N D T A X O (J ) ;T A R I F . L  = S U M ( J , T A R E C O ( J )  + T A R R W O (J )  + F U N D R W O (J)  ♦  F U N D E C O (J ) ) ;  T E C . L ( I )  = T E C O ( I ) ;T C .  L ( J )  =  T C O O ( J ) ;  T R . L ( J )  =  T R O O ( J ) ;T D .  L ( I ) =  T D O ( I ) ;R .  L  = 5 2 5 2 0 ;C P I . L  = 1 ;  P E . L ( I )  = P E O ( I ) ;  P E C . L ( I ) = P E C O ( I ) ;  P E R . L ( I )  = P E R O ( I ) ;  P E C W .L ( V E R )  = P E C W O (V E R )  ;P . L ( J )  = P O (J ) ; P D . L ( J )  = P D O ( J ) ;  P M . L ( J )  =  P M O (J ) ; P Y . L ( I )  =  P Y O ( I ) ;P C .  L ( J )  = P C O ( J ) ;  P R . L ( J )  =  P R O (J ) ; P V . L ( I )  = P V O ( I ) ;  W A G E S K .L ( S K )  = W A G E U N .L ( U N )  = 1 ;  W L S K I . L ( I )  = 1 ;  W L U N K .L ( I )  = 1 ;R E N T .L  = 1 ;  P . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P C . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P R . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;P D .  L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P M . L O ( J )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P Y . L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P E . L O ( I ) = 0 . 0 1 ;  P E C . L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P E R . L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P E C W .L O ( V E R )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  P V . L O ( I )  = 0 W A G E S K .L O ( S K )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  W A G E U N . L O (U N ) = 0 . 0 1 ;  W L S K I .L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  W L U N K .L O ( I )  = 0 . 0 1 ;  R E N T . L O  = 0 . 0 1 ;
♦ C L O S U R E  R U L E SC P I . F X  = C P I . L ;P E C W .F X ( V E R )  = P E C W .L ( V E R )  ; P E C .F X ( N V E R )  = P E C .L ( N V E R )  ;P E C . F X ( ‘ C O N S  * )  = P E C . L ( ’ C O N S * ) ;  T C . F X ( J )  = T C . L ( J ) f  T R . F X ( J )  = T R . L ( J ) ;
1;
.0 1;
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T E C . F X ( I ) = T E C . L ( I ) ;T D . F X ( J )  = T D . L ( J ) ;T H G . F X (H H ) = T H G . L (H H ) ;T H W .F X ( H H )  = T H W .L ( H H ) ;T W G .F X  = T W G .L ;T G K . F X  = T G K . L ;T W K .F X  = T W K .L ;D E P R E C .F X  = D E P R E C .L ;I M P . F X (N T ) = 0 ;I C E E .F X ( N T )  = 0 ;I R O W .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;E .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;E C E E .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;E R O W .F X ( N T )  =  0 ;L S K . F X (S K , I ) $ ( D E L T A S K (S K , I ) E Q  0 )  = 0 ;  L U N . F X  (U N , I ) $ (D E L T A U N  (U N , I ) E Q  0 ) = 0 ;  W S .F X  = W S .L  ;G S . F X  =  G S . L ;I N V . F X  = I N V . L ;
F i x e d  w a g e sW A G E S K . F X (S K ) =  W A G E S K . L (S K ) ;W A G E U N . F X ( " S a l e ’ ) = W A G EU N . L ( " S a l e " ) ;  W A G E U N . F X (■ S e r v " )  =  W AG EU N . L ( “ S e r v ■ ) ;  W A G E U N . F X  ( "N  f a r i n ' ) = W AG EU N . L  ( '  N  f  a r m ' ) ; W A G E U N .F X ( ' O t h e r ' ) = W AG EU N . L (*  O t h e r ' ) ;U N L A B . F X ( ' F a r m ' ) =  U N L A B . L ( ' F a r m ' ) ;
F l e x i b l e  w a g e sS K L A B . F X (S K ) U N L A B . F X (U N ) S K L A B .L ( S K ) ; U N L A B .L ( U N ) ;
A G C A P .F X  =  A G C A P .L ;T G C O N .F X  = T G C O N .L ;M O D E L T U R K A G 9 0  S Q U A R E  B A S E  M ODEL / A L L  / ; S O L V E  T U R K A G 9 0  M A X I M I Z I N G  U T I L I T Y  U S I N G  N L P ;
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Appendix 4.D Results of the sensitivity analysis
The figures reported in this appendix arise from the sensitivity analysis o f  the model to 
the elasticities values. The columns, which are stated “low”, show the counterfactual in 
the case o f all elasticities divided by factor two. The columns, which are stated “high”, 
show the counterfactual in the case o f  all elasticities multiplied by factor two. The 
columns, which are stated “standard”, show the counterfactual with the regular 
elasticities as reported in the main text.
Table 4.D1 The impact on output (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Sectors__________ Standard_____Low High Standard_____Low High
Agriculture
Mining
Food processed products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Textiles
Wearing apparel 
Leather and fur products 
Footwear
Wood and wood products 
Chemical products 
Petroleum and coal products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Metal products 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electricity, gas and waterworks 
Construction
Trade, restaurants and hotels 
Transport and communication 
Other services
Leysperes Quantity Index
97.8 97.4 95.8
99.7 97.3 108.9
103.6 100.2 104.6
107.0 104.8 113.9
115.0 111.2 94.1
94.3 108.4 109.7
138.1 120.6 177.5
107.8 100.2 83.2
101.0 97.0 104.4
103.3 101.6 110.0
89.3 93.0 92.7
103.9 99.8 108.0
108.8 101.4 114.4
101.3 100.6 104.8
101.6 101.2 104.1
99.2 98.5 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
100.2 101.1 103.0
101.2 102.2 102.4
99.1 99.2 98.1
101.7 100.5 101.8
102.6 101.5 99.5
99.1 101.4 101.2
103.6 110.0 111.3
105.3 102.4 111.5
98.8 96.7 102.9
121.5 94.6 98.5
175.6 138.2 146.5
106.2 99.3 80.8
99.2 100.1 102.1
105.8 101.3 103.1
88.3 94.6 93.0
101.8 97.7 104.4
107.7 104.5 101.7
100.6 98.5 99.2
100.8 100.4 100.0
96.6 96.0 96.6
100.0 100.0 100.0
97.3 96.4 94.1
100.3 105.9 108.2
97.4 97.0 96.9
100.7 100.5 100.8
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T able 4 .D 2 The im pact on exports to the EU (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Sectors Standard Low Hif>h Standard Low High
Agriculture 84.6 91.2 64.9 110.1 102.4 84.6
Mining 126.6 104.5 175.1 128.3 124.7 126.5
Food processed products 110.4 100.3 112.9 109.9 124.7 145.2
Beverages and tobacco 154.1 112.3 396.8 150.7 108.5 387.2
Textiles 148.2 127.3 103.4 102.6 101.5 130.6
Wearing apparel 108.7 125.9 163.6 162.7 103.3 140.6
Leather and fur products 222.3 150.0 378.9 317.2 212.2 278.4
Footwear 186.1 107.3 394.2 182.2 106.5 378.9
Wood and wood products 137.1 97.0 298.2 130.5 111.2 276.0
Chemical products 136.4 111.6 217.6 146.1 111.6 189.7
Petroleum and coal products 44.4 68.7 86.8 41.7 70.5 84.0
Non-metallic mineral products 146.1 105.8 233.6 135.2 96.3 203.6
Metal products 129.0 104.2 147.9 126.4 116.3 111.1
Machinery 122.5 105.8 181.1 121.4 98.6 147.7
Transport equipment 149.2 115.1 253.2 148.3 113.3 227.6
Electricity, gas and waterworks 55.9 81.6 34.5 48.9 68.8 26.6
Trade, restaurants and hotels 98.1 101.8 108.8 89.2 90.7 68.8
Transport and communication 104.2 106.6 107.2 103.3 117.8 138.8
Other services 96.2 99.5 82.0 90.5 92.0 78.3
Leysperes Quantity Index 116.6 111.1 127.6 114.2 106.0 128.3
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T able 4 .D 3 The impact on exports to the RoW  (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Sectors Standard Low High Standard Low High
Agriculture 84.6 91.2 64.9 110.1 102.4 84.6
Mining 126.6 104.5 175.1 128.3 124.7 126.5
Food processed products 110.4 100.3 112.9 109.9 124.7 145.2
Beverages and tobacco 154.1 112.3 396.8 150.7 108.5 387.2
Textiles 116.1 112.7 63.5 80.4 89.9 80.2
Wearing apparel 54.0 88.8 40.4 80.9 72.9 34.8
Leather and fur products 222.3 150.0 378.9 317.2 212.2 278.4
Footwear 186.1 107.3 394.2 182.1 106.5 378.9
Wood and wood products 137.1 97.0 298.2 130.5 111.2 276.0
Chemical products 136.4 111.6 217.6 146.1 111.6 189.7
Petroleum and coal products 44.4 68.7 86.8 41.7 70.5 84.0
Son-metallic mineral products 146.1 105.8 233.6 135.2 96.3 203.6
Metal products 129.0 104.2 147.9 126.4 116.3 111.1
Machinery 122.5 105.8 181.1 121.4 98.6 147.7
Transport equipment 149.2 115.1 253.2 148.3 113.3 227.6
Electricity, gas and waterworks 55.9 81.6 34.5 48.9 68.8 26.6
Trade, restaurants and hotels 98.1 101.8 108.8 89.2 90.7 68.8
Transport and communication 104.2 106.6 107.2 103.3 117.8 138.8
Other services 96.2 99.5 82.0 90.5 92.0 78.3
Leysperes Quantity Index 108.4 103.6 128.9 109.1 108.2 125.8
Table 4.D4 The impact on the value added (Base year = 1(H))
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Standard Low High Standard Low High
GDP in real terms 100.9 100.5 102.2 100.5 100.3 101.2
- Agriculture 94.6 95.4 92.0 102.5 99.9 96.0
- Industry 105.4 102.4 108.0 104.1 101.9 106.3
- Services 99.1 100.5 100.5 96.8 99.1 98.6
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T able 4.D5 The im pact on the trade flows (Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Standard Low_____ High Standard Low_____ High
Trade balance deficit
Trade balance deficit with the EU
Trade balance deficit with the RoW
Trade volume/GDP
Volume of exports 
Volume of exports to the EU 
Volume of exports to the RoW
Volume of imports
Volume of imports from the EU
Volume of imports from the RoW
Volume of exports in agriculture 
Volume of exports in industry 
Volume of exports in services
Volume of imports in agriculture 
Volume of imports in industry 
Volume of imports in services
100.0 100.0 100.0
105.1 77.5 322.2
99.5 102.4 76.1
110.2 106.1 121.6
113.0 107.7 128.2
116.6 111.1 127.6
108.4 103.6 128.9
109.8 105.8 121.3
116.0 109.3 138.1
104.8 103.1 107.9
84.6 91.2 64.9
125.8 112.3 153.1
101.1 104.2 106.1
108.7 102.2 127.3
110.5 106.4 122.4
100.1 98.9 100.8
100.0 100.0 100.0
138.0 152.8 299.3
95.9 94.3 78.5
109.7 105.7 121.9
111.9 107.0 127.1
114.2 106.0 128.3
109.1 108.2 125.8
109.0 105.3 120.5
115.5 108.6 137.5
103.8 102.7 106.9
110.1 102.4 84.6
125.1 108.7 147.9
96.8 105.5 107.5
97.3 100.9 112.1
110.0 105.9 122.1
100.7 98.0 100.5
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Table 4 .D 6 The im pact on the welfare of urban households
Unit of 
measure
Income class
Standard
Fixed wages 
Low High
Flexible wages 
Standard Low High
1st group 16.3 2.1 52.8 2.8 -0.5 11.2
2nd group 215.5 116.3 448.4 103.0 26.2 228.2
3rd group 180.5 79.1 481.2 -0.2 - 82.9 152.1
B 4th group 185.8 103.1 506.9 - 33.0 -93.2 158.5
i 5th group 166.3 101.2 467.1 - 66.6 -91.2 147.0
1 6th group 145.0 99.9 422.5 - 79.0 - 85.1 132.4
1 7th group 114.2 89.8 414.0 - 142.5 - 129.9 109.9
i 8th group 61.7 48.9 332.1 - 163-3 - 150.9 64.7
o 9th group 106.0 96.6 360.0 - 107.8 - 102.6 102.6
n 10th group 84.5 77.8 290.1 -91.9 -83.4 88.8
s 11th group 111.8 111.0 547.6 - 278.8 - 247.7 120.6
12th group 127.7 122.3 482.4 - 176.1 - 172.0 137.0
o 13 th group 13.2 25.7 323.5 - 242.6 - 224.3 45.2
r 14th group 38.1 36.9 297.6 - 187.9 - 181.4 45.8
15th group 33.1 31.6 217.0 - 132.9 - 146.3 22.9
T 16th group 189.2 210.4 754.0 - 317.3 - 308.3 181.1
L 17th group 161.7 146.0 448.9 -95.7 - 119.7 154.6
18th group 635.7 595.2 1246.8 24.1 - 68.9 503.5
19th group 31.4 50.3 203.7 - 155.7 - 144.7 -0.8
20th group 141.7 138.3 252.1 6.2 - 26.3 82.2
1st group 101.3 100.2 104.1 100.2 100.0 100.9
% 2nd group 102.9 101.6 106.0 101.4 100.4 103.1
3rd group 101.4 100.6 103.8 100.0 99.3 101.2
H 4th group 101.4 100.8 103.8 99.8 99.3 101.2
o 5 th group 101.3 100.8 103.6 99.5 99.3 101.1
u 6th group 101.2 100.9 103.6 99.3 99.3 101.1
s 7th group 100.9 100.7 103.4 98.8 98.9 100.9
e 8th group 100.6 100.5 103.2 98.4 98.5 100.6
h 9th group 101.1 101.0 103.9 98.8 98.9 101.1
o 10th group 101.1 101.1 103.9 98.8 98.9 101.2
1 11th group 100.7 100.7 103.7 98.1 98.3 100.8
d 12th group 101.0 101.0 103.9 98.6 98.6 101.1
13th group 100.1 100.3 103.3 97.5 97.7 100.5
i 14th group 100.5 100.5 103.8 97.6 97.7 100.6
n 15th group 100.6 100.5 103.8 97.7 97.5 100.4
c 16th group 101.1 101.2 104.2 98.2 98.3 101.0
o 17th group 101.9 101.7 105.2 98.9 98.6 101.8
m 18th group 103.6 103.4 107.0 100.1 99.6 102.8
e 19th group 100.5 100.8 103.4 97.4 97.6 100.0
20th group 104.4 104.3 107.9 100.2 99.2 102.6
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Table 4.D7 The im pact on the welfare of rural households
Unit of 
measure
Income class
Standard
Fixed wages 
Low High
Flexible wages 
Standard Low High
1st group 3.2 - 12.2 20.8 31.6 25.3 18.0
2nd group - 1.8 -52.6 46.3 127.7 95.4 65.5
3rd group 58.1 -27.6 151.8 222.6 152.6 168.2
B 4th group 29.7 - 78.1 78.1 311.2 213.2 191.6
i 5 th group - 32.1 - 114.0 - 19.4 285.2 200.4 141.3
1 6th group - 22.7 - 107.9 - 35.6 302.2 208.2 140.7
1 7th group -4.0 -92.5 -49.6 301.0 218.9 136.5
i 8 th group - 38.1 -91.9 -92.2 232.7 190.3 89.3
o 9th group - 58.8 - 107.8 - 113.2 214.6 181.4 67.6
n 1 Oth group - 38.7 -73.7 -91.1 162.0 117.3 50.0
s 11th group - 113.0 - 160.1 -231.3 346.1 301.3 88.6
12th group -43.8 - 89.6 -89.9 206.9 165.4 72.7
o 13th group 31.3 14.3 42.9 102.0 83.2 69.8
f 14th group 76.0 41.4 114.6 98.5 65.3 96.2
15th group 25.5 10.1 40.9 60.5 46.9 51.3
T 16th group 38.6 30.5 53.7 98.6 90.6 71.6
L 17th group 16.0 - 14.1 -21.6 168.1 104.3 57.3
18 th group 50.8 31.9 59.3 97.3 51.0 56.4
19th group 14.8 16.8 20.1 - 7.3 -2.5 3.2
1st group 100.2 99.2 101.4 102.1 101.7 101.2
% 2nd group 100.0 99.2 100.7 102.0 101.5 101.0
3rd group 100.5 99.7 101.4 102.1 101.4 101.6
H 4th group 100.2 99.4 100.6 102.4 101.7 101.5
o 5th group 99.8 99.1 99.8 102.2 101.6 101.1
u 6th group 99.8 99.0 99.7 102.7 101.9 101.3
s 7 th group 100.0 99.0 99.5 103.1 102.3 101.4
e 8th group 99.5 98.9 98.9 102.8 102.3 101.1
h 9 th group 99.2 98.6 98.5 102.8 102.4 100.9
o 1 Oth group 99.2 98.5 98.1 103.4 102.4 101.0
1 11th group 99.0 98.6 97.9 103.1 102.7 100.8
d 12th group 99.4 98.7 98.7 102.9 102.3 101.0
13th group 100.7 100.3 101.0 102.4 102.0 101.6
i 14th group 101.5 100.8 102.2 101.9 101.3 101.9
n 15th group 101.0 100.4 101.6 102.3 101.8 102.0
c 16th group 100.6 100.5 100.9 101.6 101.5 101.2
o 17th group 100.3 99.7 99.6 103.5 102.2 101.2
m 18th group 101.1 100.7 101.2 102.0 101.1 101.2
e 19th group 101.9 102.1 102.5 99.1 99.7 100.4
208
Table 4.D8 The im pact on  aggregate welfare
Unit of Region Fixed wages Flexible wages
measure
Standard Low High Standard Low High
Turkey 2750.3 1405.5 8433.3 1226.3 75.4 4123.5
Billions of Urban 2759.3 2282.5 8548.6 -2135.2 - 2433.2 2487.6
1990 TL
Rural -9.1 - 877.0 - 115.3 3361.4 2508.6 1635.9
Turkey 100.8 100.4 102.6 100.4 100.0 101.3
°7c of household Urban 101.4 101.1 104.2 99.1 98.9 101.3
income
Rural 100.0 99.3 100.0 102.5 101.9 101.2
T ab le  4.D9 The im pact on the size distribution of income
(Base year = 100)
Generalised 
Entropy Index
Inequality Fixed wages
Standard Low High
Flexible wages 
Standard Low High
Overall inequality 100.5 101.3 101.5 98.0 98.4 99.8
-1 Within urban group 99.9 100.8 100.8 98.2 98.7 99.8
Within rural group 99.7 100.2 98.1 100.7 100.7 99.7
Between groups 107.5 109.8 123.8 82.3 84.5 100.1
Overall inequality 100.7 101.4 101.8 98.2 98.6 100.0
0 Within urban group 100.3 100.9 101.0 98.8 99.1 100.1
Within rural group 100.1 100.6 99.0 100.4 100.4 99.8
Between groups 107.4 109.7 123.3 82.5 84.7 100.1
Overall inequality 101.5 102.1 103.1 98.2 98.4 100.3
+ 1 Within urban group 101.0 101.5 101.7 99.5 99.5 100.5
Within rural group 100.7 101.2 100.1 99.9 100.0 99.9
Between groups 106.5 107.9 115.3 89.7 91.5 100.6
Overall inequality 103.6 104.4 106.4 97.8 97.7 101.0
+ 2 Within urban group 102.7 103.2 103.5 100.4 99.0 101.2
Within rural group 101.7 102.5 101.7 98.8 99.0 99.7
Between groups 107.3 109.6 123.0 82.7 84.9 100.1
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Table 4.D10 The im pact on the functional distribution o f incom e
(Base year = 100)
Fixed wages Flexible wages
Standard Low High Standard Low High
A -Capital income 100.7 101.0 101.2 99.1 99.6 100.2
- Agricultural income 97.2 96.8 94.0 103.7 102.4 99.6
- Non-agricultural income 101.5 101.9 102.8 98.1 99.0 100.3
B - Labour income 100.4 99.0 102.3 99.9 99.2 100.0
B.l - Skilled labour income 100.6 100.2 102.1 98.2 96.5 99.6
- Professional workers 100.3 100.0 101.5 97.9 95.8 99.4
- Managerial workers 101.5 100.7 103.4 99.0 97.9 100.1
- Clerical workers 100.6 100.3 102.5 98.2 96.8 99.6
B.2 - Basic skilled labour income 101.8 101.0 104.7 99.5 98.8 100.2
- Sales workers 101.2 101.7 106.2 98.5 96.7 99.2
- Service workers 100.2 100.0 102.8 99.0 97.6 99.6
- Non agricultural workers 102.4 101.2 105.2 99.7 99.6 100.6
- Other workers 102.1 101.1 104.4 99.4 98.6 100.3
B.3 - No-skilled labour income 97.4 93.2 97.8 103.2 104.2 100.0
- Agricultural workers 91A 93.2 97.8 103.2 104.2 100.0
Basic skilled /  Skilled labour income 101.2 100.8 102.6 101.3 102.5 100.7
No-skilled/Skilled labour income 96.8 93.0 95.7 105.2 108.0 100.4
Basic skilled labour /  Capital income 101.1 100.0 103.4 100.4 99.2 100.1
No-skilled labour /  Capital income 96.7 92.3 96.6 104.2 104.6 99.8
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